This book examines positions that challenge the Fregean logic-first view. It raises critical questions about logic by examining various ways in which logic may be entangled with mathematics and metaphysics. Is logic topic-neutral and general? Can we take the application of logic for granted? This book suggests that we should not be dogmatic about logic but ask similar critical questions about logic as those Kant raised about metaphysics and mathematics. It challenges the Fregean ‘logic-first’ view according to which logic is fundamental and hence independent of any extra-logical considerations. Whereas Quine assimilated logic and mathematics to the theoretical parts of empirical science, the present volume explores views that stop short of his thoroughgoing holism but instead take logic to be answerable to or entangled with some particular discipline. The contributions provide views that assign primacy to mathematical reasons, Kantian metaphysical grounds, Husserlian transcendental phenomenological reflection, or normative considerations about how terms ought to be defined in various fields of empirical science or mathematics. Space is thereby carved out between a Fregean position on the one hand and Quinean holism on the other. Critical Views of Logic will be a key resource for academics, researchers, and advanced students of philosophy, linguistics, mathematics, and computer science, as well as those engaged in various fields of empirical science. The chapters in this book, except for chapter 4, were originally published in the journal Inquiry.