Definitions of the "Al-Aqsa" intifada have ranged from being part of the global war on terrorism, an asymmetric inter-state war, to being part of the on-going Palestinian struggle for national liberation. All have validity as explanatory paradigms, but equally, none can capture fully the dynamics of this conflict. By contrast, this volume seeks to explore whether the current violence, its origins and dynamics can best be understood as a manifestation of civil war. In so doing, it explores the following questions: how the use of violence by all parties has been conditioned and or constrained by the domestic factors pertaining to their societies; how external actors have dealt with the violence internally, and how, in turn, this has impacted on their relations with Israel and the Palestinians; and what does the conduct and scope of the Al-Aqsa intifada suggest about the broader issue of state boundaries and state legitimacy in the contemporary Middle East?
This volume was previously published as a special issue of the journal "Civil Wars,"

This book is the definitive guide to the topical issue of the relationship between political parties that embrace the democratic process and terrorist groups which eschew the legal and procedural strictures of democracy.

The fully revised edition continues to provide the most detailed theoretical and empirical analysis of this controversial issue, highlighting the fluid nature of boundaries between terrorist organisation and legitimate political party. Drawing on a vast array of data, the authors examine a large number of international case studies from Italy, Spain, Lebanon, Turkey, Iran, Israel, Palestine, Peru, Argentina, Japan and Northern Ireland.

By incorporating substantial new material on ETA, Hizbollah and Hamas, this book retains its position at the forefront of the worldwide political discussion on terrorism, and continues to be essential reading for all students, academics and readers with an interest in security studies, terrorism and political violence

This book is the definitive guide to the topical issue of the relationship between political parties that embrace the democratic process and terrorist groups which eschew the legal and procedural strictures of democracy.

The fully revised edition continues to provide the most detailed theoretical and empirical analysis of this controversial issue, highlighting the fluid nature of boundaries between terrorist organisation and legitimate political party. Drawing on a vast array of data, the authors examine a large number of international case studies from Italy, Spain, Lebanon, Turkey, Iran, Israel, Palestine, Peru, Argentina, Japan and Northern Ireland.

By incorporating substantial new material on ETA, Hizbollah and Hamas, this book retains its position at the forefront of the worldwide political discussion on terrorism, and continues to be essential reading for all students, academics and readers with an interest in security studies, terrorism and political violence

This volume seeks to explore whether the current violence, its origins and dynamics can best be understood as a manifestation of civil war. In so doing, it considers how the use of violence by all parties has been conditioned and/or constrained by the domestic factors pertaining to their societies, how external actors have dealt with the violence internally, and how this has impacted on their relations with Israel and the Palestinians, and what does the conduct and scope of the al-Aqsa Intifada suggest about the broader issue of state boundaries and state legitimacy in the contemporary Middle East? This volume was previously published as a special issue of the journal Civil Wars.

Suicide terrorism in its modern form appeared in the 1980s. The first organization to use this strategy was the Shi'ite Hizbollah in Lebanon. Later, it was adopted by many terrorist organizations in the Middle East and Asia. This new study shows how there are at least two reasons to question the central role that is assigned to religion and more specifically Islam when explaining suicide terrorism. First, suicide terrorism is a modern phenomenon, yet Islam is a very old religion. Except for two periods in the 12th and 18th centuries, suicide was never part of Islamist beliefs and behaviors. Actually, Islam clearly forbids suicide. Hence, the argument that Islamic religious beliefs are the main cause of suicide terrorism is inherently dubious. Second, many suicide attacks have been carried out by secular organizations with little connection to fundamentalist Islam: Palestinian Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Kurdish Workers Party. Moreover, one of the organizations that has employed this strategy devastatingly and regularly is the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam). Not only are members of this organization not Muslim, most of them are not religious at all.
This superb book contains essays by some of the world's leading scholars of terrorism and political violence. It is essential reading for students of terrorism, political science and Middle Eastern politics, and useful to students of social psychology, theology and history.

Contributors to this volume explore the relationships between fundamentalist religious belief, political extremism and outbreaks of religiously inspired violence. Is the post-Cold War world increasingly violent and is this violence the result of increasingly strident religious understandings of how societies should be organised? The contributors to this volume do not always agree on the answers to these questions. But they do agreee the questions themselves are among the most important to be posed in the early years of the 21st century.

Contributors to this volume explore the relationships between fundamentalist religious belief, political extremism and outbreaks of religiously inspired violence. Is the post-Cold War world increasingly violent and is this violence the result of increasingly strident religious understandings of how societies should be organised? The contributors to this volume do not always agree on the answers to these questions. But they do agreee the questions themselves are among the most important to be posed in the early years of the 21st century.

Suicide terrorism in its modern form appeared in the 1980s. The first organization to use this strategy was the Shi'ite Hizbollah in Lebanon. Later, it was adopted by many terrorist organizations in the Middle East and Asia. This new study shows how there are at least two reasons to question the central role that is assigned to religion and more specifically Islam when explaining suicide terrorism. First, suicide terrorism is a modern phenomenon, yet Islam is a very old religion. Except for two periods in the 12th and 18th centuries, suicide was never part of Islamist beliefs and behaviors. Actually, Islam clearly forbids suicide. Hence, the argument that Islamic religious beliefs are the main cause of suicide terrorism is inherently dubious. Second, many suicide attacks have been carried out by secular organizations with little connection to fundamentalist Islam: Palestinian Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Kurdish Workers Party. Moreover, one of the organizations that has employed this strategy devastatingly and regularly is the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam). Not only are members of this organization not Muslim, most of them are not religious at all.
This superb book contains essays by some of the world's leading scholars of terrorism and political violence. It is essential reading for students of terrorism, political science and Middle Eastern politics, and useful to students of social psychology, theology and history.

Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, world experts on the study of terror and security, propose a theory of violence that contextualizes not only recent acts of terror but also instances of terrorism that stretch back centuries. Beginning with ancient Palestine and its encounters with Jewish terrorism, the authors analyze the social, political, and cultural factors that sponsor extreme violence, proving religious terrorism is not the fault of one faith, but flourishes within any counterculture that adheres to a totalistic ideology.

When a totalistic community perceives an external threat, the connectivity of the group and the rhetoric of its leaders bolster the collective mindset of members, who respond with violence. In ancient times, the Jewish "sicarii" of Judea carried out stealth assassinations against their Roman occupiers. In the mid-twentieth century, to facilitate their independence, Jewish groups committed acts of terror against British soldiers and the Arab population in Palestine. More recently, Yigal Amir, a member of a Jewish terrorist cell, assassinated Yitzhak Rabin to express his opposition to the Oslo Peace Accords.

Conducting interviews with former Jewish terrorists, political and spiritual leaders, and law-enforcement officials, and culling information from rare documents and surveys of terrorist networks, Pedahzur and Perliger construct an extensive portrait of terrorist aggression, while also describing the conditions behind the modern rise of zealotry.

Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, world experts on the study of terror and security, propose a theory of violence that contextualizes not only recent acts of terror but also instances of terrorism that stretch back centuries. Beginning with ancient Palestine and its encounters with Jewish terrorism, the authors analyze the social, political, and cultural factors that sponsor extreme violence, proving religious terrorism is not the fault of one faith, but flourishes within any counterculture that adheres to a totalistic ideology.

When a totalistic community perceives an external threat, the connectivity of the group and the rhetoric of its leaders bolster the collective mindset of members, who respond with violence. In ancient times, the Jewish "sicarii" of Judea carried out stealth assassinations against their Roman occupiers. In the mid-twentieth century, to facilitate their independence, Jewish groups committed acts of terror against British soldiers and the Arab population in Palestine. More recently, Yigal Amir, a member of a Jewish terrorist cell, assassinated Yitzhak Rabin to express his opposition to the Oslo Peace Accords.

Conducting interviews with former Jewish terrorists, political and spiritual leaders, and law-enforcement officials, and culling information from rare documents and surveys of terrorist networks, Pedahzur and Perliger construct an extensive portrait of terrorist aggression, while also describing the conditions behind the modern rise of zealotry.

While Mossad is known as one of the world's most successful terrorist-fighting organizations, the state of Israel has, more than once and on many levels, risked the lives of its agents and soldiers through unwise intelligence-based intervention. The elimination of Palestinian leaders and militants has not decreased the incidence of Palestinian terrorism, for example. In fact, these incidents have become more lethal than ever, and ample evidence suggests that the actions of Israeli intelligence have fueled terrorist activities across the globe.

An expert on terror and political extremism, Ami Pedahzur argues that Israel's strict reliance on the elite units of the intelligence community is fundamentally flawed. A unique synthesis of memoir, academic research, and information gathered from print and online sources, Pedahzur's complex study explores this issue through Israel's past encounters with terrorists, specifically hostage rescue missions, the first and second wars in Lebanon, the challenges of the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian terrorist groups, and Hezbollah. He brings a rare transparency to Israel's counterterrorist activities, highlighting their successes and failures and the factors that have contributed to these results. From the foundations of this analysis, Pedahzur ultimately builds a strategy for future confrontation that will be relevant not only to Israel but also to other countries that have adopted Israel's intelligence-based model.

While Mossad is known as one of the world's most successful terrorist-fighting organizations, the state of Israel has, more than once and on many levels, risked the lives of its agents and soldiers through unwise intelligence-based intervention. The elimination of Palestinian leaders and militants has not decreased the incidence of Palestinian terrorism, for example. In fact, these incidents have become more lethal than ever, and ample evidence suggests that the actions of Israeli intelligence have fueled terrorist activities across the globe.

An expert on terror and political extremism, Ami Pedahzur argues that Israel's strict reliance on the elite units of the intelligence community is fundamentally flawed. A unique synthesis of memoir, academic research, and information gathered from print and online sources, Pedahzur's complex study explores this issue through Israel's past encounters with terrorists, specifically hostage rescue missions, the first and second wars in Lebanon, the challenges of the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian terrorist groups, and Hezbollah. He brings a rare transparency to Israel's counterterrorist activities, highlighting their successes and failures and the factors that have contributed to these results. From the foundations of this analysis, Pedahzur ultimately builds a strategy for future confrontation that will be relevant not only to Israel but also to other countries that have adopted Israel's intelligence-based model.

Two decades ago, the idea that a "radical right" could capture and drive Israeli politics seemed highly improbable. While it was a boisterous faction and received heavy media coverage, it constituted a fringe element. Yet by 2009, Israel's radical right had not only entrenched itself in mainstream Israeli politics, it was dictating policy in a wide range of areas. The government has essentially caved to the settlers on the West Bank, and restrictions on non-Jews in Israel have increased in the past few years. Members of the radical right have assumed prominent positions in Israel's elite security forces. The possibility of a two state solution seems more remote than ever, and the emergence of ethnonationalist politician Avigdor Lieberman suggests that its power is increasing. Quite simply, if we want to understand the seemingly intractable situation in Israel today, we need a comprehensive account of the radical right. In The Triumph of Israel's Radical Right, acclaimed scholar Ami Pedahzur provides an invaluable and authoritative analysis of its ascendance to the heights of Israeli politics. After analyzing what, exactly, they believe in, he explains how mainstream Israeli policies like "the right of return" have served as unexpected foundations for their nativism and authoritarian tendencies. He then traces the right's steady rise, from the first intifada to the "Greater Israel" movement that is so prominent today. Throughout, he focuses on the radical right's institutional networks and how the movement has been able to expand its constituency. His closing chapter is grim yet realistic: he contends that a two state solution is no longer viable and that the vision of the radical rabbi Meir Kahane, who was a fringe figure while alive, has triumphed.