A sense of order has irreversibly retreated at the turn of the twenty-first century with the rise of such ancient civilizations as China and India and the militant resurgence of Islamic groups. The United States and like-minded states want to maintain the once-dominant international and global order buttressed by a set of mainly Western value systems and institutions. Nevertheless, challengers have sought to redraw the international and global order according to their own ideas and preferences, while selectively accommodating and taking advantage of the established order. Because of this, the entire world is teetering on the brink of an order war. This book is a synthesis of two separate bodies of thoughts, from Western and East Asian ideas and philosophies respectively. The authors deploy the major ideas of key Western and East Asian thinkers to shed a new light on their usefulness in understanding the transition of global order. They locate new ideas to overcome the contradictions of the late modern world and provide some ideational building blocks of a new global order. The new concepts proposed are: recognition between the great civilizations; a harmony and floating balance between and within contrasts-individual versus community, freedom versus equality-;and mediation between friends and foes. As the former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin put it, "you don't need to make peace with your friends, you have to make peace with your foes." The values of the West as well as that of the East cannot survive in a globalized world by taking them as absolute, but only by balancing them to those of the other great civilizations of the world.

A sense of order has irreversibly retreated at the turn of the twenty-first century with the rise of such ancient civilizations as China and India and the militant resurgence of Islamic groups. The United States and like-minded states want to maintain the once-dominant international and global order buttressed by a set of mainly Western value systems and institutions. Nevertheless, challengers have sought to redraw the international and global order according to their own ideas and preferences, while selectively accommodating and taking advantage of the established order. Because of this, the entire world is teetering on the brink of an order war. This book is a synthesis of two separate bodies of thoughts, from Western and East Asian ideas and philosophies respectively. The authors deploy the major ideas of key Western and East Asian thinkers to shed a new light on their usefulness in understanding the transition of global order. They locate new ideas to overcome the contradictions of the late modern world and provide some ideational building blocks of a new global order. The new concepts proposed are: recognition between the great civilizations; a harmony and floating balance between and within contrasts-individual versus community, freedom versus equality-;and mediation between friends and foes. As the former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin put it, "you don't need to make peace with your friends, you have to make peace with your foes." The values of the West as well as that of the East cannot survive in a globalized world by taking them as absolute, but only by balancing them to those of the other great civilizations of the world.

This groundbreaking volume offers a historical comparison between the events leading up to World War I and current global tensions related to the economical and political rise of Asia. What are the risks that the desire of the new super power China and great powers like India to be recognized by the West could set off a chain of events resulting in the nightmare of a great power war? Assessing the similarities as well as differences between the build-up of World War I and today, it is argued that we need to understand the driving forces behind the scene of global politics: The conflict between rising, established, and disintegrating powers and the desire of recognition on all sides. Carefully dissecting the current power dynamics in play, the authors hope to contribute to a better understanding of world events in order to ensure that history will not repeat itself.

Clausewitz's On War has, at least until very recently, been regarded as the most important work of theory on its subject. But since the end of the Cold War in 1990, and even more since the 9/11 attacks on the United states in 2001, an increasing number of commentators have argued that On War has lost its analytical edge as a tool for understanding war. They have argued that Clausewitz was concerned solely with inter-state war and with properly defined armies, and that the sorts of conflicts which he discussed are therefore part of a historical pattern which dominated Europe between 1648, the end of the Thirty Years War, and 1990 itself. Some have gone further, and suggested that Clausewitz's best known aphorism, that war is a continuation of policy by other means, is not only irrelevant today but also inapplicable historically. Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century reconsiders the principal themes in Clausewitz's writings from a contemporary perspective, and finds in them much more inspiration and insight than these generalisations allow. Embracing the perspectives of history, philosophy and political science, the book reconsiders both the text and its current implications. Traditional interpretations of On War are put into fresh light; neglected passages are re-examined; and new insights are derived from the conjunction between Clausewitz's text and today's challenges. This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War.

Blending detailed contextual analysis with issues in modern-day international relations this book provides a major new analysis of the theory of Clausewitz and its relevance to contemporary society. This book argues that Clausewitz developed a wide-ranging political theory of war by reflecting on the success, the limitations, and the failure of Napoleon's method of waging war, a theory, which is still relevant in light of contemporary conflict. This new interpretation is the result of reflecting on Clausewitz's theory in light of the new developments and lays down the foundation of a general theory of war by concentrating on Clausewitz's historical analyses of war campaigns. For the first time analysis of three paradigmatic military campaigns is placed at the centre of understanding surrounding Clausewitz's 'On War': The author argues that the limitations of Napoleon's strategy, as revealed in Russia and in his final defeat, enabled Clausewitz to develop a general theory of war. This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War.

This groundbreaking volume offers a historical comparison between the events leading up to World War I and current global tensions related to the economical and political rise of Asia. What are the risks that the desire of the new superpower China and great powers like India to be recognized by the West could set off a chain of events resulting in the nightmare of a great power war? Assessing the similarities as well as differences between the build-up of World War I and today, one needs to understand the driving forces behind the scene of global politics: The conflict between rising, established, and disintegrating powers and the desire for recognition on all sides. Carefully dissecting the current power dynamics in play, the authors hope to contribute to a better understanding of world events in order to ensure that history will not repeat itself.