Airpower for Strategic Effect is intended to contribute to the understanding of airpower-what it is, what it does, why it does it, and what the consequences are. This is the plot: airpower generates strategic effect. Airpower's product is strategic effect on the course of strategic history. Everything about military airpower is instrumental to the purpose of securing strategic effect.

First published in 2002. From the foreword: "This insightful work by David N. Spires holds many lessons in tactical air-ground operations. Despite peacetime rivalries in the drafting of service doctrine, in World War II the immense pressures of wartime drove army and air commanders to cooperate in the effective prosecution of battlefield operations. In northwest Europe during the war, the combination of the U.S. Third Army commanded by Lt. Gen. George S. Patton and the XIX Tactical Air Command led by Brig. Gen. Otto P. Weyland proved to be the most effective allied air-ground team of World War II. The great success of Patton's drive across France, ultimately crossing the Rhine, and then racing across southern Germany, owed a great deal to Weyland's airmen of the XIX Tactical Air Command. This deft cooperation paved the way for allied victory in Westren Europe and today remains a classic example of air-ground effectiveness. It forever highlighted the importance of air-ground commanders working closely together on the battlefield. The Air Force is indebted to David N. Spires for chronicling this landmark story of air-ground cooperation."

Christian Anrig examines the responses of France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden to the challenges of air power in the last two decades, His examination is both instructive and disheartening. Anyone who is detailed to work alongside these air forces will benefit considerably from understanding how and why they do what they do. Sadly, the author has only too clearly identified the national features which, with one or two exceptions, are likely to inhibit the creation of European air power in the foreseeable future. The author brings deep scholarship to his study, reinforced by his national objectivity. It is a unique and indispensable contribution to international awareness of twenty-first-century air power. This is an extended edition of the original 2011 release with an extended update covering Libya and other relevant air power developments. Includes 67 full colour illustrations.

Airpower for Strategic Effect is intended to contribute to the understanding of airpower-what it is, what it does, why it does it, and what the consequences are. This is the plot: airpower generates strategic effect. Airpower's product is strategic effect on the course of strategic history. Everything about military airpower is instrumental to the purpose of securing strategic effect.

Aerial refueling is key to the nation's global reach in response to operations in all parts of the world. As such, aerial refueling provides the bridge for air, joint, and coalition forces to deploy anywhere, any time around the world. It is important in this era of transformation that the tanker force and doctrine of aerial refueling also meet the challenges of the Air Force's task force concept of operations(CONOPS). The highly demanded tanker has the ability to affect global strike; homeland security; global mobility; space; and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR);global response; and nuclear response. The KC-135 air-craft has been an outstanding platform for aerial refueling, and through some enhancements, it has been able to leverage some of its capabilities in airlift and communication. However, the Air Force has the opportunity with its next class of tankers to field a new tanker with capabilities that can serve all services in more demanding joint and coalition warfare of the future. In Tanker-Force Structure: Recapitalization of the KC-135, Lt Col Juan Narvid challenges air mobility warriors to de-velop a tanker-force structure that overcomes the thinking of old to launch new concepts and capabilities for the future tanker. He argues that the future of warfare will re-quire a tanker that is able to operate as a force enabler across the full spectrum of operations. This research isvery timely with the Boeing 767 being looked at as a re-placement for some of the older KC-135s. In contrast to some of the 767's capabilities, he outlines a conceptual tanker that combines airlift and aerial-refueling capabilities and is able to survive in a combat environment, and he leverages its ability to act as a platform to enhance network-centric warfare. He points out that while the "Cadillac" of all tankers may only be conceived in the minds of Airmen, the tanker of the future cannot resemble the single-role tanker of the past. In this paper, Colonel Narvid examines the chronology of the tanker and the role it has played throughout its his-tory. He argues that the next tanker must break from old capabilities, tied to a Cold War strategy, and embark on new operations and more capabilities that are able to respond to future threats. Joint warfare already capitalizes on getting the right information to the decision makers and the warrior executing the combat mission. Innovative ideas within the mobility Air Force (MAF) are providing the link for information between the two through roll-on beyond line of sight (ROBE) systems. To employ these type capabilities into a combat area, tankers may come up against asymmetric threats from an enemy willing to blunt any advantages the MAF has to offer. Colonel Narvid believes the Boeing767 improves on the capabilities of the KC-135 and that the Air Force currently needs to replace some of the olderKC-135s. However, he argues, it will not fit the bill when It comes to meeting the challenges of the future-instead, a tanker designed from the ground up should recapitalize theKC-135 fleet

The Air Force and the national defense mission are the big losers when talented individuals choose to separate early. Although specific separation figures are not available, analysis of the percentage of men and women by commissioned years of service in the Air Force indicates that women separate prior to retirement more frequently than men. The percentages of men and women remain steady through eh first four years, the typical period of post-commissioning commitment. By the fifth year, the number of women drops two percent, and by the following year, the number of women drops an additional four percent, with corresponding increases in the percentage of men. The percentage of women continues to decrease gradually through year twenty, the point of retirement eligibility. Having determined that women separate from the Air Force prior to retirement eligibility more often than men, Lt. Col. Laura DiSilverio wanted to find out why. The only people with the answers were the women who had separated, so the author developed a survey to elicit the reasons for separating. The results of this survey of 1,000 women appear in this paper. The first chapter demonstrates why the Air Force needs women. It makes the demographic case and presents research results showing the value of diversity in general and the value of women leaders in particular. The second chapter presents the survey results, analyzes why women separate from the Air Force, and lists the types of programs that might retain them. The final chapter looks at the feasibility of implementing some programs that might help the Air Force retain more of its talented members.

The development of airpower can be traced to three key elements: thought, organization and technology. The Luftwaffe of World War II is no different. This paper will examine the Luftwaffe's thought, organization and technology as it pertains to maritime operations, or as the modern United States Air Force (USAF) calls it, Countersea Operations. These maritime operations will include direct support of the Kriegsmarine and independent Luftwaffe operations against the Allies. Luftwaffe thought will show that doctrinally the Luftwaffe was not as prepared for the maritime role its leaders thrust upon it, but flexibility and the application of the tenets of airpower provided the basis for adaptation. Also included will be an examination of the fierce rivalry between the Luftwaffe and Kreigsmarine senior leadership and how this interfered with the conduct of countersea operations. Luftwaffe organization during World War II provided a more than adequate basis for conducting the countersea campaign. The adaptability of the operational and support structure allowed the Luftwaffe to accomplish a variety of missions, even as their aircraft and weapons were proving deficient. Finally, the Luftwaffe was at the forefront of innovation in the field of aviation technology, including airframe and weapon development. Once again, interference by senior leadership and equipment teething problems combined with increasing Allied attacks cost the Luftwaffe precious time.

Air Force Smart Operations for the Twenty-first Century (AFSO 21) is the Air Force's initiative to recapitalize funds by maximizing value and minimizing waste in operations. This is a fundamental shift by the Air Force toward a desired end state of continuous process improvement. Will AFSO 21 change the culture of the Air Force? A successful change requires a balance between the system components of culture, vision, structure, leadership, and systems. Air Force leadership may avoid failure in its AFSO 21 implementation if it addresses potential failure points before they fester and take root. The first potential failure point is focusing only on culture and thus creating an unbalanced system or organization. The next potential failure point is the inflexibility of the Air Force structure. A third potential failure point is its human resource management systems. When it comes to "quality" programs, Air Force midlevel officers are experiencing deja vu. How will midlevel officers accept it? The failure to win over Generation TQM, the midlevel officers, is a fourth potential failure point for the sustainment of AFSO 21. Does the Air Force have a vision for AFSO 21? The Air Force must rectify this disparity between vision and message and remove a final potential failure point in sustaining AFSO 21. This paper identifies potential failure points associated with the changing Air Force culture. Overall, the Air Force's change plan appears to be proceeding according to schedule. However, it does not appear that the Air Force is adequately planning for a long-term sustainment of AFSO 21. There is still time for Air Force senior leadership to correct the system's alignment and put AFSO 21 on track for long-term sustainment. A culture of continuous process improvement will take root once the Air Force leadership fully commits to AFSO 21.

Some readers may wonder at the title of this volume. It was inspired, in a somewhat roundabout way, by Air Force chief of staff T. Michael Moseley, who struggled mightily during his tenure to, in his words, "recapitalize the fleet" of aging USAF aircraft during a period of significant budget constraints. In a world of rapid change and confounding problems that threaten all of mankind, intellectual recapitalization of the Air Force has become critical to survival and success and is at least equal in importance to the recapitalization of the aircraft fleet. One article, "The Essence of Aerospace Power: A New Perspective from a Century of Experience," had been heavily edited to meet the space limitations of the journal in which it was published. The essays and speeches are grouped into four broad subject areas, within which they are arranged chronologically. Part 1, Considering the Past-Contemplating the Future, examines some classical military themes and their relationship to modern military problems and the use of modern airpower. Airpower is a child of technological development, and Airmen are in love with their high-tech gadgetry. Technological fascination is not limited to Airmen, of course, but Airmen have raised that fascination to the status of a fetish, often to the exclusion of fundamental military thinking that could profitably inform them about the employment of airpower above the tactical level. The essays in part 1 address these issues. All were written and published during the 1980s. Part 2, The End of the Cold War, looks at problems that were a consequence of this historical development. Although cause for much joy and relief, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the self-liberation of the former Soviet empire, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union also caused great angst in the US military. It was almost immediately clear to those with any insight that as the new millennium (in one sense of that word) was about to begin, the old millennium (in another sense of that word) had not yet departed. Local and regional politico-military struggles long suppressed by the Cold War superpowers raised their ugly heads as the stability of the Cold War gave way to the near chaos of the post-Cold War. Faced with an enormous amount of uncertainty, the US military had to reevaluate its size, composition, and essential missions, all of which fostered spirited debate within and among the services. The essays and speeches in part 2 illustrate these concerns from an Airman's point of view and are representative of the kinds of jockeying for position (and funding) that went on between the services. These essays and speeches were all written between 1990 and 1993. The demise of our arch adversary, the upheaval of the Cold War regime, and the uncertainty that ensued prompted fierce competition for what all assumed would be drastically reduced military budgets. To make the case for maintaining a strong air arm in the post-Cold War era, it was prudent to begin thinking about the fundamentals of airpower, its impact during the twentieth century, and its potential to make important contributions during the post-Cold War era. Thus the essays in part 3, The Nature and Impact of Airpower, reexamine these issues and attempt to identify what airpower is really all about and what makes it so fundamentally different from land and sea power. These essays, written between 1988 and 2002, examine the impact of airpower and how it influenced national and military strategy since it came of age in the middle of the twentieth century. Finally, the essays and speech selected for part 4, Educating Airmen, reflect the primary focus of the author's career for 30 years and the fundamental reason for writing every essay in this volume as well as every other essay, monograph, and book he's written.

As political and military leaders ponder the future of space operations, the time has come to frame propositions regarding spacepower. Specifically, this study seeks to answer the question, "What is the nature of spacepower?" It also tests the aerospace integration school's hypothesis that space power is simply a continuation or extension of airpower. Two points come immediately to the forefront of this work. First, spacepower is different from airpower even though both share the vertical dimension of warfare. Second, space operations have matured to a point wherein valid and unique propositions regarding spacepower are identifiable. The method used to derive these propositions involved literary research that resulted in a long list. The list evolved over three years during numerous brainstorming sessions with several space experts - most of them space weapons officers with theater and, often, combat experience - until the list was carefully refined into the 10 most salient propositions. The author deferred to Col. Phillip S. Meilinger's approach, in "Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power," of citing each proposition as a thesis statement, with supporting material immediately following. The objective of this work is to stimulate discussions and encourage those who do not yet understand or appreciate the nature of spacepower in modern warfare.

In "Preventing Catastrophe: US Policy Options for Management of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia," Lt. Col. Martin J. "Marty" Wojtysiak, USAF, proposes a response to the dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan. This paper highlights the threat in "The Nuclear Catastrophe of 2005," a gripping projection of the worst case scenario on the current realities of the Indian subcontinent. Written a year after the "catastrophe," it vividly describes the events leading up to the disaster as well as the grim aftermath of a South Asian nuclear war. The remainder of the paper looks at US regional objectives and suggests how they might be achieved. The author proposes a regional proliferation regime that realistically addresses the threat and moves the United States to a pragmatic approach to manage and limit the ongoing proliferation in South Asia. At present, India and Pakistan possess only marginal strategic delivery capabilities, and the tensions between them remain at the "simmering" stage. The United States is pursuing closer relations with India with tangible success, but its relations with Pakistan have soured over the last ten years and reached a low point following the military coup of October 1999. The author believes this imbalance contributes to regional instability and leaves disturbing questions on the horizon. Can the United States help prevent the deployment of nuclear weapon systems in India and Pakistan? How does the United States help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology to less friendly, perhaps even hostile, countries? Can Washington prevent either India or Pakistan, or both, from turning hostile to the United States?

This study is based on an examination of professional military education (PME) for United States Air Force officers that was conducted in 1988 at the Airpower Research Institutes (ARI), Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (AUCADRE), Maxwell AFT, Alabama. The original study researched the history and evolution of the Air Force's PME systems, assessed the current status of Air Force PME, and compared the PME systems of the other US military services to that of the Air Force. This extract, however, restricts itself to the history of Air Force PME between 1946 and 1987. Originally, seven ARI officers, including the editors of this study, worked on the project. Collectively, they examined more than 345 documents, - letters, regulations, manual, studies, reports, catalogs, and histories - in an effort to fully understand the criticisms made of Air Force PME throughout its history. The capstone of Air Force PME is Air University (AU), located at Maxwell Air Force Base. AU consists of three schools: Squadron Officer School, Air Command Staff College, and Air War College. During the more than 40 years examined here, PME became thoroughly institutionalized. Further, the quality of professional education offered by AU was constantly assessed and reassessed. External observers (those outside the Air Force) and internal observers (both military and civilian, assigned from within the Air Force) regularly examined the qualifications and teaching methods of the schools' faculty, as well as the schools' curricula. Throughout this period, PME's purpose was the subject of ongoing discussion: whether it should provide broad or specialized instruction and whether it should address only military issues or include political and related topics. These questions remain unanswered because the Air Force has never effectively defined what it wanted its officers to know or to be. Although the assessments described in this book are not exhaustive, they are representative of both internal and external commentary over the entire four-decade period. Internal criticism is especially difficult to assess since it is often only implicit in recommendations for changes made by the various groups that conducted studies of PME. In addition, internal Air Force reviews of AU and the schools tended to become less critical as the schools became institutionalized, thus making an objective assessment even more difficult. On the other hand, external criticisms - particularly those from non-Department of Defense observers - were prone to find fault with PME. These evaluations were more likely to be explicitly critical, often bluntly so, and they too were perhaps not wholly objective. This study seeks a balance between the two types of criticisms and attempts to determine how they complement each other.

Since the end of the Gulf War, the debate over whether there should be a separate space service, equal with the Air Force, Army, and Navy, has grown in proportion to the indispensable value of space operations to our nation's defense. Increasing dependency on space-systems is a fact of military life. In this we-documented essay, Col. Michael C. Whittington compares the leading arguments for a separate space force to the cogent arguments for an independent air force made by airpower advocates during the interwar years of 1920-1940. The airpower issues in 1920 and the space power issues of today are strikingly similar, revolving around four key issues: leadership, doctrine, technology, and funding. The irony, or course, it that these arguments, which helped created an independent air force in 1947, are challenged by many within today's Air Force leadership, which leads Colonel Whittington to ask, "if there were cogent in 1920, would they not be relevant today?" Interestingly, the author, though a professional Air Force officer, is neither a space operators nor a pilot. Colonel Whittington's purpose is not to propose a separate space force but rather to provide the reader with an unbiased perspective of the arguments for and against. Though all agree that aerospace power is at a critical juncture, senior leaders are divided as to which direction the Air Force should pursue regarding space. Space separatists want space warfare freed from control of "air" commanders, argue that space power doctrine cannot be built upon airpower doctrine, contend that space is a wholly different technological medium, and want to free space funding from competition with Air Force fighter and bomber programs. Whichever road is taken - whether a separate space force or an Air Force with a greater emphasis in space - the shift from an airpower to a space power culture is inevitable. And, when this shift occurs, the author argues, the Air Force "would do well to remember its own history."

"United States Marine Corps Air-Ground Integration in the Pacific Theater" addresses how the United States Marine Corps dealt with the challenge of air support for the infantry in the Second World War. Sources for research included primary documents on doctrine and personal interviews from the United States Air Force Historical Research Agency. Periodicals written before and immediately after the war provided additional information. The research indicated that the Marines developed an effective means for air-ground integration during the Second World War. A great deal of this success was due to the Marine Corps' philosophy of airpower as well as to experience gained during the interwar years, particularly in Nicaragua. In addition, the unique environment in the Pacific influenced many of the procedures that were developed. Finally, the Marines learned a great deal during the course of the Pacific campaign itself. The battles of Guadalcanal, Bougainville, and Luzon illustrate the significant innovations and improvements that were made during the war.

This paper focuses on the unique and vital capabilities of the US Air Force's KC-135 tanker fleet. Specifically, historic and current tanker usage, tanker operational employment, and the capability of today's tanker fleet are analyzed, with emphasis on force structure and force management. Given that the KC-135 is the USAF's primary air refueling asset and that no planned replacements are due on the flightline for some time, how can the current KC-135 method of employment and force structure support future DOD and coalition operations? Since its inception in the mid-1950s, the KC-135 has undergone numerous configuration as well as mission changes. One constant throughout has been the reliance of the nation's airpower on this critical asset, whether it was sitting alert during the cold war, or providing mission essential fuel for F-117s en route to Baghdad during the Gulf War. The success of combat operations in Operation Allied Force was made possible due to the rapid, massive, and professional employment of the KC-135 in the theater of operations. This success, however, can be attributed more to the actions of the tanker community than to any planned, deliberate inclusion of air refueling assets into the operations plan. In light of decreasing budgets, aging airframes, increased downtime for maintenance, and an explosion in the operations tempo, this paper proposes a four-pronged methodology addressing taker vision, organization training and employment, as the correction needed to get the KC-135 weapon system back on centerline. This will allow the tanker to effectively aid the Air Force in successfully deterring conflict and if needed, quickly win the nation's future wars.

This study examines the rise of operations other than war (OOTW) as a new and prominent tasking for the armed services of the United States. The author, Lt Col Charles W. Hasskamp, USAF, is an advocate of the OOTW mission, and he argues that the US Special Forces Command is an excellent instrument for the task. The author bases his position on these points. First, the end of the cold war has provided the United States a respite from the focused geopolitical strategy and challenge of "containment." Unfortunately, without the stability coerced by a bipolar world, the shutters have come off and the shades have gone up on "windows" that reveal a new world disorder. While the world has an increasingly interdependent global economy, the legacies of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drug trafficking, and religious and ethnic extremism generate increasing threats to that free market, democratic ideal the American public espouses for all countries. Second, the US government's current national security strategy emphasizes "engagement and enlargement" as they factor into US preventive diplomacy. The national military strategy emphasizes "flexible and selective engagement" which relates to preventive deterrence. Both of these strategies emphasize the use of US military forces for considerable work other than fighting the nation's wars-that is, for OOTW. As recent experience shows, there is considerable pressure to use the American military as an arbitrator and peacemaker to the world. This study examines the arguments for and against expanding our military's nontraditional roles and missions. It concludes that the US armed forces can do and will continue to be able to perform an excellent job in operations other than war, as they have done in the past. The danger is that this endeavor could jeopardize the readiness of a force structure necessary to maintain the more traditional war-fighting capabilities. The study suggests that an actually smaller force and smaller defense budget can still accomplish the primary mission of fighting the nation's wars while also undertaking the myriad of peacetime engagements and conflict preventions our leaders have ordered. Moreover, the Special Operations Command, which has the skill and will to serve well in the full spectrum of armed conflict, also has the cultural, social, and technical know-how to perform the more complex chores of nation building and humanitarian operations.

We have been at war for four and one half years. The financial burden of executing Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom caused military services to undergo extensive cost cutting efforts. The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) community is not exempt. Recently, the Air Force Nuclear General Officer Steering Group (AFNGOSG) requested an additional study of lower missile readiness rates, presumably to identify any potential cost savings from reduced maintenance and security footprints. This research offers an initial study by analyzing the impact of lowered ICBM alert rates caused by not repairing off alert missiles until a lowered alert rate threshold is reached and any correlation to a potential decrease in daily ICBM maintenance team utilization. The intent of this research is to provide an analysis of the ICBM maintenance team utilization at the current ICBM alert rate and at lowered alert rates. Quantitative research methodologies are used to model historical ICBM maintenance data from the 341st Maintenance Group (MG) and simulate future maintenance team utilization at both the current and decreased ICBM alert rates. The results of this simulation and modeling show negligible savings in overall ICBM maintenance team utilization. One maintenance section under study showed a statistically significant but slight increase in team utilization as the alert rate decreased. Another section under study exhibited a slight decrease in team utilization deemed statistically significant, however, extremely hard to quantify as the increase in team utilization was only .62 percent. The remaining four maintenance sections under study had statistically the same team utilization at all alert rate levels.

Lt. Col. Karen U. Kwiatkowski's "Expeditionary Air Operations in Africa: Challenges and Solutions" details air operations challenges in Africa. She discusses how the USAF currently meets or avoids these challenges. She contends that Africa is like the "western frontier" of America's history - undeveloped, brimming with opportunity as well as danger, and that it is a place where standard assumptions often do not apply. Africa has not been, and is not today, a US geostrategic interest area. However, as the dawn of the twenty-first century breaks over a planet made both intimate and manageable by CNN and DHL Air Express, Colonel Kwiatkowski believes that the winners will be those who understand Africa and can meet the challenges of air operations on the continent first. Air operations whether commercial or military, are critical to a continent that has a limited overland transportation infrastructure of roads, rail, and waterways. Sea and river access to most of the major population areas of Africa is possible and well used. But from a US military perspective, water transportation does not always provide the desired speed or flexibility for contingency or humanitarian response. Africa is a continent connected overwhelmingly via airways, and the USAF will continue to use African airspace and air infrastructures. There are multiple perspectives on the numerous air and transportation challenges in Africa. The problems - whether air safety, navigation, ground transportation network and airport infrastructure immaturity, security, geography, culture, governmental mismanagement - are often presented as insurmountable. Ironically, the air transport situation is often seen as a problem that must be solved collectively by the 53 very different and very burdened states of Africa; and for this reason, unsatisfactory air operation infrastructures are accepted as a permanent handicap. A portion of Colonel Kwiatkowski's study is dedicated to illustrating how USAF air transport is really done in Africa on a daily basis. In hopes of shedding light on lessons the leadership of the world's most powerful air force may have missed. She recommends ways to improve our ability to conduct expeditionary air operations on the continent.

In this excellent essay Lt Col David G. Curdy examines the prospects for democratic transitions in the Middle East. Henotes that with the conclusion of the cold war, the basis for US Middle East policy, which had centered around oil, Israel, and the Soviet Union, should be reexamined and, perhaps, redesigned. Moreover, major political events stemming from the 1990--91 Gulf War have reenergized efforts to implement democratic processes within the region. Colonel Curdy argues that the West has generally held the view that democracy and Islam are mutually exclusive and incompatible. However, he notes that the Islam-based traditions of consultation, consensus, and independent judgment are being used today to legitimize the rise of democracy in a number of Arab states. In opposition to this democratizing trend is the rise of Islamic radicalism which rejects evolutionary political change and liberal political formulas. The clash of these two approaches will severely test US policy in the Middle East. Contemporaneous with these political currents is a new phase in resolving the decades-old Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Palestinians' struggle to create a democratic identity will be key in establishing their economic vitality and in reassuring Israelis that a Palestinian state will not be a security threat. Colonel Curdy concludes that the future challenge for the US will be to foster the view among Arab states that the US favors democratization based on Islamic traditions, rather than the imposition of Western democratic institutions on our Muslim friends. When democratic Arab nations can coexist with Israel, the US will have contributed to a basis for regional peace and stability that it has long sought, both as an ideal in itself and as instrumental to America's continuing access to Middle East oil and markets.

Lt. Col. John J. Zentner's "The Art of Wing Leadership and Aircrew Morale in Combat" addresses the role that the air force wing commander plays in affecting the level of aircrew morale during combat. More specifically, Colonel Zentner's study seeks to identify and define those unique characteristics associated with leading airmen that sustain aircrew moral in the face of significant losses. Colonel Zentner defines aircrew morale as the enthusiasm and persistence with which an aviator flies combat missions. He then offers three historical case studies to establish a framework within which aircrew morale can be assessed. The first case study is of Maj. Adolf Galland and Jagdgeschwader 26 during the Battle of Britain. The second case study considers Lt. Col. Joseph Laughlin and the 362d Fighter Group during the invasion of France in the summer of 1944. The third case study examines Col. James R. McCarthy and the 43d Strategic Wing during Operation Linebacker II. Drawing heavily on the results of questionnaires and personal interviews, each case study is focused on the importance that aircrews ascribed to three general areas: individual needs, group cohesion, and unit esprit de corps. Colonel Zentner concludes that aircrew control over development of combat tactics was the single most important element affecting morale. This finding supports one of the fundamental truths about the employment of airpower, centralized control and decentralized execution, that has become embedded in the airman's culture. In each of the three cases studied by the author, morale generally improved when the wing commander either displayed a personal flair for tactical innovation or allowed his subordinates to become innovative. Conversely, morale declined when higher headquarters placed burdensome and unsound restrictions on aircrew tactics. In light of the restrictive rules of engagement that have governed recent application of American airpower, Colonel Zentner recommends the USAF take steps to modify doctrine and professional military education in order to relate the findings of this study to the combat air forces.

Lt Col Curtis C. Connell hits a sensitive key in his observation that Islamic terrorism became one of the most important American security concerns after the attacks of 11 September 2001. Having spent three years as assistant air attache in Buenos Aires, he sought to combine a fresh interest in Latin America with his desire to learn more about the nature of radical Islamic fundamentalism and its virulent association with terrorism. His fellowship year at Harvard University and guidance of his professors encouraged him to coalesce interests into a combined study of Islamic fundamentalism and its manifestation in Latin America. At the end of the term, he produced this very useful and attractive monograph, Understanding Islam and Its Impact on Latin America. The initial question of this study concerns the debate between those who believe in a general Islamic threat, as defined most eloquently by Samuel P. Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, and others who see a small band of religious fanatics who have hijacked Islam from the moderate majority. This question about the source of terrorism has importance to the major Islamic nations as it does for Latin American countries, where Muslims are a largely undistinguishable minority. The preliminary answer for Latin America is that the United States should not be alarmed at the potential for Islamic fundamentalism, but sufficiently concerned to keep a watchful eye on future developments. In fact Connell suggests that the demographics do not favor the growth of an effective radical movement. If there are too few Muslims in Latin America to birth radicalism, there is on the other hand, a very active and extensive native, non-Islamic terrorism. The author connects these dots because he sees a latent connection to Muslims in the areas where terrorist organizations and drug traffickers proliferate. It is a potentially easy step for incipient Muslim radicals to get caught up and find beneficial purpose with these criminals. For example, the US dependence on imported petroleum and natural gas and a vulnerable transportation system provide an attractive target for Islamic terrorists, one they have used in the past.

Recent military engagements have seen a radical shift in adversary tactics. In addition to confronting traditional conventional forces, the US military now faces an increasing use of irregular warfare tactics to offset the US technological and operational advantages. Long, slow, and predictable supply convoys along overstretched lines of communication also tend to place US supplies and troops at significant risk. This is further complicated by a general lack of logistical infrastructure and increasing requirements for US forces to assume positions in isolated and rugged locations. The low likelihood of these trends changing in future engagements places the DOD in a difficult position. How do you increase cargo movement to isolated forward operating bases (FOB) in relatively inaccessible locations while maintaining secure lines of communication? Operational and budgetary limitations coupled with tooth-to-tail ratio, shrinking force sizes, increasing logistical requirements, and deployment footprint concerns require immediate solutions, even if finding them means searching outside the box. This challenge dictates a movement away from traditional resupply means and an accompanying paradigm and doctrinal shift. Advancements in technology, increased needs, and shrinking budgets present the DOD with both challenges and opportunities. Augmenting the current tactical airlift system with a modular autonomous and/or semiautonomous unmanned tactical airlift aircraft offers a flexible, responsive, and inexpensive solution that will increase airlift capacity, minimize carbon footprint, reduce risk to ground and airlift crews, and reduce wear and tear on manned assets. The movement of supplies and personnel within the Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom areas of operation is currently extremely costly, hazardous, and inefficient. Frequent attacks against insecure lines of communication and difficult terrain have led to a constantly increasing tactical airlift requirement. As of September 2009, 75 percent of all troop locations in Afghanistan and Iraq required resupply by ground convoy, airdrop, or vertical takeoff- and-landing aircraft. Unfortunately, the Department of Defense (DOD) currently lacks the capability to fulfill all tactical airlift requests. This paper investigates the DOD's tactical logistical challenges and each service's tactical lift requirements, especially with respect to the movement of supplies from forward supply hubs to forward forces. To address these challenges and requirements, the author suggests the use of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) as a potential solution. Focusing on existing and quickly emerging technologies as well as the joint operating requirements, the author proposes RPA performance and design characteristics along with a concept of employment that increases tactical lift capabilities and meets all current service requirements.