The Iraq War has been the subject of heated political debate and
intense academic scrutiny. Much argument has focused on the
decision to invade and the size of the force tasked with the
campaign. While these factors have contributed to the challenge of
counterinsurgency operations, so has the American approach to
unconventional war. Taking full account of the factors beyond the
control of the U.S. military and avoiding glib comparisons with
Vietnam, this monograph examines how the American approach has
affected operations. The author, Dr. Thomas Mockaitis, draws on the
experience of other nations, particularly the United Kingdom, to
identify broad lessons that might inform the conduct of this and
future campaigns. He also documents the process by which soldiers
and Marines in Iraq have adapted to the challenging situation and
incorporated both historic and contemporary lessons into the new
counterinsurgency doctrine contained in Field Manual 3-24
General
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