The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards was established in July 2012, in the wake of the LIBOR scandal, the report Changing Banking For Good (HL 27-I, HC 175-I) is the result of their inquiry into professional standards and culture in the UK banking sector, and makes recommendations for legislative and other action. Key recommendations include: a new Senior Persons Regime, replacing the Approved Persons Regime, to ensure that the most important responsibilities within banks are assigned to specific, senior individuals so they can be held fully accountable for their decisions and the standards of their banks in these areas; a new licensing regime underpinned by Banking Standards Rules to ensure those who can do serious harm are subject to the full range of enforcement powers; a new criminal offence for Senior Persons of reckless misconduct in the management of a bank, carrying a custodial sentence;

This report finds the three bankers guilty of "catastrophic failures of management" in the run-up to the collapse of HBOS which resulted in its emergency takeover by Lloyds bank. "Toxic" misjudgments by the three led to the bank's downfall. Lloyds later needed a GBP20.5bn taxpayer bail-out at the height of the financial crisis as a direct result of its acquisition of HBOS. So far only one former HBOS director, Peter Cummings, has been penalised, after being fined GBP500,000 and banned for life from working in the City last September. The Commission said it was wrong that he should shoulder the blame alone. They claim "The primary responsibility for the downfall of HBOS should rest with Sir James Crosby, architect of the strategy that set the course for disaster, with Andy Hornby, who proved unable or unwilling to change course, and Lord Stevenson, who presided over the bank's board from its birth to its death.", and calls on the new City regulator to consider barring them from taking up any role in the financial sector. Senior executives of HBOS tried to blame the losses on the temporary closure of wholesale markets. During the financial crisis, banks stopped lending to each other, resulting in their short-term supplies of funding drying up. But members of the Commission said they were disappointed by such explanations, as it was the lending approach that was to blame. The FSA's failure to act exposes what a flawed regulatory framework was in place and politicians of all parties backed the propping up of the banks with frighteningly expensive bailouts

The Commission welcomes the Government's acceptance of the principle that it's proposed framework for ring-fencing requires reinforcement. The Commission sees no merit in the proposition that the first reserve power will create uncertainty for banks or put at risk their attempts to raise funds for lending. That power will be a source of uncertainty only for those minded to take actions that conflict with the objectives of the ring-fence. It is important that the regulator's powers to break-up a bank should be exercisable only after by an independent reviewer. It is also important that the reviewer should be independent of Government. The Government should make explicit provision in the Bill to enable the regulator to require a bank to divest itself of a specified division or set of activities which would fall short of the requirements of the first reserve power. The Government's proposal for the periodic review to be conducted by the regulator is wholly inadequate. Government has been at pains to make the case against the provision for full separation being implemented on the say so of the regulator. Instead, it is envisioned that the legislative provisions would be brought into force only in the light of the recommendations of the independent review. It is essential that the timetable for the progress of the current Bill allows adequate time not only for the full scrutiny of the current content, but also for the addition of provisions to give effect to their recommendations

In its struggle against international terrorism following 9/11, the United States developed rendition - the international transfer of an individual without customary due processes - as an instrument of policy. Rendition became associated with the use of coercive interrogation techniques - techniques often crossing the threshold of torture, in violation of international standards to which successive American administrations committed themselves. To a degree yet to be fully established, Britain was implicated in that policy. Whatever its alleged benefits, rendition's cost is clear - not simply in terms of the human impact of the abuses, but also in terms of the huge damage done to the moral authority of the West. By creating a powerful image of injustice, rendition gives Islamist radicals a recruiting and propaganda tool. Moreover, the policy is a severe setback to efforts to enhance shared international standards in humanitarian and human rights laws. The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition was founded in December 2005, following the emergence of allegations that the United States had been operating a programme of 'ghost flights' and 'black sites'. In the five years since then the Group has contributed to public knowledge and awareness of the debate surrounding rendition and Britain's involvement in it.