This volume provides a comprehensive analysis of how politics shape housing markets and vice-versa. It demonstrates how housing impacts a variety of social and political phenomenon including populist politics, generational divides, wealth inequality, monetary policy, and the welfare state. Housing and housing markets have important implications for economic stability, public policy, domestic politics and wealth inequality in Europe and beyond. Yet despite its importance, housing has received relatively little attention in comparative politics scholarship. The contributions within this volume push the scholarship of housing into fresh, innovative directions. The chapters focus on housing’s contribution to wealth inequality, how housing constrains governments’ policy choices in welfare state reform and how it can strengthen governments’ hands in financial regulation. Other contributions reveal the impact of housing on central bankers’ motivations for implementing monetary expansion, highlight the generational divide in gaining access to home-ownership, demonstrate how housing-driven wealth inequality steers voters political preferences towards right-wing populism, and explain how housing gradually shifted from being a social right to an object of investment in Europe, even within its most egalitarian states. These contributions cover a diversity of cases in Western and Eastern Europe and theoretical paradigms that will appeal to scholars and policy makers alike. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of West European Politics.

The 2009 European sovereign debt crisis and the EU’s policy response to it have prompted scholars to re-think whether diverse national models of capitalism can thrive within the European Union (EU). Are some national economic systems better suited to adapt to European integration than others, and if so, why? Contributions within this volume provide a qualified yes to these questions raised, concluding that the EU favors export-led growth models while it penalizes and discourages domestic consumption-oriented growth paths, particularly those that are financed by debt-accumulation. The book questions whether the EU is capable of integrating these diverse capitalist regimes. This volume adds a comparative capitalism perspective to EU integration scholarship in order to demonstrate that ever-closer union is not capable of accommodating diversity in national economic institutions. Chapters in this volume provide an innovative framework for understanding what factors related to European integration impede the economic and political integration of diverse European market economies. While recent comparative capitalism literature highlights that European monetary integration has favored export-led growth regimes, contributions in this volume outline that the EU’s prioritization of export-led growth over domestic-demand led growth is present in other facets of integration, including EU accession, financial integration, the free movement of people, fiscal governance and the Europe 2020 growth strategy. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of New Political Economy.

This volume provides a comprehensive analysis of how politics shape housing markets and vice-versa. It demonstrates how housing impacts a variety of social and political phenomenon including populist politics, generational divides, wealth inequality, monetary policy, and the welfare state. Housing and housing markets have important implications for economic stability, public policy, domestic politics and wealth inequality in Europe and beyond. Yet despite its importance, housing has received relatively little attention in comparative politics scholarship. The contributions within this volume push the scholarship of housing into fresh, innovative directions. The chapters focus on housing's contribution to wealth inequality, how housing constrains governments' policy choices in welfare state reform and how it can strengthen governments' hands in financial regulation. Other contributions reveal the impact of housing on central bankers' motivations for implementing monetary expansion, highlight the generational divide in gaining access to home-ownership, demonstrate how housing-driven wealth inequality steers voters political preferences towards right-wing populism, and explain how housing gradually shifted from being a social right to an object of investment in Europe, even within its most egalitarian states. These contributions cover a diversity of cases in Western and Eastern Europe and theoretical paradigms that will appeal to scholars and policy makers alike. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of West European Politics.

The 2009 European sovereign debt crisis and the EU's policy response to it have prompted scholars to re-think whether diverse national models of capitalism can thrive within the European Union (EU). Are some national economic systems better suited to adapt to European integration than others, and if so, why? Contributions within this volume provide a qualified yes to these questions raised, concluding that the EU favors export-led growth models while it penalizes and discourages domestic consumption-oriented growth paths, particularly those that are financed by debt-accumulation. The book questions whether the EU is capable of integrating these diverse capitalist regimes. This volume adds a comparative capitalism perspective to EU integration scholarship in order to demonstrate that ever-closer union is not capable of accommodating diversity in national economic institutions. Chapters in this volume provide an innovative framework for understanding what factors related to European integration impede the economic and political integration of diverse European market economies. While recent comparative capitalism literature highlights that European monetary integration has favored export-led growth regimes, contributions in this volume outline that the EU's prioritization of export-led growth over domestic-demand led growth is present in other facets of integration, including EU accession, financial integration, the free movement of people, fiscal governance and the Europe 2020 growth strategy. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of New Political Economy.

What explains Eurozone member-states' divergent exposure to Europe's sovereign debt crisis? Deviating from current fiscal and financial views, From Convergence to Crisis focuses on labor markets in a narrative that distinguishes the winners from the losers in the euro crisis. Alison Johnston argues that Europe's monetary union was structured in a way that advantaged the corporatist labor markets of its northern economies in external trade and financial lending. Northern Europe's distinct economic advantage lay not with its fiscal capabilities, which were not that different from those of southern Eurozone countries, but with its wage-setting institutions. Through highly coordinated collective bargaining, the euro North persistently undercut the inflation performance of southern trading partners, destining them to a perpetual cycle of competitive decline and external borrowing. While northern Europe's corporatist labor markets were always low inflation performers, monetary union ultimately made their wage-setting institutions toxic for the South.The euro's institutional predecessor, the European Monetary System, included economic and institutional mechanisms that facilitated macroeconomic adjustment and convergence between the common currency's corporatist and noncorporatist economies. Combining cross-national statistical analysis with detailed qualitative case studies of Denmark, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Spain, Johnston reveals that monetary union's removal of these mechanisms allowed external imbalances between these two blocs to grow unchecked, underpinning the crisis in which Europe currently finds itself. Rather than achieving the EU's goal of an ever-closer union, the common currency produced a monetary environment that destabilized the economic integration of its diverse labor markets.

How do countries' political and policy choices affect the credit ratings they receive? Sovereign ratings influence countries' cost of funding, and observers have long worried that rating agencies - these unelected, unappointed, unaccountable, for-profit organizations - can interfere with democratic sovereignty if they assign lower ratings to certain political and policy choices. The questions of whether, how, and why ratings react to policy and politics, however, remain unexplored. Rating Politics opens the black box of sovereign ratings to uncover the logic that drives rating responses to political and policy factors. Relying on statistical analysis of rating scores, interviews with sovereign rating analysts, and a close reading of the official communications of rating agencies about their decisions, Zsófia Barta and Alison Johnston show that ratings penalize center-left governments and many (though not all) policies associated with the center-left agenda. The motivation for such penalties is not rooted in assumptions about how those political and policy features affect growth and debt servicing capacity. Instead, ratings are lower in the presence of those features because they are expected to make a country more vulnerable to market panics whenever the economy is hit by unforeseen shocks, as they signal insufficient willingness and/or ability to engage in determined austerity for the sake of reassuring markets. Since market panics and the resulting "sudden stops" of funding lead to humiliating collapses of ratings, rating agencies attempt to insure themselves against "rating failures" by pre-emptively assigning lower ratings to countries with the "wrong" political and policy mix.