Although an army's success is often measured in battle outcomes, its victories depend on strengths that may be less obvious on the field. In "Sickness, Suffering, and the Sword," military historian Andrew Bamford assesses the effectiveness of the British Army in sustained campaigning during the Napoleonic Wars. In the process, he offers a fresh and controversial look at Britain's military system, showing that success or failure on campaign rested on the day-to-day experiences of regimental units rather than the army as a whole.

Bamford draws his title from the words of Captain Moyle Sherer, who during the winter of 1816-1817 wrote an account of his service during the Peninsular War: "My regiment has never been very roughly handled in the field. . . But, alas What between sickness, suffering, and the sword, few, very few of those men are now in existence." Bamford argues that those daily scourges of such often-ignored factors as noncombat deaths and equine strength and losses determined outcomes on the battlefield.

In the nineteenth century, the British Army was a collection of regiments rather than a single unified body, and the regimental system bore the responsibility of supplying manpower on that field. Between 1808 and 1815, when Britain was fighting a global conflict far greater than its military capabilities, the system nearly collapsed. Only a few advantages narrowly outweighed the army's increasing inability to meet manpower requirements. This book examines those critical dynamics in Britain's major early-nineteenth-century campaigns: the Peninsular War (1808-1814), the Walcheren Expedition (1809), the American War (1812-1815), and the growing commitments in northern Europe from 1813 on.

Drawn from primary documents, Bamford's statistical analysis compares the vast disparities between regiments and different theatres of war and complements recent studies of health and sickness in the British Army.

When Charles Edward Stuart launched the last, and perhaps most famous, of the Jacobite Risings in the late summer of 1745, the British Army found itself ill-placed to respond. Its most effective troops were on the continent; regular units at home were weak, inexperienced or both; the Militia system was moribund and politically suspect. When the opposing forces first met in the field, the result was ignominious rout and retreat. Nevertheless, eight months after the Rising began, the Jacobite cause went down in crushing defeat at Culloden. This collection of essays examines in detail some of the units that marched and fought for George II during this tumultuous period. Consideration is given to regular regiments of foot and dragoons as well as to the additional units raised for the emergency. In the latter category, different chapters examine the 'noblemen's regiments' added to the regular line as a piece of political jobbery, the militias raised by clans loyal to the House of Hanover, and the bluecoated volunteer regiments fielded to resist the Jacobite invasion of England. Emphasising the fact that this was a civil war, three of the units that are considered were Scottish-raised, whilst others contained substantial numbers of Scotsmen in their ranks. The experiences of the units in question varied greatly; some took part in the pivotal battles of Prestonpans, Falkirk, and Culloden whilst others never fired a shot in anger. Taken together, however, these studies provide a new and fascinating insight into the military response to the Jacobite '45.

The 2019 From Reason to Revolution conference took as its theme the experiences of the ordinary British soldier in the era 1721-1815, from enlistment, through service at home, to life on campaign and the experience of battle. This book presents the proceedings of that conference in full, along with an introduction by series editor Andrew Bamford This was an era in which the social position of the soldier began to change, as did the relationship between the Army and society at large. Soldiers saw service against Jacobite rebels in Scotland and anti-Catholic rioters in London. Campaign service overseas stretched from garrison duties in the growing empire to pitched battles in Flanders and the Iberian Peninsula. Lack of indigenous manpower led to the enlistment of foreigners in large numbers into the British Army itself by the end of the period, whereas in earlier days the shortfall had been made up by hiring mercenaries. As the idea of a social contract became embedded, it was necessary to make provision for pensions for maimed or superannuated soldiers, as well as the more obvious need for medical care for the sick and wounded. The nine chapters contained in this volume all address aspects of these topics, drawing upon focussed case studies from across the long 18th century.

Although an army's success is often measured in battle outcomes, its victories depend on strengths that may be less obvious on the field. In Sickness, Suffering, and the Sword, military historian Andrew Bamford assesses the effectiveness of the British Army in sustained campaigning during the Napoleonic Wars. In the process, he offers a fresh and controversial look at Britain's military system, showing that success or failure on campaign rested on the day-to-day experiences of regimental units rather than the army as a whole.Bamford draws his title from the words of Captain Moyle Sherer, who during the winter of 1816-1817 wrote an account of his service during the Peninsular War: "My regiment has never been very roughly handled in the field. . . But, alas! What between sickness, suffering, and the sword, few, very few of those men are now in existence." Bamford argues that those daily scourges of such often-ignored factors as noncombat deaths and equine strength and losses determined outcomes on the battlefield. In the nineteenth century, the British Army was a collection of regiments rather than a single unified body, and the regimental system bore the responsibility of supplying manpower on that field. Between 1808 and 1815, when Britain was fighting a global conflict far greater than its military capabilities, the system nearly collapsed. Only a few advantages narrowly outweighed the army's increasing inability to meet manpower requirements. This book examines those critical dynamics in Britain's major early-nineteenth-century campaigns: the Peninsular War (1808-1814), the Walcheren Expedition (1809), the American War (1812-1815), and the growing commitments in northern Europe from 1813 on. Drawn from primary documents, Bamford's statistical analysis compares the vast disparities between regiments and different theatres of war and complements recent studies of health and sickness in the British Army.

William Hay had a varied and exciting military career during the later years of the Napoleonic Wars, which took him to the Peninsula, to Waterloo, and, after 1815, to Canada. Graduating from the Royal Military College at Marlow, of which he begins his memoirs with a rare account, he was first commissioned into the crack 52nd Light Infantry and served with that regiment in the campaigns of 1810 and 1811. Promotion then took him into the 12th Light Dragoons and, after a spell at home due to illness, he joined his new regiment in the field just as Wellington's army began its retreat from Burgos. Thereafter, Hay served with the 12th for the remainder of the Peninsular War and again during the Waterloo campaign. A well-connected young man, he spent some of his time away from the regiment on staff duties, serving as an aide to Lord Dalhousie in the Peninsula and later to the same officer again during his tenure as Governor General of British North America. Hay's recollections are very much those of a dashing young officer, and, if not quite rivalling Marbot for imagination, there is no denying that he is the hero of his own epic. But these are more than just tales of derring-do, for Hay's stories of the lighter side of military life do much to illuminate the character and attitudes of Britain's Napoleonic officer corps. There is also no question but that Hay was a competent and effective officer who did good service in a number of important campaigns, and an old soldier's tendency to polish his recollections should take nothing from that. However, in order to help the reader better judge when Hay is remembering events with advantage, this edition of his memoirs is introduced and annotated by historian Andrew Bamford and includes additional information to identify places, people, and events and to otherwise add context to the original narrative.

The Jacobite Rising of 1745 could not have taken place without French support. French ships carried Charles Edward Stuart to Scotland, French gold financed his campaign, and French weapons equipped many of his troops. Yet the actual French military contribution to the campaign was small, and its role is frequently neglected. This book seeks to redress this balance by looking in detail at the French military contribution to the Jacobite '45: the first detachment of troops to sail with the Prince - who instead of landing in Scotland found themselves caught up in an intense naval battle; the staff officers and professionals who helped Charles organise his army on modern European lines; and the Irish and Scots regulars who fought with distinction at Inverurie, Falkrik, and Culloden. As with many aspects of the '45, myths and misconceptions aplenty have arisen about the nature and significance of the French contribution. New archival research enables a better picture to be obtained than ever before of the men who made up the rank and file of this contingent, and of the background and fates of those who led them. New analysis is offered, too, as to details of the uniforms worn by the detachments serving in Scotland, re-considering existing sources and also bringing out new information. Taken together, the result is to fill an important gap in our understanding of these dramatic events, one of the last occasions that foreign troops fought on British soil.

The inaugural `From Reason to Revolution Conference' took as its theme `Command and Leadership', which was explored in a variety of different ways by eight speakers whose papers took in the armies of France, Austria, Portugal, and Britain (and touched in passing on those of Prussia and the Netherlands too), and whose geographical remit encompassed North America, Europe, and Africa. This volume presents the proceedings of that conference. The first three chapters consider lower-level leadership, with a focus on ideas of expertise and professionalism. Will Raffle explores the tensions between local experts in New France and professional officers from the mother country, taking as its case study the campaign for Oswego in 1756. Tobias Roeder looks at the Habsburg officer corps during the eighteenth century and the tensions between the dictates imposed by the profession of arms on the one hand and the social expectations of a gentleman on the other. Lastly, Mark Thompson reviews a little-known body of men from the Peninsular War in the shape of the Portuguese Army's corps of engineers. The next pair of chapters address the opposing commanders in the Jacobite Rising of 1745, drawing some interesting parallels between two young royals who were both obliged to rely on their own charisma and force of character to address difficult and complex military situations. For Charles Edward Stuart, Jacobite Prince of Wales, the challenge was to create an army from scratch out of a collection of self-willed and self-opinionated individuals. Arran Johnston looks at how he did this, but also at the tensions that were inherent in the Jacobite command structure. Conversely, Prince William, Duke of Cumberland, inherited command of an army of regular troops but one which had its morale at rock bottom after defeat at Falkirk, and Jonathan Oates addresses how Cumberland was able to restore order and self-respect to his command, and take it on to victory at Culloden. The final three chapters jump forwards by a half-century, to look at the events of the French Revolutionary Wars. Carole Divall looks at the Flanders campaigns of 1793-1795, considering the problems faced by generals on both sides and concluding that all would have been far better off without the interference of their respective political masters. Jacqueline Reiter, by contrast, considers someone who was both general and politician in the shape of John Pitt, 2nd Earl of Chatham, and her study of his role in the 1799 Helder Campaign both restores a reputation as a brigadier unfairly sullied by Sir John Fortescue but also considers the tensions caused by his dual role as subordinate general on the one hand and senior cabinet minister on the other. Finally, Yves Martin looks at the three very different personalities who successively commanded the French Army of the Orient in Egypt, providing very illuminating pen-portraits of three larger-than-life characters each with pronounced strengths and weaknesses.