What does it mean to be in the middle of a pandemic-for me, for my country, for the world? How do our current inequalities and injustices become amplified by the demands of the pandemic and what, if anything, can be done? Who is most impacted-and why does it seem that so many of the same people are, once again, deemed expendable and less-than? How do we explain COVID-19 and its attendant traumas to our children, and what do we teach them about hope, justice, grief, and the role of imagination in survival? And once the worst has passed, how do we start again, and what should we care about as we contemplate individual and collective repair? In this collection of public and political philosophy, both well-established and up-and-coming philosophers come together to address these and other questions born of a devastating pandemic to which they are neither objective spectators nor observers, insulated by the passage of time. Indeed, the contributors to this volume are both grounded in, and immediately affected by, their own lived realities as source material for the questions that move and motivate them.

What kind of an emotion is regret? What difference does it make whether, how, and why we experience it, and how does this experience shape our current and future thoughts, decisions, goals? Under what conditions is regret appropriate? Is it always one kind of experience, or does it vary, based on who is doing the regretting, and why? How is regret different from other backward-looking emotions? In The Moral Psychology of Regret, scholars from several disciplines-including philosophy, gender studies, disability studies, law, and neuroscience-come together to address these and other questions related to this ubiquitous emotion that so many of us seem to dread. And while regret has been somewhat under-theorized as a subject worthy of serious and careful attention, this volume is offered with the intent of expanding the discourse on regret as an emotion of great moral significance that underwrites how we understand ourselves and each other.

What does it mean to be sad? What difference does it make whether, how, and why we experience our own, and other people's, sadness? Is sadness always appropriate and can it be a way of seeing more clearly into ourselves and others? In this volume, a multi-disciplinary team of scholars - from fields including philosophy, women's and gender studies, bioethics and public health, and neuroscience - addresses these and other questions related to this nearly-universal emotion that all of us experience, and that some of us dread. Somewhat surprisingly, sadness has been largely ignored by philosophers and others within the humanities, or else under-theorized as a subject worthy of serious and careful attention. This volume reverses this trend, presenting sadness as not merely a feeling or affect, but an emotion of great moral significance that in important ways underwrites how we understand ourselves and each other.

What does it mean to be sad? What difference does it make whether, how, and why we experience our own, and other people's, sadness? Is sadness always appropriate and can it be a way of seeing more clearly into ourselves and others? In this volume, a multi-disciplinary team of scholars - from fields including philosophy, women's and gender studies, bioethics and public health, and neuroscience - addresses these and other questions related to this nearly-universal emotion that all of us experience, and that some of us dread. Somewhat surprisingly, sadness has been largely ignored by philosophers and others within the humanities, or else under-theorized as a subject worthy of serious and careful attention. This volume reverses this trend, presenting sadness as not merely a feeling or affect, but an emotion of great moral significance that in important ways underwrites how we understand ourselves and each other.

What kind of an emotion is regret? What difference does it make whether, how, and why we experience it, and how does this experience shape our current and future thoughts, decisions, goals? Under what conditions is regret appropriate? Is it always one kind of experience, or does it vary, based on who is doing the regretting, and why? How is regret different from other backward-looking emotions? In The Moral Psychology of Regret, scholars from several disciplines-including philosophy, gender studies, disability studies, law, and neuroscience-come together to address these and other questions related to this ubiquitous emotion that so many of us seem to dread. And while regret has been somewhat under-theorized as a subject worthy of serious and careful attention, this volume is offered with the intent of expanding the discourse on regret as an emotion of great moral significance that underwrites how we understand ourselves and each other.

V knige analiziruyutsya metodologicheskie osnovaniya kachestvennogo sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniya: predmetnaya oblast', spetsifika sposoba poznaniya, logika polucheniya znaniya, kriterii kachestva, pozitsiya issledovatelya.Vpervye v otechestvennoy sotsiologii vydeleny napravleniya kachestvennykh issledovaniy, proanalizirovana avtoetnografiya.Vpervye proanalizirovano ekzistentsial'noe izmerenie kachestvennogo issledovaniya, predstavlen ekzistentsial'nyy opyt sotsiologov.Predstavlen opyt issledovaniy sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoy adaptatsii naseleniya postsovetskoy Rossii.Kniga rekomendovana vsem, kto interesuetsya problemami empiricheskoy sotsiolog