How to avoid taxpayers paying for bank failures and banking crises? This book provides a proposal and a critique by twelve independent experts. It is addressed particularly to the threat posed in Europe by having large international banks, a history of bailouts and limited means of resolving any future banking crises. It shows how political imperatives and legal constraints currently result in economic losses in many countries round the world.

How to avoid taxpayers paying for bank failures and banking crises? This book provides a proposal and a critique by twelve independent experts. It is addressed particularly to the threat posed in Europe by having large international banks, a history of bailouts and limited means of resolving any future banking crises. It shows how political imperatives and legal constraints currently result in economic losses in many countries round the world.

Improving Banking Supervision shows how greater market discipline can be used to help improve the quality of banks and their management in a world of increasing complexity, size and innovation. The book is based on research undertaken in the Nordic countries and New Zealand, and set in an international context through reference and comparison to the experiences of banks throughout the EU and the US. The authors show how traditional methods of regulation, particularly across borders face limits and can impose substantial costs on customers. They propose alternatives for today's international banks, based on a network of incentives to prudential behaviour and focusing on three main issues: - the development of transparent corporate structures - the public disclosure of comparable meaningful information so that markets can assess banks - the implementation of effective means to allow banks to exit without unacceptable costs to society

Improving Banking Supervision shows how greater market discipline can be used to help improve the quality of banks and their management in a world of increasing complexity, size, and innovation. The book is based on research undertaken in the Nordic countries and New Zealand, and set in an international context through reference and comparison to the experiences of banks throughout the EU and the US. The authors show how traditional methods of regulation, particularly across borders face limits and can impose substantial costs on customers. They propose alternatives for today's international banks, based on a network of incentives to prudential behavior and focusing on three main issues: the development of transparent corporate structures; the public disclosure of comparable meaningful information so that markets can assess banks; and the implementation of effective means to allow banks to exit without unacceptable costs to society.