This comprehensive volume provides a state-of-the-art overview of regulatory economics and reviews the main theories, tools, and domains of regulation. The book is divided into six parts: regulation in general; tools of regulation; social regulation; regulation of public utilities; regulation of non-natural-monopolies, and regulation of professions. Regulation and Economics begins with a valuable introductory chapter on the law and economics of regulation followed by 17 concise chapters on specific subjects in regulation including highly topical matters such as regulation of banking, finance and insurance; energy markets and telecommunications; and environmental and risk regulation. Providing an overview of the most important insights in regulatory economics and providing a useful access point to the more specialized literature in this area, this unique book will particularly benefit students of law and economics, as well as academics and government officials of regulatory agencies. Contributors: A. Arcuri, D. Black, K.J. Cseres, P.M. Danzon, A. de Hauteclocque, J. den Hertog, M.G. Faure, C. Gibson, D. Heremans, W. Jacobs, B. Kuipers, J.H. Love, C. McKean, B. Moselle, J.S. Netz, R.N. Olsen, A.M. Pacces, Y. Perez, N.J. Philipsen, H. Piffaut, D. Porrini, A. Renda, N. Rickman, P.H. Rubin, F.H. Stephen, R.J. Van den Bergh, M. White

In this timely book, the law and economics of corporate governance is approached from a range of angles. The study reveals that perspectives are changing - they differ between the economic and the legal standpoint; they vary across countries; they evolve over time.

The Neglected Role of Justification under Uncertainty in Corporate Governance and Finance does three novel things. First, it demonstrates that the need to justify is pervasive and identifies a type of agency cost - "justification costs" - resulting from decisions motivated by justification. Second, it considers the relationship between these sorts of agency costs and more traditional agency costs, such as those involving self-dealing or empire building. Third, and most importantly, it introduces a role for uncertainty. Under conditions of low(er) uncertainty, more accountability does not necessarily increase justification costs, which are apt to be low in any event, and does reduce traditional agency costs. But under conditions of uncertainty, accountability increases justification costs, potentially in an amount greater than any reduction in traditional agency costs; under some circumstances, reducing accountability, thereby granting managers more leeway, may be preferable. The authors propose a mechanism by which managers and stockholders can agree on granting managers some leeway for a specified period of time, in the form of "Control-Enhancing-Mechanisms" (CEMs). They consider how the existence of justification costs might apply in some private and public financial contexts, and suggest some solutions in those contexts as well.