Andreu Mas-Colell has been doing pioneering work using differential topology in the analysis of general equilibrium. This work is regarded as outstanding and one of the major contributions to the development of rigorous economic theory in the last twenty years. The articles he has written have been difficult and technically demanding. In this book he brings this work together to show its scope and its power. He presents the analysis in a way which makes it accessible to the broader range of economic theorists and advanced students. This book has been long awaited as a seminal contribution to the subject.

This volume collects almost two decades of joint work of Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell on game dynamics and equilibria. The starting point was the introduction of the adaptive strategy called regret-matching, which on the one hand is simple and natural, and on the other is shown to lead to correlated equilibria. This initial finding - boundedly rational behavior that yields fully rational outcomes in the long run - generated a large body of work on the dynamics of simple adaptive strategies. In particular, a natural condition on dynamics was identified: uncoupledness, whereby decision-makers do not know each other's payoffs and utilities (so, while chosen actions may be observable, the motivations are not). This condition turns out to severely limit the equilibria that can be reached. Interestingly, there are connections to the behavioral and neurobiological sciences and also to computer science and engineering (e.g., via notions of "regret").Simple Adaptive Strategies is self-contained and unified in its presentation. Together with the formal treatment of concepts, theorems, and proofs, significant space is devoted to informal explanations and illuminating examples. It may be used for advanced graduate courses - in game theory, economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering - and for further research.

Andreu Mas-Colell revolutionized our understanding of competitive markets, price formation, and the behavior of market participants. General Equilibrium and Game Theory offers readers a compendium of his most important scholarly contributions, gathering in a single volume the groundbreaking papers that have solidified his standing as one of the preeminent economic theorists of our time. Built upon the foundations of neoclassical economics, Mas-Colell's work is distinguished by a mathematical and analytical elegance that brings theory closer to real-world situations. He overturns the standard assumption of general equilibrium theory-that markets are perfectly competitive and their participants are perfectly rational-and concludes that neither the law of supply and demand nor the existence of equilibrium prices depends on the rationality of agents. Similarly, Mas-Colell (working with Sergiu Hart) challenges classical game theory's reliance on rational behavior, demonstrating that adaptation and learning shape the dynamics of repeated games. Addressing central questions of finance, trade, industrial organization, and welfare economics, Mas-Colell shows the surprising power and versatility of differentiability and linear-space mathematical techniques, and he emphasizes the fruitfulness of cooperative game-theory approaches, such as Shapley value theory and the Bargaining Set, for understanding competition and distribution. General Equilibrium and Game Theory is a signal contribution to economic theory and an invaluable resource for anyone wishing to study the craft of a master of economic modeling.

The contents of this volume comprise the proceedings of the conference, "Equilibrium theory and applications." Some of the recent developments in general equilibrium theory in the perspective of actual and potential applications are presented. The conference was organized in honor of Jacques Drèze on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. Held at C.O.R.E., it was also the unanimous recognition, stressed by Gérard Debreu in his Address, of his role as "the architect and builder" of the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics. An introductory address by Gérard Debreu comprises Part 1 of the volume. The rest of the volume is divided into four parts spanning the scope of the conference. Part 2 is on incomplete markets, increasing returns, and information, Part 3 on equilibrium and dynamices, Part 4 on employment, imperfect competition, and macroeconomics, and Part 5 on applied general equilibrium models.

Issues relating to the emergence, persistence, and stability of cooperation among social agents of every type are widely recognized to be of paramount importance. They are also analytically difficult and intellectually challenging. This book, arising from a NATO Advanced Study Institute held at SUNY in 1994, is an up-to-date presentation of the contribution of game theory to the subject. The contributors are leading specialists who focus on the problem from the many different angles of game theory, including axiomatic bargaining theory, the Nash program of non-cooperative foundations, game with complete information, repeated and sequential games, bounded rationality methods, evolutionary theory, experimental approaches, and others. Together they offer significant progress in understanding cooperation.

The author's pioneering work using differential topology in the analysis of general equilibrium is considered one of the major contributions to the development of rigorous economic theory in the past twenty years. This compilation makes his work accessible to the broader range of economic theorists and advanced students.

Many instructors of microeconomic theory have been waiting for a text that provides balanced and in-depth analysis of the essentials of microeconomics. Masterfully combining the results of years of teaching microeconomics at Harvard, Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston, and Jerry Green have filled that conspicuous vacancy with their groundbreaking text, Microeconomic Theory. The authors set out to create a solid organizational foundation upon which to build the effective teaching tool for microeconomic theory--the result presents unprecedented depth of coverage in all the essential topics, while allowing professors to "tailor-make" their course to suit personal priorities and style. Topics such as noncooperative game theory, information economics, mechanism design, and general equilibrium under uncertainty receive the attention that reflects their stature within the discipline. The authors devote an entire section to game theory alone, making it "free-standing" to allow instructors to return to it throughout the course when convenient. Discussion is clear, accessible, and engaging, enabling the student to gradually acquire confidence as well as proficiency. Extensive exercises within each chapter help students to hone their skills, while the text's appendix of terms, fully cross-referenced throughout the previous five sections, offers an accessible guide to the subject matter's terminology. Teachers of microeconomics need no longer rely upon scattered lecture notes to supplement their textbooks. Deftly written by three of the field's most influential scholars, Microeconomic Theory brings the readability, comprehensiveness, and versatility to the first-year graduate classroom that has long been missing.

The contents of this volume comprise the proceedings of the conference, "Equilibrium theory and applications." Some of the recent developments in general equilibrium theory in the perspective of actual and potential applications are presented. The conference was organized in honor of Jacques Dreze on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. Held at C.O.R.E., it was also the unanimous recognition, stressed by Gerard Debreu in his Address, of his role as "the architect and builder" of the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics. An introductory address by Gerard Debreu comprises Part 1 of the volume. The rest of the volume is divided into four parts spanning the scope of the conference. Part 2 is on incomplete markets, increasing returns, and information, Part 3 on equilibrium and dynamices, Part 4 on employment, imperfect competition, and macroeconomics, and Part 5 on applied general equilibrium models.

This pithy and engaging volume shows that economists may be better equipped to predict the future than science fiction writers. Economists' ideas, based on both theory and practice, reflect their knowledge of the laws of human interactions as well as years of experimentation and reflection. Although perhaps not as screenplay-ready as a work of fiction, these economists' predictions are ready for their close-ups. In this book, ten prominent economists -- including Nobel laureates and several likely laureates -- offer their ideas about the world of the twenty-second century. In scenarios that range from the optimistic to the guardedly gloomy, these thinkers consider such topics as the transformation of work and wages, the continuing increase in inequality, the economic rise of China and India, the endlessly repeating cycle of crisis and (projected) recovery, the benefits of technology, the economic consequences of political extremism, and the long-range effects of climate change. For example, Daron Acemoglu offers a thoughtful discussion of how trends of the last century -- including uneven growth, technological integration, and resource scarcity -- might translate into the next; 2013 Nobelist Robert Shiller provides an innovative view of future risk management methods using information technology; 2012 Nobelist Alvin Roth projects his theory of Matching Markets into the next century, focusing on schools, jobs, marriage and family, and medicine; 1987 Nobelist Robert Solow considers the shift away from remunerated labor, among other subjects; and Martin Weitzman raises the intriguing but alarming possibility of using geoengineering techniques to mitigate the nevitable effects of climate change. In a 1930 essay mentioned by several contributors, "Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren," John Maynard Keynes offered predictions that, read today, range from absolutely correct to spectacularly wrong. This book follows in Keynes's path, hoping, perhaps, to better his average.