In the 1970s tactical nuclear warfare was a topical issue. The
introduction of the new generation of tactical nuclear weapons into
Europe could have had disastrous consequences. These new weapons
had already been developed by nuclear-weapon laboratories and
pressures were growing for their deployment. On first sight,
smaller and more accurate nuclear weapons may seem more humane and
militarily preferable to the relatively high-yield tactical nuclear
weapons currently deployed. But some of these new types of weapons
would blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons
and their use would make escalation to strategic nuclear war
extremely likely. Indeed, the argument for these new weapons is
that their use in wartime is more credible (and therefore
'acceptable') than current types of tactical nuclear weapons. This
perception could easily lead to the exceedingly dangerous idea that
some types of tactical nuclear war were 'winnable'. The fact has to
be faced that any use of nuclear weapons is almost certain to
escalate until all available weapons are used. To believe otherwise
is to believe that one side will surrender before it has used all
the weapons in its arsenal. History shows that this is most
unlikely to happen. Because of its importance, SIPRI organized a
meeting to discuss the whole question. Originally published in
1978, this book is the outcome of that meeting.
General
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