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Advances in Financial Economics, volume 18, will present research
on corporate governance both in the US and globally. Papers will
deal with the role played by boards of directors, internal
organization design and governance mechanisms, franchise
agreements, the effect of regulation and policy, the market for
corporate control, and strategic alliances. The volume will aim at
providing a deeper understanding of corporate governance practices,
trends, innovations and challenges using international data.
Volume 17 of Advances in Financial Economics, entitled "Corporate
Governance in the US and Global Settings" will provide further
insights into corporate governance in the US & global economic
and financial environment by publishing international,
within-country and cross-country comparative studies. The volume
will be edited by the series editors, Kose John, New York
University, Anil Makhija, Ohio State University, and Stephen P.
Ferris, University of Missouri.
Advances in Financial Economics volume 20 deals with International
Corporate Governance, particularly the role played by boards of
directors, internal organization design and governance mechanisms,
franchise agreements, the effect of regulation and policy, the
market for corporate control, and strategic alliances.
Advances in Financial Economics Volume 19 deals with International
Corporate Governance, particularly the role played by boards of
directors, internal organization design and governance mechanisms,
franchise agreements, the effect of regulation and policy, the
market for corporate control, and strategic alliances.
This volume contains a set of empirical papers by a set of global
scholars who examine corporate governance and market regulation
from a variety of perspectives. Jiang, Kim and Zhang argue that in
certain cases an ex post increase in CEO pay can prevent the ex
ante problem of managerial underinvestment and thereby help to
reduce the agency problems characteristic of modern firms. Akyol
and Cohen focus on firms' use of executive search firms versus
allowing internal members to nominate new directors to serve on the
board of directors. Choi, Ferris, Jayaraman and Sabherwal examine
361 CEO terminations occurring among the Fortune Global 500 firms
during the years 2000 to 2006. Cashman, Gillan and Whitby
investigate the labor market for corporate directors to better
understand which director attributes are relevant for board
selection. Baulkaran, Amoako-Adu and Smith analyze the link between
the valuation discount of dual class companies and the channels
through which private benefits can be extracted. Aggarwal examines
ETFs and notes that the additional risks, complexity, and reduced
transparency of these funds have attracted heightened attention by
regulators.
This volume contains eight empirical papers that examine corporate
governance from a number of different perspectives. Howe et al
investigate how governance can influence short- and long-term
performance in the case of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies;
Javakhadze et al analyze limits to convergence in international
corporate governance practices; Barak and Lauterbach focus on the
private benefits of control; and Dong examines the relation between
the discipline of options and corporate debt and the design of
executive compensation. Jiang et al measure the effect of R&D
expenditures on bondholders; Gondhalekar et al examine the capital
market response to financial restatements; Al-Khouri reports robust
evidence that privately owned banks are more risky than
government-owned banks; and Luo and Jackson conclude that the
positive relationship between tunneling and executive compensation
implies personal benefits for controlling shareholders at the
expense of minority shareholders.
Volume 14 of "Advances in Financial Economics" presents recent
research on corporate governance from a number of countries across
the world, including the United States, Spain, Malaysia, Israel and
others. Many important corporate governance mechanisms are
examined, such as board characteristics (size, independence,
duality, staggered form), ownership structure, legal protection of
shareholders, annual general meetings, and executive compensation.
The findings have implications for mergers and acquisitions, IPOs,
related party transactions, CEO pay, volume of trading and stock
volatility, and underwriting. Thus, the implications of corporate
governance for firm performance and shareholder experience are
covered through the salient activities of firms.
While Advances continues to publish papers from any area of
Finance, the focus of this issue is on corporate governance,
broadly defined as the system of controls that helps corporations
and other organizations effectively manage, administer, and direct
economic resources. Included in the volume are papers focusing on:
the impact of deregulation and corporate structure on productive
efficiency; the effectiveness of the fraud triangle and SAS; board
monitoring and access to debt financing; institutional investors;
and managerial stability and payout policy.
While "Advances" continues to publish papers from any area of
Finance, the focus of this issue is on corporate governance,
broadly defined as the system of controls that helps corporations
and other organizations effectively manage, administer, and direct
economic resources. Papers of this title deal with the role played
by boards of directors, impact of ownership, executive
compensation, and investor protection. Other papers deal with stock
repurchases, default, banking, financial sector development, and
the Asian financial crisis. Papers cover a wide range of
international experience, including evidence from the U.S., Japan,
Israel, Malaysia, China, and New Zealand. Papers cover a wide range
of international experience with this issue focusing on corporate
governance. This book series is available electronically at
website.
Empirical Research in Banking and Corporate Finance is the 21st
volume of Advances in Financial Economics and deals with
International Corporate Governance. Explored in detail are the role
of corporate cultures, social responsibility, stock liquidity,
securitization, leveraged buyouts and the cost of private debt.
Papers in this volume focus upon corporate governance, broadly
defined as the system of controls that helps the corporation
effectively manage, administer and direct economic resources.
Questions of what and how to produce become equally important as
organizations strive to better serve demanding customers. As a
result, the design and control of effective organizations structure
has been described by the vertical and horizontal relationships
among the firm, its customers and suppliers. More recently,
researchers have come to understand that the efficiency of firms
depends upon the ability of participants to find effective means to
minimize the transaction costs of coordinating productive activity.
As financial economists have learned, resource allocation will be
efficient so long as transaction costs remain low and property
rights can be freely assigned and exchanged. An important problem
that must be addressed is the so-called agency problem resulting
from the natural conflict between owners and managers. Agency costs
are the explicit and implicit transaction costs necessary to
overcome the natural divergence of interest between agent managers
and principal stockholders. The value-maximizing organization
design minimizes unproductive conflict within the firm. Papers in
this volume show how corporate control mechanisms inside and
outside the firm have evolved to allocate decision authority to
that person or organization best able to perform a given task.
Papers in this volume focus on corporate governance broadly defined
as the system of control that helps corporations effectively
manage, administer, and direct economic resources. Questions of
what and how to produce become equally important as organizations
strive to better serve demanding customers. As a result, the design
and control of effective organizations have become an integral part
of financial economics. Traditionally, organization structure has
been described by the vertical and horizontal relationships among
the firm, its customers and suppliers. More recently, researchers
have come to understand that the efficiency of firms depends upon
the ability of participants to find effective means to minimize the
transaction costs of coordinating productive activity. As financial
economists have learned, resource allocation will be efficient so
long as transaction costs remain low and property rights can be
freely assigned and exchanged. An important problem that must be
addressed is the so-called agency problem resulting from the
natural conflict between owners and managers. Agency costs are the
explicit and implicit transaction costs necessary to overcome the
natural divergence of interest between agent managers and principal
stockholders. The value-maximizing organization design minimizes
unproductive conflict within the firm. Papers in this volume show
how corporate control mechanisms inside and outside the firm have
evolved around the world to allocate decision authority to that
person or organization best able to perform a given task.
This volume focuses on recent pricing puzzles in investments. The
valuation of Internet companies, effects of firm size in takeover
studies, and long-run performance of mergers in the
telecommunications industry are all seen as riddles for the
Efficient Markets Hypothesis. Explanations may be found in studies
of the effects of differences in investor risk/return preferences,
information and liquidity. Also featured are studies describing
recent innovations in corporate finance, such as an experimental
study of discount rates, an analysis of issues related to the
estimation of internal cash flows, corporate payout policy, and the
use of convertible and warrant bonds by Japanese firms.
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