Terrorist violence is no novelty in human history and, while government reactions to it have varied over time, some lessons can be learnt from the past. Indeed, the debate on when and how a state should use emergency powers that limit individual freedoms is nearly as old as the history of political thought. After reviewing some history of state responses to terrorist violence and their efficacy, this book sets out to assess the effects of contemporary counterterrorism law and policies on democratic states. In particular, it considers the interaction between national and international law in shaping and implementing anti-terror measures, and the difficult role of the judiciary in striking a balance between security concerns and fundamental rights. It also examines the strains this has caused on some democracies, especially a blurring in the separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government, giving reason to enquire afresh whether new paradigms are needed. Finally, the issue of whether the doctrine of constitutionalism can provide an appropriate frame of analysis to encapsulate current developments in international law in response to terrorism is broached. By drawing on the expertise of historians, political scientists and lawyers, this book promotes transdisciplinary dialogue, recognising that counterterrorism is an issue at the intersection of law and politics that has profound implications for democratic institutions and practices.

Just War has attracted considerable attention. The words peace and justice are often used together. Surprisingly, however, little conceptual thinking has gone into what constitutes a Just Peace. This book, which includes some of the world's leading scholars, debates and develops the concept of Just Peace. The problem with the idea of a Just Peace is that striving for justice may imply a Just War. In other words, peace and justice clash at times. Therefore, one often starts from a given view of what constitutes justice, but this a priori approach leads - especially when imposed from the outside - straight into discord. This book presents conflicting viewpoints on this question from political, historical, and legal perspectives as well as from a policy perspective. The book also argues that Just Peace should be defined as a process resting on four necessary and sufficient conditions: thin recognition whereby the other is accepted as autonomous; thick recognition whereby identities need to be accounted for; renouncement, requiring significant sacrifices from all parties; and finally, rule, the objectification of a Just Peace by a "text" requiring a common language respecting the identities of each, and defining their rights and duties. This approach based on a language-oriented process amongst directly concerned parties, goes beyond liberal and culturalist perspectives. Throughout the process, negotiators need to build a novel shared reality as well as a new common language allowing for an enduring harmony between previously clashing peoples. It challenges a liberal view of peace founded on norms claiming universal scope. The liberal conception has difficulty in solving conflicts such as civil wars characterized typically by fundamental disagreements between different communities. Cultures make demands that are identity-defining, and some of these defy the "cultural neutrality" that is one of the foundations of liberalism. Therefore, the concept of Just Peace cannot be solved within the liberal tradition.

Just war has attracted considerable attention. The words peace and justice are often used together. Surprisingly, however, little conceptual thinking has gone into what constitutes a just peace. This book, which includes some of the world's leading scholars, debates and develops the concept of just peace.
The problem with the idea of a just peace is that striving for justice may imply a just war. In other words, peace and justice clash at times. Therefore, one often starts from a given view of what constitutes justice, but this a priori approach leads--especially when imposed from the outside--straight into discord. This book presents conflicting viewpoints on this question from political, historical, and legal perspectives as well as from a policy perspective.
This book also argues that a just peace is a mediated peace. It is just, because it is based on conventions that are negotiated and recognized by the parties. Mutual recognition is central: parties recognize each other as agents that have an identity. Consent is necessary, too: all parties need to approve a solution; therefore, each party needs to understand what allows the other to remain "self." And renouncement: concessions are necessary, some symbols and positions need to be sacrificed. In this sense, the Geneva Initiative--the first comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace plan--is a mediated peace.
Thus the book challenges a liberal view of peace founded on norms claiming universal scope. This liberal conception has difficulty in solving conflicts such as civil wars characterized typically by fundamental disagreements between different communities. Cultures make demands that are identity-defining, and some ofthese defy the "cultural neutrality" that is one of the foundations of liberalism. Thus, the concept of just peace cannot be solved within liberalism--nor for that matter within communitarianism.