In brute-force struggles for survival, such as the two World
Wars, disorganization and divisions within an enemy alliance are to
one's own advantage. However, most international security politics
involve coercive diplomacy and negotiations short of all-out war.
"Worse Than a Monolith" demonstrates that when states are engaged
in coercive diplomacy--combining threats and assurances to
influence the behavior of real or potential adversaries--divisions,
rivalries, and lack of coordination within the opposing camp often
make it more difficult to prevent the onset of conflict, to prevent
existing conflicts from escalating, and to negotiate the end to
those conflicts promptly. Focusing on relations between the
Communist and anti-Communist alliances in Asia during the Cold War,
Thomas Christensen explores how internal divisions and lack of
cohesion in the two alliances complicated and undercut coercive
diplomacy by sending confusing signals about strength, resolve, and
intent. In the case of the Communist camp, internal mistrust and
rivalries catalyzed the movement's aggressiveness in ways that we
would not have expected from a more cohesive movement under
Moscow's clear control.
Reviewing newly available archival material, Christensen
examines the instability in relations across the Asian Cold War
divide, and sheds new light on the Korean and Vietnam wars.
While recognizing clear differences between the Cold War and
post-Cold War environments, he investigates how efforts to adjust
burden-sharing roles among the United States and its Asian security
partners have complicated U.S.-China security relations since the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
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