Institutional weaknesses limit the capacity of local governments to
support efficient urbanization in developing countries. They also
lead to the emergence of large developers with the clout to build
entire cities. This paper analyzes the urbanization process when
local governments are weak and large developers are powerful.
Results from a non-cooperative game setting with minimal
assumptions show that multiple equilibria can emerge depending on
key institutional parameters of the model and the nature of the
game, but all of them are inefficient. In this simple setting,
increasing the capacity of the local government may not lead to
better outcomes, because it may crowd out urban land development by
the more effective private investor. Subsidizing the large investor
can ensure efficiency, but it makes the rest of society worse off.
Selling the rights to the city can be Pareto efficient, but only
provided that the price at which the rights are sold are
sufficiently high. However, more analytical and empirical work is
needed before these analyses can be deemed relevant in practice.
Competition among jurisdictions, time consistency challenges, and
the social implications of private cities deserve special
attention.
General
Imprint: |
World Bank Publications
|
Country of origin: |
United States |
Series: |
South Asia Development Forum |
Release date: |
June 2023 |
Authors: |
Yue Li
• Martin Rama
|
Format: |
Paperback
|
Pages: |
200 |
ISBN-13: |
978-1-4648-1833-2 |
Categories: |
Books
|
LSN: |
1-4648-1833-9 |
Barcode: |
9781464818332 |
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