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Biology and history are often viewed as closely related
disciplines, with biology informed by history, especially in its
task of charting our evolutionary past. Maximizing the
opportunities for cross-fertilization in these two fields requires
an accurate reckoning of their commonalities and
differences—precisely what this volume sets out to achieve.
Specially commissioned essays by a team of recognized international
researchers cover the full panoply of topics in these fields and
include notable contributions on the correlativity of evolutionary
and historical explanations, applying to history the latest
causal-mechanical approach in the philosophy of biology, and the
question of generalized laws that might pertain across the two
subjects.  The collection opens with a vital
interrogation of general issues on explanation that apart from
potentially fruitful areas of interaction (could the etiology of
the causal-mechanical perspective in biology account for the
historical trajectory of the Roman Empire?) this volume also seeks
to chart relative certainties distinguishing explanations in
biology and history. It also assesses techniques such as the use of
probabilities in biological reconstruction, deployed to overcome
the inevitable gaps in physical evidence on early evolution.
Methodologies such as causal graphs and semantic explanation
receive in-depth analysis. Contributions from a host of prominent
and widely read philosophers ensure that this new volume has the
stature of a major addition to the literature. ​
What are the metaphysical commitments which best 'make sense' of
our scientific practice (rather than our scientific theories)? In
this book, Andreas Hüttemann provides a minimal metaphysics for
scientific practice, i.e. a metaphysics that refrains from
postulating any structure that is explanatorily
irrelevant. Hüttemann closely analyses paradigmatic aspects
of scientific practice, such as prediction, explanation and
manipulation, to consider the questions whether and (if so) what
metaphysical presuppositions best account for these practices. He
looks at the role which scientific generalisation (laws of nature)
play in predicting, testing, and explaining the behaviour of
systems. He also develops a theory of causation in terms of
quasi-inertial processes and interfering factors, and he proposes
an account of reductive practices that makes minimal metaphysical
assumptions. His book will be valuable for scholars and advanced
students working in both philosophy of science and metaphysics.
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