Despite several decades of research on Supreme Court
decision-making by specialists in judicial politics, there is no
good answer to a key question: if each justice's behavior on the
Court were motivated solely by some kind of "liberal" or
"conservative" ideology, what patterns should be expected in the
Court's decision-making practices and in the Court's final
decisions? It is only when these patterns are identified in advance
that political scientists will be able to empirically evaluate
theories which assert that the justices' behavior is motivated by
the pursuit of their personal policy preferences. This book
provides the first comprehensive and integrated model of how
strategically rational Supreme Court justices should be expected to
behave in all five stages of the Court's decision-making process.
The authors' primary focus is on how each justice's wish to gain as
desirable a final opinion as possible will affect his or her
behavior at each stage of the decision-making process.
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