This book presents post-peace agreement violence as a serious, yet predictable and manageable, political phenomenon. Negotiating an end to a civil war is extremely difficult, and many signed peace agreements subsequently unravel, ushering in renewed conflict. In response, important international actors have become increasingly involved in conflict mediation, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction around the globe. Policymakers and scholars alike have identified spoilers-violent actors who often rise up and attempt to challenge or derail the peace process-as one of the greatest threats to peace. Using a mixed-method approach combining quantitative and qualitative analyses of a newly created, global dataset of spoiling, Reiter demonstrates that this type of violence occurs in predictable circumstances and only represents a threat to peace under specific conditions. The book also shows that spoiling often serves to bring agreement flaws and implementation failures to light and in turn forces actors to recommit to an accord, thereby strengthening peace in the long term.

The interaction between military and civilian courts, the political power that legal prerogatives can provide to the armed forces, and the difficult process civilian politicians face in reforming military justice remain glaringly under-examined, despite their implications for the quality and survival of democracy. This book breaks new ground by providing a theoretically rich, global examination of the operation and reform of military courts in democratic countries. Drawing on a newly created dataset of 120 countries over more than two centuries, it presents the first comprehensive picture of the evolution of military justice across states and over time. Combined with qualitative historical case studies of Colombia, Portugal, Indonesia, Fiji, Brazil, Pakistan, and the United States, the book presents a new framework for understanding how civilian actors are able to gain or lose legal control of the armed forces. The book's findings have important lessons for scholars and policymakers working in the fields of democracy, civil-military relations, human rights, and the rule of law.

The interaction between military and civilian courts, the political power that legal prerogatives can provide to the armed forces, and the difficult process civilian politicians face in reforming military justice remain glaringly under-examined, despite their implications for the quality and survival of democracy. This book breaks new ground by providing a theoretically rich, global examination of the operation and reform of military courts in democratic countries. Drawing on a newly created dataset of 120 countries over more than two centuries, it presents the first comprehensive picture of the evolution of military justice across states and over time. Combined with qualitative historical case studies of Colombia, Portugal, Indonesia, Fiji, Brazil, Pakistan, and the United States, the book presents a new framework for understanding how civilian actors are able to gain or lose legal control of the armed forces. The book's findings have important lessons for scholars and policymakers working in the fields of democracy, civil-military relations, human rights, and the rule of law.

This book presents post-peace agreement violence as a serious, yet predictable and manageable, political phenomenon. Negotiating an end to a civil war is extremely difficult, and many signed peace agreements subsequently unravel, ushering in renewed conflict. In response, important international actors have become increasingly involved in conflict mediation, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction around the globe. Policymakers and scholars alike have identified spoilers-violent actors who often rise up and attempt to challenge or derail the peace process-as one of the greatest threats to peace. Using a mixed-method approach combining quantitative and qualitative analyses of a newly created, global dataset of spoiling, Reiter demonstrates that this type of violence occurs in predictable circumstances and only represents a threat to peace under specific conditions. The book also shows that spoiling often serves to bring agreement flaws and implementation failures to light and in turn forces actors to recommit to an accord, thereby strengthening peace in the long term.