Statistical mechanics attempts to explain the behaviour of macroscopic physical systems in terms of the mechanical properties of their constituents. Although it is one of the fundamental theories of physics, it has received little attention from philosophers of science. Nevertheless, it raises philosophical questions of fundamental importance on the nature of time, chance and reduction. Most philosophical issues in this domain relate to the question of the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. This book addresses issues inherent in this reduction: the time-asymmetry of thermodynamics and its absence in statistical mechanics; the role and essential nature of chance and probability in this reduction when thermodynamics is non-probabilistic; and how, if at all, the reduction is possible. Compiling contributions on current research by experts in the field, this is an invaluable survey of the philosophy of statistical mechanics for academic researchers and graduate students interested in the foundations of physics.

Biology and history are often viewed as closely related disciplines, with biology informed by history, especially in its task of charting our evolutionary past. Maximizing the opportunities for cross-fertilization in these two fields requires an accurate reckoning of their commonalities and differences-precisely what this volume sets out to achieve. Specially commissioned essays by a team of recognized international researchers cover the full panoply of topics in these fields and include notable contributions on the correlativity of evolutionary and historical explanations, applying to history the latest causal-mechanical approach in the philosophy of biology, and the question of generalized laws that might pertain across the two subjects.

The collection opens with a vital interrogation of general issues on explanation that apart from potentially fruitful areas of interaction (could the etiology of the causal-mechanical perspective in biology account for the historical trajectory of the Roman Empire?) this volume also seeks to chart relative certainties distinguishing explanations in biology and history. It also assesses techniques such as the use of probabilities in biological reconstruction, deployed to overcome the inevitable gaps in physical evidence on early evolution. Methodologies such as causal graphs and semantic explanation receive in-depth analysis. Contributions from a host of prominent and widely read philosophers ensure that this new volume has the stature of a major addition to the literature.

'Microphysicalism', the view that whole objects behave the way they do in virtue of the behaviour of their constituent parts, is an influential contemporary view with a long philosophical and scientific heritage. In What's Wrong With Microphysicalism? Andreas Huttemann offers a fresh challenge to this view. Huttemann agrees with the microphysicalists that we can explain compound systems by explaining their parts, but claims that this does not entail a fundamentalism that gives hegemony to the micro-level. At most, it shows that there is a relationship of determination between parts and wholes, but there is no justification for taking this relationship to be asymmetrical rather than one of mutual dependence. Huttemann argues that if this is the case, then microphysicalists have no right to claim that the micro-level is the ultimate agent: neither the parts nor the whole have 'ontological priority'. Huttemann advocates a pragmatic pluralism, allowing for different ways to describe nature. What's Wrong With Microphysicalism? is a convincing and original contribution to central issues in contemporary philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and metaphysics.

Contents:
Acknowledgements Introduction 1. Microphysicalism 1. The multi-layered conception of reality 2. Microphysicalism 3. The significance of microphysicalism 4. Analysis of the argument for microphysicalism 2. Laws of nature 1. Explanation, manifestation and instantiation 2. Laws and dispositions 3. Continuously manifestable dispositions 4. What is explained by the assumption of CMDs? 5. Conclusion 3. Micro-explanation 1. Distinctions 2. Micro-explanation (1) and the explanation of bridge-laws 3. Micro-explanation (3): C.D. Broad on the relation of parts and wholes 4. Micro-explanation (3) at work 5. Micro-explanation (2) and micro-explanation (4): explaining the states of compound systems 6. Micro-explanation and emergence 7. Failure of micro-explanation (1): emergence in the sense of Kim 8. Failure of micro-explanation (3): emergence in the sense of Broad 9. The case of quantum-entanglement 10. A diagnosis 11. Other modes of explanation 12. Concluding remarks 4. What is the Issue? 1. The issue 2. Non-issue 1: functionalism 3. Non-issue 2: the explanatory gap 5. Micro-determination 1. Explanation 2. Determination 3. A note on the pragmatics of explanation 4. Underdetermination 5. Hegemony 6. Micro-explanation and micro-determination 7. Objections and replies 8. Conclusion 6. Micro-government and the laws of the special sciences 1. Autonomy 2. Micro-government 3. On the instantiation of micro-laws 4. The failure of supervenience 5. The relativity of instantiation 6. The special laws of many particle physics 7. Conclusion Apendix 7. Micro-causation 1. Three models of micro-dependent causation 2. Causation 3. Micro-causation 4. Conclusion 8. Microphysicalism, physicalism and pluralism 1. Definitions of physicalism 2. Microphysicalism and identity-physicalism 3. Ontological unity and pragmatic pluralism Bibliography

What are the metaphysical commitments which best 'make sense' of our scientific practice (rather than our scientific theories)? In this book, Andreas Huttemann provides a minimal metaphysics for scientific practice, i.e. a metaphysics that refrains from postulating any structure that is explanatorily irrelevant. Huttemann closely analyses paradigmatic aspects of scientific practice, such as prediction, explanation and manipulation, to consider the questions whether and (if so) what metaphysical presuppositions best account for these practices. He looks at the role which scientific generalisation (laws of nature) play in predicting, testing, and explaining the behaviour of systems. He also develops a theory of causation in terms of quasi-inertial processes and interfering factors, and he proposes an account of reductive practices that makes minimal metaphysical assumptions. His book will be valuable for scholars and advanced students working in both philosophy of science and metaphysics.

Der Begriff der Ursache spielt eine zentrale Rolle, wenn es um Verantwortung, Erklarungen oder Kontrolle von Ereignissen geht. Dabei ist aber auch trotz der langen Tradition des Begriffs in der Philosophienicht klar, ob es uberhaupt zwingende Kausalverhaltnisse gibt. In diesem neuen Grundthemen-Band folgt der Autor dem bewahrten Prinzip der Reihe: Nach einem historischen Abschnitt uber den Ursachenbegriff entwickelt er mit Bezug auf gegenwartige Debatten einen eigenen Ansatz. Dabei verbindet er aktuelle philosophische mit naturwissenschaftlichen Theorien.