1876. This volume is a new edition of Cory's Fragments. The translation has been revised and there is an addition of introductions to several of the fragments, together with notes and explanations supplied from the recently interpreted hieroglyphic and cuneiform texts, and from the researches of competent students. Contents: Sanchoniathon; Tyrian Annals; Periplus of Hanno; Chaldean history; Chaldean fragments; Egyptian histories; Indian fragments; Atlantic and Panchaean fragments; miscellaneous fragments.

In 1768 the sixty-year struggle to open the lands of the Kayaderosseras Patent north of Albany for settlement was finally resolved. The long conflict with France was over, and disputes over ownership rights with the local Mohawk Indians had been settled. This is the story of the families that left their homesteads in Connecticut and moved to Middleline Road in Ball's Town, in the Patent. There they began their new life on the frontier, soon to be interrupted by the American Revolution. As Yankees, most of these pioneers supported the rebel cause. In 1780 the war came to them, as a contingent of 200 British soldiers, Loyalists, and Mohawk Indians descended on Ball's Town, pillaging and burning their newly-built cabins. In the wake of the raid twenty-five men were carried off to Canada, where many remained imprisoned until the end of the War two years later. "War on the Middleline" is the story of these families, their heritage, and the hardships they endured during the founding of our nation.

This Is A New Release Of The Original 1876 Edition.

This paper analyzes the relevancy of the terms center of gravity and decisive points at the operational level of war in communist insurgencies. It begins by proposing acceptable meanings for the terms center of gravity, decisive points, subversion, insurgency, and counter-insurgency. The subsequent portion of the analysis explores the characteristics of insurgent warfare. Historical examples illustrate each characteristic by establishing a situation and context of historical significance. It is in this context that the study examines the characteristics of communist insurgency and their relation to the terms center of gravity and decisive points at the operational level of conflict. This study found that an analysis of insurgencies clearly identifies an operational center of gravity for cellular-type insurgencies such as communist insurgencies. The communist cells of active supporters neatly fulfills the Clausewitzian concept for center of gravity with only minor modification. The most important characteristic is that they are truly the "hub of all power and movement, on which everything else depends." They are the source of supplies, recruits and intelligence for the entire insurgency. Although they are not physically concentrated as Clausewitz demands, they derive strength from the security of their dispersion and will concentrate when necessary. The communist cells and active supporters are the cohesion of the movement. As Clausewitz said, "Where there is cohesion, the analogy of center of gravity can be applied." Because a communist insurgency's center of mass is usually dispersed, its center of gravity is difficult to identify. Consequently, operational planners must normally strike the insurgency's center of gravity indirectly by attacking its decisive points. Thus, Jomini's decisive points are especially applicable to communist insurgencies. There are several decisive points the operational planner should target when planning a counterinsurgency operation. C

This study explores the experiences of the Army's only World War II era divisional unit designed specifically for employment in mountainous terrain, the 10th Mountain Division. It examines the reasons for its activation, its organization, training, and combat performance. Using this as a historical precedence, it then analyzes the current training programs for operations in mountainous terrain, drawing parallels between the training of the 10th of 1944 and that of the light infantry divisions of 1987. Investigation reveals that a rapid deployment force must be ready today to fight in any terrain to which they deploy. With this requirement comes a responsibility to conduct the training necessary for them to fight and win in any of the likely environments. Virtually every contingency area for the United States contains extensive mountain ranges. Light infantry divisions do not have to be terrain specific in their training, but historical evidence proves the necessity of their being terrain adaptable. Although most divisions currently train in desert, jungle, urban and forested terrain, almost none conduct training in mountainous terrain. The experiences of the 10th Mountain Division and Fifth Army in World War II illustrate the absolute necessity of units training in mountain operations if they are to be successful in combat in mountainous terrain. This thesis concludes that the Army leadership cannot ignore the peculiar requirements of combat in mountainous terrain. Rapid deployment forces, specifically light infantry divisions, must begin a concerted program of training in mountainous terrain. The problem is identified. Facilities are available for training. The risk of not beginning such a program is too high to ignore the problem any further.

This scarce antiquarian book is included in our special Legacy Reprint Series. In the interest of creating a more extensive selection of rare historical book reprints, we have chosen to reproduce this title even though it may possibly have occasional imperfections such as missing and blurred pages, missing text, poor pictures, markings, dark backgrounds and other reproduction issues beyond our control. Because this work is culturally important, we have made it available as a part of our commitment to protecting, preserving and promoting the world's literature.