Allan Schmid's innovative text, "Conflict and Cooperation: Institutional and Behavioral Economics," investigates "the rules of the game," how institutions--both formal and informal--affect these rules, and how these rules are changed to serve competing interests. This text addresses both formal and informal institutions and the impact of alternative institutions, as well as institutional change and evolution. With its broad applications and numerous practice and discussion questions, this book will be appealing not only to students of economics, but also to those studying sociology, law, and political science.
Addresses formal and informal institutions, the impact of alternative institutions, and institutional change and evolution.
Presents a framework open to changing preferences, bounded rationality, and evolution.
Explains how to form empirically testable hypotheses using experiments, case studies, and econometrics.
Includes numerous practice and discussion questions.

This book brings together a number of articles, for the most part already pub lished, that develop a contemporary institutionalist approach to the study of the economic role of government. The institutionalist tradition in these matters began with the work of Henry Carter Adams on economics and jurisprudence and Richard T. Ely on the relation of the institutions of property and contract 2 to the distribution of wealth. It continued with John R. Commons's monu 3 mental analytical and historical study of the legal foundations of capitalism, Edwin E. Witte's work on the role of government in the economy,4 and Ken s neth Parson's study of economic developmenL The approach to law and economics that is developed in this book centers on (1) an identification of the objective fundamentals of the interrelations between legal and economic pro. cesses and (2) the development of skills with which to analyze and predict the performance consequences of alternative institutional designs. We must stress that our principal goal is quite simply to understand what is going on-to identify the instrumental variables and fundamental issues and processes-in the operation of legal institutions of economic significance. We envision government as an object of legal control. We also see law as an instrument of securing economic gain and advantage-that is, as a wealth producing and -acquiring alternative."

The Economy as Process of Valuation sheds new light on the potential benefits of concept and theory formation along dynamic and evolutionary lines for understanding economic processes. The emphasis is on aspects of the economy as a process of valuation rather than as a mechanistic result of transcendental forces yielding unique determinate results.The book begins by examining instrumentalism and the process of valuation, arguing that to choose involves the process of valuation. It then focuses on Coases's work on institutions and considers the implications for a variety of subjects including the theory of the firm and the theory and policy of externalities - all aspects of the economy as a process of valuation. This is followed by analyses of the concepts of coercion and cost in economics, with special reference to one agent's interest being another agent's cost. Each elicits key aspects of analysis, valuation and the complexities and conflictual nature of valuation processes and structures. Finally, Kenneth Boulding's work on 'The Image' is examined, arguing that definitions of reality and values derive, in part from language.

This book brings together a number of articles, for the most part already pub lished, that develop a contemporary institutionalist approach to the study of the economic role of government. The institutionalist tradition in these matters began with the work of Henry Carter Adams on economics and jurisprudence and Richard T. Ely on the relation of the institutions of property and contract 2 to the distribution of wealth. It continued with John R. Commons's monu 3 mental analytical and historical study of the legal foundations of capitalism, Edwin E. Witte's work on the role of government in the economy,4 and Ken s neth Parson's study of economic developmenL The approach to law and economics that is developed in this book centers on (1) an identification of the objective fundamentals of the interrelations between legal and economic pro. cesses and (2) the development of skills with which to analyze and predict the performance consequences of alternative institutional designs. We must stress that our principal goal is quite simply to understand what is going on-to identify the instrumental variables and fundamental issues and processes-in the operation of legal institutions of economic significance. We envision government as an object of legal control. We also see law as an instrument of securing economic gain and advantage-that is, as a wealth producing and -acquiring alternative."

Allan Schmid's innovative text, "Conflict and Cooperation: Institutional and Behavioral Economics," investigates "the rules of the game," how institutions--both formal and informal--affect these rules, and how these rules are changed to serve competing interests. This text addresses both formal and informal institutions and the impact of alternative institutions, as well as institutional change and evolution. With its broad applications and numerous practice and discussion questions, this book will be appealing not only to students of economics, but also to those studying sociology, law, and political science.
Addresses formal and informal institutions, the impact of alternative institutions, and institutional change and evolution.
Presents a framework open to changing preferences, bounded rationality, and evolution.
Explains how to form empirically testable hypotheses using experiments, case studies, and econometrics.
Includes numerous practice and discussion questions.