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This challenging study places fiction squarely at the center of the
discussion of metaphysics. Philosophers have traditionally treated
fiction as involving a set of narrow problems in logic or the
philosophy of language. By contrast Amie Thomasson argues that
fiction has far-reaching implications for central problems of
metaphysics. The book develops an "artifactual" theory of fiction,
whereby fictional characters are abstract artifacts as ordinary as
laws or symphonies or works of literature. In taking seriously the
work of literary scholars and in citing a wide range of literary
examples, this book will interest not only philosophers concerned
with metaphysics and the philosophy of language, but also those in
literary theory interested in these foundational issues.
This challenging study places fiction squarely at the center of the
discussion of metaphysics. Philosophers have traditionally treated
fiction as involving a set of narrow problems in logic or the
philosophy of language. By contrast Amie Thomasson argues that
fiction has far-reaching implications for central problems of
metaphysics. The book develops an "artifactual" theory of fiction,
whereby fictional characters are abstract artifacts as ordinary as
laws or symphonies or works of literature. In taking seriously the
work of literary scholars and in citing a wide range of literary
examples, this book will interest not only philosophers concerned
with metaphysics and the philosophy of language, but also those in
literary theory interested in these foundational issues.
Philosophical work on the mind flowed in two streams through the
20th century: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The
phenomenological tradition began with Brentano and was developed by
such great European philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and
Merleau-Ponty. As the century advanced, Anglophone philosophers
increasingly developed their own distinct styles and methods of
studying the mind, and a gulf seemed to open up between the two
traditions. This volume aims to bring them together again, by
demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to significant
progress on problems central to current analytic research, and how
analytical philosophy of mind may shed light on phenomenological
concerns. Leading figures from both traditions contribute specially
written essays on such central topics as consciousness,
intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal
awareness, and mental content. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind
demonstrates that these different approaches to the mind should not
stand in opposition to each other, but can be mutually
illuminating.
Philosophical work on the mind flowed in two streams through the
20th century: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The
phenomenological tradition began with Brentano and was developed by
such great European philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and
Merleau-Ponty. As the century advanced, Anglophone philosophers
increasingly developed their own distinct styles and methods of
studying the mind, and a gulf seemed to open up between the two
traditions. This volume aims to bring them together again, by
demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to significant
progress on problems central to current analytic research, and how
analytical philosophy of mind may shed light on phenomenological
concerns. Leading figures from both traditions contribute specially
written essays on such central topics as consciousness,
intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal
awareness, and mental content. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind
demonstrates that these different approaches to the mind should not
stand in opposition to each other, but can be mutually
illuminating.
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