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Myths of the Cold War: Amending Historiographic Distortions
provides a corrective for the distortions and omissions of many
previous domestic and foreign (including Russian) studies of the
Cold War, especially those published since 2000. The "present
interest" motivation in Weeks's analysis is gaining a clear
understanding of the bi-polar, $4 trillion, nuclear-war-threatening
standoff that lasted over 40 years after World War II until the
demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. Without such knowledge and
understanding of this dangerous conflict, any future encounter of
the cold-war type with another nation-state is liable to be
construed in confusing ways just as the U.S.-Soviet Cold War was.
The consequence of such misunderstanding in the historiographic
sense as well as in policy-making at the highest level is that the
populations of the contending powers will have distorted
conceptions of the reasons for the confrontation. The result of
this, in turn, is skewed tendentiousness that masks concrete,
underlying causes of intense inter-state contention. Practical
benefits thus flow from an unprejudiced analysis of the past Cold
War with Communist Russia. This understanding can help prevent a
future conflict, such as one with Communist China, which some
reputed sinologists are currently predicting, as well as one with
post-Soviet Russia. Conversely, if a new cold war is imposed on the
West, a clearer understanding of the post-World War II archetypical
Cold War will be edifying.
On June 22, 1941, just less than two years after signing the
Nazi-Soviet Agreements, Adolf Hitler's German army invaded the
Soviet Union. The attack hardly came as a surprise to Josef Stalin;
in fact, history has long held that Stalin spent the two
intervening years building up his defenses against a Nazi attack.
With the gradual declassifying of former Soviet documents, though,
historians are learning more and more about Stalin's grand plan
during the years 1939-1941. Longtime Soviet expert Albert L. Weeks
has studied the newly-released information and come to a different
conclusion about the Soviet Union's pre-war buildup-it was not
precaution against German invasion at all. In fact, Weeks argues,
the evidence now suggests Soviet mobilization was aimed at an
eventual invasion of Nazi Germany. The Soviets were quietly biding
their time between 1939 and 1941, allowing the capitalist powers to
destroy one another, all the while preparing for their own Westward
march. Stalin, Weeks shows, wasn't waiting for a Nazi attack-Hitler
simply beat him to the punch.
'The United States is a country of machines. Without the use of
these machines through Lend-Lease, we would lose this war.' -Josef
Stalin (1943), quoted in W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special
Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946, Random House, N.Y., 1975,
p. 277 The United States shipped more than $12 billion in
Lend-Lease aid to Stalin's Russia during World War II. Materials
lent, beginning in late 1941 before the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor, included airplanes and tanks, locomotives and rails,
construction materials, entire military production assembly lines,
food and clothing, aviation fuel, and much else. Lend-Lease is now
recognized by post-Soviet Russian historians as essential to the
Soviet war effort. Wielding many facts and statistics never before
published in the U.S., author Albert L. Weeks keenly analyzes the
diplomatic rationale for and results of this assistance. Russia's
Life-Saver is a brilliant contribution to the study of U.S.-Soviet
relations and its role in World War II.
"The United States is a country of machines. Without the use of
these machines through Lend-Lease, we would lose this war." Josef
Stalin (1943), quoted in W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special
Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946, Random House, N.Y., 1975,
p. 277 The United States shipped more than $12 billion in
Lend-Lease aid to Stalin's Russia during World War II. Materials
lent, beginning in late 1941 before the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor, included airplanes and tanks, locomotives and rails,
construction materials, entire military production assembly lines,
food and clothing, aviation fuel, and much else. Lend-Lease is now
recognized by post-Soviet Russian historians as essential to the
Soviet war effort. Wielding many facts and statistics never before
published in the U.S., author Albert L. Weeks keenly analyzes the
diplomatic rationale for and results of this assistance. Russia's
Life-Saver is a brilliant contribution to the study of U.S.-Soviet
relations and its role in World War II."
On June 22, 1941, just less than two years after signing the
Nazi-Soviet Agreements, Adolf Hitler's German army invaded the
Soviet Union. The attack hardly came as a surprise to Josef Stalin;
in fact, history has long held that Stalin spent the two
intervening years building up his defenses against a Nazi attack.
With the gradual declassifying of former Soviet documents, though,
historians are learning more and more about Stalin's grand plan
during the years 1939-1941. Longtime Soviet expert Albert L. Weeks
has studied the newly-released information and come to a different
conclusion about the Soviet Union's pre-war buildup_it was not
precaution against German invasion at all. In fact, Weeks argues,
the evidence now suggests Soviet mobilization was aimed at an
eventual invasion of Nazi Germany. The Soviets were quietly biding
their time between 1939 and 1941, allowing the capitalist powers to
destroy one another, all the while preparing for their own Westward
march. Stalin, Weeks shows, wasn't waiting for a Nazi attack_Hitler
simply beat him to the punch.
This book documents dictator Joseph Stalin's brilliant tactics as
well as missteps in taking preemptive actions that guaranteed
ultimate victory over the German invaders. It also covers the
policies implemented after the war that made the Soviet Union a
menace to world peace and led to collapse of Soviet rule. A
detailed reexamination of historical facts indicates that Stalin
could deserve to be regarded as a "great leader." Yet Stalin
clearly failed as his nation's leader in a post-World War II
milieu, where he delivered the Cold War instead of rapid progress
and global cooperation. It is the proof of both Stalin's brilliance
and blunders that makes him such a fascinating figure in modern
history. Today, most of the Russian population acknowledges that
Stalin achieved "greatness." The Soviet dictator's honored place in
history is largely due to Stalin successfully attending to the
Soviet Union's defense needs in the 1930s and 1940s, and leading
the USSR to victory in the war on the Eastern Front against Nazi
Germany and its allies. This book provides an overdue critical
investigation of how the Soviet leader's domestic and foreign
policies actually helped produce this victory, and above all, how
Stalin's timely support of a wartime alliance with the Western
capitalist democracies assured the defeat of the Axis powers in
1945. Using new archive and other original source material, this
book documents how dictator Josef Stalin adroitly prepared for
"assured victory" in World War II Canvasses not only Western
literature on Stalin's prewar, wartime, and postwar leadership, but
also examines current post-2004 Russian histories
A longtime scholar of the Cold War deftly weaves together the
tradition of "just war" and an examination of current events to
show how the time-honored concepts of jus ad bellum (justice of
war) and jus in bello (justice in war) apply to the U.S. military
involvement in Iraq. This timely analysis of President George W.
Bush's foreign policy deals with the cornerstone of his
administrations—the "war on terror"—as implemented in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, and at Abu Ghraib prison. The
Choice of War: The Iraq War and the "Just War" Tradition discusses
NSS 2002, the national security statement that became the blueprint
for the Bush Doctrine. It explains the differences and similarities
between preventive and pre-emptive war and explores the
administration's justification of the necessity of the March 2003
invasion. Finally, it analyzes the conduct of the war, the
occupation, and the post-occupation phases of the conflict. In
evaluating the Bush Doctrine, both as declared strategy and as
implemented, Albert L. Weeks asks whether going it virtually alone
in the global struggle against 21st-century terrorism should be
incorporated permanently into American political and military
policy. Answering no, he suggests an alternative to a doctrine that
has isolated the United States and left the world divided.
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