My interest in the issues considered here arose out of my great
frustration in trying to attack the all-pervasive relativism of my
students in introductory ethics courses at Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University. I am grateful to my students for
forcing me to take moral relativism and skepticism seriously and
for compelling me to argue for my own dogmatically maintained
version of moral objectivism. The result is before the reader. The
conclusions reached here (which can be described either as a
minimal objectivism or as a moderate verson of relativism) are
considerably weaker than those that I had expected and would have
liked to have defended. I have arrived at these views kicking and
screaming and have resisted them to the best of my ability. The
arguments of this book are directed at those who deny that moral
judgments can ever be correct (in any sense that is opposed to
mistaken) and who also deny that we are ever rationally com pelled
to accept one moral judgment as opposed to another. I have sought
to take their views seriously and to fight them on their own
grounds without making use of any assumptions that they would be
unwilling to grant. My conclusion is that, while it is possible to
refute the kind of extreme irrationalism that one often encounters,
it is impossible to defend the kind of objectivist meta-ethical
views that most of us want to hold, without begging the question
against the non-objectivist."
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