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When can the Executive manipulate the composition of a Court? What
political factors explain judicial instability on the bench? Using
original field data from Argentina's National Supreme Court and all
twenty-four Provincial Supreme Courts, Andrea Castagnola develops a
novel theory to explain forced retirements of judges. She argues
that in developing democracies the political benefits of
manipulating the court outweigh the costs associated with doing so.
The instability of the political context and its institutions
causes politicians to focus primarily on short-term goals and to
care mostly about winning elections. Consequently, judiciaries
become a valuable tool for politicians to have under their control.
Contrary to the predictions of strategic retirement theory,
Castagnola demonstrates that there are various institutional and
non-institutional mechanisms for induced retirement which
politicians have used against justices, regardless of the amount of
support their party has in Congress. The theoretical innovations
contained herein shed much needed light on the existing literature
on judicial politics and democratization. Even though the political
manipulation of courts is a worldwide phenomenon, previous studies
have shown that Argentina is the theory-generating case for
studying manipulation of high courts.
After more than seventy years of uninterrupted authoritarian
government headed by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional
(PRI), Mexico formally began the transition to democracy in 2000.
Unlike most other new democracies in Latin America, no special
Constitutional Court was set up, nor was there any designated bench
of the Supreme Court for constitutional adjudication. Instead, the
judiciary saw its powers expand incrementally. Under this new
context inevitable questions emerged: How have the justices
interpreted the constitution? What is the relation of the court
with the other political institutions? How much autonomy do
justices display in their decisions? Has the court considered the
necessary adjustments to face the challenges of democracy? It has
become essential in studying the new role of the Supreme Court to
obtain a more accurate and detailed diagnosis of the performances
of its justices in this new political environment. Through critical
review of relevant debates and using original data sets to
empirically analyze the way justices voted on the three main means
of constitutional control from 2000 through 2011, leading legal
scholars provide a thoughtful and much needed new interpretation of
the role the judiciary plays in a country's transition to democracy
This book is designed for graduate courses in law and courts,
judicial politics, comparative judicial politics, Latin American
institutions, and transitions to democracy. This book will equip
scholars and students with the knowledge required to understand the
importance of the independence of the judiciary in the transition
to democracy.
After more than seventy years of uninterrupted authoritarian
government headed by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional
(PRI), Mexico formally began the transition to democracy in 2000.
Unlike most other new democracies in Latin America, no special
Constitutional Court was set up, nor was there any designated bench
of the Supreme Court for constitutional adjudication. Instead, the
judiciary saw its powers expand incrementally. Under this new
context inevitable questions emerged: How have the justices
interpreted the constitution? What is the relation of the court
with the other political institutions? How much autonomy do
justices display in their decisions? Has the court considered the
necessary adjustments to face the challenges of democracy? It has
become essential in studying the new role of the Supreme Court to
obtain a more accurate and detailed diagnosis of the performances
of its justices in this new political environment. Through critical
review of relevant debates and using original data sets to
empirically analyze the way justices voted on the three main means
of constitutional control from 2000 through 2011, leading legal
scholars provide a thoughtful and much needed new interpretation of
the role the judiciary plays in a country's transition to democracy
This book is designed for graduate courses in law and courts,
judicial politics, comparative judicial politics, Latin American
institutions, and transitions to democracy. This book will equip
scholars and students with the knowledge required to understand the
importance of the independence of the judiciary in the transition
to democracy.
When can the Executive manipulate the composition of a Court? What
political factors explain judicial instability on the bench? Using
original field data from Argentina's National Supreme Court and all
twenty-four Provincial Supreme Courts, Andrea Castagnola develops a
novel theory to explain forced retirements of judges. She argues
that in developing democracies the political benefits of
manipulating the court outweigh the costs associated with doing so.
The instability of the political context and its institutions
causes politicians to focus primarily on short-term goals and to
care mostly about winning elections. Consequently, judiciaries
become a valuable tool for politicians to have under their control.
Contrary to the predictions of strategic retirement theory,
Castagnola demonstrates that there are various institutional and
non-institutional mechanisms for induced retirement which
politicians have used against justices, regardless of the amount of
support their party has in Congress. The theoretical innovations
contained herein shed much needed light on the existing literature
on judicial politics and democratization. Even though the political
manipulation of courts is a worldwide phenomenon, previous studies
have shown that Argentina is the theory-generating case for
studying manipulation of high courts.
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