Controversy surrounds the construction of postwar European institutions. How far did the leaders of West European states simply respond to American pressures and to cold war politics? Were they motivated by federalist idealism, or by economic and power-political factors? Why did states behave in different ways towards the many new institutions created during the first fifteen years after the end of the Second World War? These studies, by an international team of historians, use newly released archival material to examine the motivations of national political leaders and their officials. Topics covered include French and British military thinking about European and national defence; British and French officials and their European integration policies; Italian, Belgian and Dutch attitudes towards the politics of postwar European integration; German decision-making elites in the 1950s; Britain and the first attempt to join the EEC; and the covert relationship between the USA and the European federalists.

At the beginning of June 1961, the tensions of the Cold War were supposed to abate as both sides sought a resolution. The two most important men in the world, John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, met for a summit in Vienna. Yet the high hopes were disappointed. Within months the Cold War had become very hot: Khrushchev built the Berlin Wall and a year later he sent missiles to Cuba to threaten the United States directly. Despite the fact that the Vienna Summit yielded barely any tangible results, it did lead to some very important developments. The superpowers came to see for the first time that there was only one way to escape from the atomic hell of their respective arsenals: dialogue. The "peace through fear" and the "hotline" between Washington and Moscow prevented an atomic confrontation. Austria successfully demonstrated its new role as neutral state and host when Vienna became a meeting place in the Cold War. In The Vienna Summit and Its Importance in International History international experts use new Russian and Western sources to analyze what really happened during this critical time and why the parties had a close shave with catastrophe.

At the beginning of June 1961, the tensions of the Cold War were supposed to abate as both sides sought a resolution. The two most important men in the world, John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, met for a summit in Vienna. Yet the high hopes were disappointed. Within months the Cold War had become very hot: Khrushchev built the Berlin Wall and a year later he sent missiles to Cuba to threaten the United States directly. Despite the fact that the Vienna Summit yielded barely any tangible results, it did lead to some very important developments. The superpowers came to see for the first time that there was only one way to escape from the atomic hell of their respective arsenals: dialogue. The "peace through fear" and the "hotline" between Washington and Moscow prevented an atomic confrontation. Austria successfully demonstrated its new role as neutral state and host when Vienna became a meeting place in the Cold War. In The Vienna Summit and Its Importance in International History international experts use new Russian and Western sources to analyze what really happened during this critical time and why the parties had a close shave with catastrophe.

Presenting a new interpretation of the British government's policy toward Germany from the period of Churchill and Eden to that of Attlee and Bevin, this study exploits recently released documents to illuminate the strategic maneuverings of West and East over Germany and the emergence of the Cold War.