![]() |
![]() |
Your cart is empty |
||
Showing 1 - 2 of 2 matches in All Departments
This monograph provides a novel reliabilist approach to epistemic responsibility assessment. The author presents unique arguments for the epistemic significance of belief-influencing actions and omissions. She grounds her proposal in indirect doxastic control. The book consists of four chapters. The first two chapters look at the different ways in which an agent might control the revision, retention, or rejection of her beliefs. They provide a systematic overview of the different approaches to doxastic control and contain a thorough study of reasons-responsive approaches to direct and indirect doxastic control. The third chapter provides a reliabilist approach to epistemic responsibility assessment which is based on indirect doxastic control. In the fourth chapter, the author examines epistemic peer disagreement and applies her reliabilist approach to epistemic responsibility assessment to this debate. She argues that the epistemic significance of peer disagreement does not only rely on the way in which an agent should revise her belief in the face of disagreement, it also relies on the way in which an agent should act. This book deals with questions of meliorative epistemology in general and with questions concerning doxastic responsibility and epistemic responsibility assessment in particular. It will appeal to graduate students and researchers with an interest in epistemology.
This monograph provides a novel reliabilist approach to epistemic responsibility assessment. The author presents unique arguments for the epistemic significance of belief-influencing actions and omissions. She grounds her proposal in indirect doxastic control. The book consists of four chapters. The first two chapters look at the different ways in which an agent might control the revision, retention, or rejection of her beliefs. They provide a systematic overview of the different approaches to doxastic control and contain a thorough study of reasons-responsive approaches to direct and indirect doxastic control. The third chapter provides a reliabilist approach to epistemic responsibility assessment which is based on indirect doxastic control. In the fourth chapter, the author examines epistemic peer disagreement and applies her reliabilist approach to epistemic responsibility assessment to this debate. She argues that the epistemic significance of peer disagreement does not only rely on the way in which an agent should revise her belief in the face of disagreement, it also relies on the way in which an agent should act. This book deals with questions of meliorative epistemology in general and with questions concerning doxastic responsibility and epistemic responsibility assessment in particular. It will appeal to graduate students and researchers with an interest in epistemology.
|
![]() ![]() You may like...
Sizzlers - The Hate Crime That Tore Sea…
Nicole Engelbrecht
Paperback
The Asian Aspiration - Why And How…
Greg Mills, Olusegun Obasanjo, …
Paperback
Democracy Works - Re-Wiring Politics To…
Greg Mills, Olusegun Obasanjo, …
Paperback
We Were Perfect Parents Until We Had…
Vanessa Raphaely, Karin Schimke
Paperback
Heart Of A Strong Woman - From Daveyton…
Xoliswa Nduneni-Ngema, Fred Khumalo
Paperback
Because I Couldn't Kill You - On Her…
Kelly-Eve Koopman
Paperback
![]()
The South African Guide To Gluten-Free…
Zorah Booley Samaai
Paperback
Palaces Of Stone - Uncovering Ancient…
Mike Main, Thomas Huffman
Paperback
|