GAO-11-700. Cyclone Nargis hit Burma's impoverished Irrawaddy Delta
on May 2, 2008, leaving nearly 140,000 people dead or missing and
severely affecting about 2.4 million others, according to the UN.
The Burmese military government initially blocked most access to
the affected region; however, amid international pressure, it
slowly began allowing international aid workers entry into the
region. Since 1997, the United States has imposed sanctions to
prohibit, among other things, the exportation of financial services
to Burma and transactions with Burmese officials. In response to a
congressional mandate, GAO (1) described the assistance UN and U.S.
agencies have provided in response to Cyclone Nargis, (2) assessed
USAID actions to help ensure funds are used as intended and do not
benefit sanctioned entities, and (3) described the challenges
responders experienced and the lessons learned. GAO reviewed
financial and program documents; interviewed U.S., UN, and
nongovernmental organization (NGO) officials; and traveled to
Thailand and Burma. UN and U.S. agencies provided about $335
million for emergency response and recovery activities after
Cyclone Nargis. Of that total, 11 UN agencies obligated roughly
$288 million for assistance in various sectors, including food,
health, water and sanitation, and agriculture. The U.S. government
provided about $38 million of the UN's total as part of its roughly
$85 million in obligations for emergency response and longer-term
recovery activities. Of the $85 million U.S. response, the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), which led U.S.
efforts, obligated about $72 million. The Department of Defense
obligated about $13 million to procure and deliver emergency relief
supplies. USAID took actions to help ensure U.S. funds were used as
intended and did not benefit sanctioned entities, but had some
monitoring weaknesses. USAID took actions prior to the delivery of
assistance, including selecting partners experienced in working
with USAID and in Burma and providing extra guidance to help ensure
funds were not misused. To monitor assistance, USAID has conducted
some site visits. However, USAID's monitoring contains little
financial oversight and we found that two grantees charged USAID
for unapproved international travel. Also, in some cases site
visits were not sufficiently documented. USAID relies on external
audits of grantees, but relevant USAID staff were not aware of
audit findings related to one grantee's cash payments to villagers
in Burma. The grantee subsequently addressed the audit findings.
Lastly, U.S. and UN agencies said they examined reports of misuse
of assistance in their programs and found no evidence that
assistance had been misused. GAO's review of 16 after-action
reports from donors, NGOs, and UN agencies, showed that those
responding to Cyclone Nargis experienced similar challenges and
developed lessons learned in four main areas: access, coordination,
implementation, and limited in-country disaster response capacity.
Responders found it difficult to reach affected areas because the
Burmese government limited their travel and the infrastructure was
poor. Responders also had difficulty coordinating between
headquarters and field offices for several reasons, including
limited telecommunication services. A U.S. report highlighted
coordination challenges amongst U.S. agencies, stating that
agencies' conflicting agendas resulted in difficulties related to
the appropriateness, timing, procurement, and distribution of aid.
Implementation challenges include supplies that were incompatible
with local conditions, such as medicines with instructions printed
in non-Burmese languages and difficulties monitoring aid.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!