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In Place of Inter-State Retaliation - The European Union's Rejection of WTO-style Trade Sanctions and Trade Remedies (Hardcover)
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In Place of Inter-State Retaliation - The European Union's Rejection of WTO-style Trade Sanctions and Trade Remedies (Hardcover)
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Unlike many other trade regimes, the European Union forbids the use
of inter-state retaliation to enforce its obligations, and rules
out the use of common 'escape' mechanisms such as anti-dumping
between the EU member states. How does the EU do without these
mechanisms that appear so vital to the political viability of other
international trade regimes, including the World Trade
Organization? How, therefore, is the European legal order, with the
European Court of Justice at its centre, able to be so much more
binding and intrusive than the legal obligations of many other
trade regimes? This book puts forward a new explanation of a key
part of the European Union's legal system, emphasising its break
with the inter-state retaliation mechanisms and how Europe's
special form of legal integration is facilitated by intra-industry
trade, parliamentary forms of national government, and European
welfare states. It argues first that the EU member states have
allowed the enforcement of EU obligations by domestic courts in
order to avoid the problems associated with enforcing trade
obligations by constant threats of trade retaliation. It argues
second that the EU member states have been able to accept such a
binding form of dispute settlement and treaty obligation because
the policy adjustments required by the European legal order were
politically acceptable. High levels of intra-industry trade reduced
the severity of the economic adjustments required by the expansion
of the European market, and inclusive and authoritative democratic
institutions in the member states allowed policy-makers to
prioritise a general interest in reliable trading relationships
even when policy changes affected significant domestic lobbies.
Furthermore, generous national social security arrangements
protected national constituents against any adverse consequences
arising from the expansion of European law and the intensification
of the European market. The European legal order should therefore
be understood as a legalized dispute resolution institution well
suited to an international trade and integration regime made up of
highly interdependent parliamentary welfare states.
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