Property and Practical Reason makes a moral argument for common law property institutions and norms, and challenges the prevailing dichotomy between individual rights and state interests and its assumption that individual preferences and the good of communities must be in conflict. One can understand competing intuitions about private property rights by considering how private property enables owners and their collaborators to exercise practical reason consistent with the requirements of reason, and thereby to become practically reasonable agents of deliberation and choice who promote various aspects of the common good. The plural and mediated domains of property ownership, though imperfect, have moral benefits for all members of the community. They enable communities and institutions of private ordering to pursue plural and incommensurable good ends while specifying the boundaries of property rights consistent with basic moral requirements.

This book diagnoses an unexamined cause of the incivility in our public discourse. Our most contentious controversies today are moral. We disagree not only about questions of efficiency and democracy and civil liberties but also about what is right to do and who we are becoming as a people. We have not yet understood the implications of this shift in public reasoning from discourse about political ideals to debates about moral imperatives. The book prescribes a way to educate ourselves and our young people how to disagree well. We are not able to engage in moral discourse effectively because our educational programs are still organized around obsolete principles of political neutrality. Meanwhile, our young people have learned to bend moral claims in service to self-authorship. Also, different groups of us look to different sources of moral truth. Further complicating our efforts, different generations use the same language to refer to different moral ideas. The book suggests principles for a practical education that is robustly moral, that will enable us to understand and overcome these new challenges. And it lays out a framework for flourishing together in society despite our radical differences.

This book diagnoses an unexamined cause of the incivility in our public discourse. Our most contentious controversies today are moral. We disagree not only about questions of efficiency and democracy and civil liberties but also about what is right to do and who we are becoming as a people. We have not yet understood the implications of this shift in public reasoning from discourse about political ideals to debates about moral imperatives. The book prescribes a way to educate ourselves and our young people how to disagree well. We are not able to engage in moral discourse effectively because our educational programs are still organized around obsolete principles of political neutrality. Meanwhile, our young people have learned to bend moral claims in service to self-authorship. Also, different groups of us look to different sources of moral truth. Further complicating our efforts, different generations use the same language to refer to different moral ideas. The book suggests principles for a practical education that is robustly moral, that will enable us to understand and overcome these new challenges. And it lays out a framework for flourishing together in society despite our radical differences.