In this book the author investigates what is common to the German idea of the "Rechtsstaat "and the Anglo-American idea of the Rule of Law. He argues that, although dressed up in rather different garb, these two concepts are in fact based on the same fundamental idea and stand for the same values ( the law-state values ) all ideas that are in the European tradition older than their British and German variants. The fundamental idea is that the individual shall enjoy legal protection against infringements brought about by the exercise of power on the part of the state. In the book basic concepts such as legality, legal equality, legal certainty, legal accessibility and legal security are investigated. Also explored are their mutual relations, in particular, conflicts between them. Furthermore, the book offers practical advice on realising and sustaining these values in practice. Finally, it is argued that the characteristic law-state values can only be justified by reference to an even more fundamental humanistic idea, namely, what the author calls a life of human dignity ."

In this monograph a fundamental distinction is made between law and juridical thinking. Law is the content of legal rules and the systems of legal rules. Juridical thinking is the handling of the law by the lawyers. To this distinction corresponds a basic distinction between the language of law and the language of juridical thinking, and correlatively, between L-concepts (law concepts) and J-concepts (juridical or jurisprudential concepts). The monograph is devoted to the J-concepts, especially of technical (not ideological or evaluative) J-concepts. Four kinds of J-concepts are investigated: morphological J-concepts, those that help us to structure the law in a logical and functional way; topological J-concepts, those that help us to indicate the phenomena to which the law is applicable, and to separate the areas of application for different legal systems; praxeological J-concepts, those that help us to explore the relations between law and action, and methodological J-concepts, those that help us to describe the methods of the professional-juridical handling of the law. The work can be characterised as presenting a lawyers philosophy of law.

In this monograph a fundamental distinction is made between law and juridical thinking. Law is the content of legal rules and the systems of legal rules. Juridical thinking is the handling of the law by the lawyers. To this distinction corresponds a basic distinction between the language of law and the language of juridical thinking, and correlatively, between L-concepts (law concepts) and J-concepts (juridical or jurisprudential concepts). The monograph is devoted to the J-concepts, especially of technical (not ideological or evaluative) J-concepts. Four kinds of J-concepts are investigated: morphological J-concepts, those that help us to structure the law in a logical and functional way; topological J-concepts, those that help us to indicate the phenomena to which the law is applicable, and to separate the areas of application for different legal systems; praxeological J-concepts, those that help us to explore the relations between law and action, and methodological J-concepts, those that help us to describe the methods of the professional-juridical handling of the law. The work can be characterised as presenting a lawyers philosophy of law.