Deliberation and Decision explores ways of bridging the gap between two rival approaches to theorizing about democratic institutions: constitutional economics on the one hand and deliberative democracy on the other. The two approaches offer very different accounts of the functioning and legitimacy of democratic institutions. Although both highlight the importance of democratic consent, their accounts of such consent could hardly be more different. Constitutional economics models individuals as self-interested rational utility maximizers and uses economic efficiency criteria such as incentive compatibility for evaluating institutions. Deliberative democracy models individuals as communicating subjects capable of engaging in democratic discourse. The two approaches are disjointed not only in terms of their assumptions and methodology but also in terms of the communication - or lack thereof - between their respective communities of researchers. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the recent debate between the two approaches and makes new and original contributions to that debate.

Deliberation and Decision explores ways of bridging the gap between two rival approaches to theorizing about democratic institutions: constitutional economics on the one hand and deliberative democracy on the other. The two approaches offer very different accounts of the functioning and legitimacy of democratic institutions. Although both highlight the importance of democratic consent, their accounts of such consent could hardly be more different. Constitutional economics models individuals as self-interested rational utility maximizers and uses economic efficiency criteria such as incentive compatibility for evaluating institutions. Deliberative democracy models individuals as communicating subjects capable of engaging in democratic discourse. The two approaches are disjointed not only in terms of their assumptions and methodology but also in terms of the communication - or lack thereof - between their respective communities of researchers. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the recent debate between the two approaches and makes new and original contributions to that debate.

Dieser Band prasentiert Aufsatze, die exemplarisch Anknupfungspunkte zwischen der okonomischen Theorie des Rechts und der Rechtswissenschaft im Offentlichen Recht aufgreifen. Die Autoren behandeln Themen aus dem Internationalen Volkerrecht, dem Europarecht und dem Steuerrecht sowie methodische Probleme, z.B. rationales Abwagen, Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse und Konsensokonomik.

The European Court of Human Rights is one of the main players in interpreting international human rights law where issues of general international law arise. While developing its own jurisprudence for the protection of human rights in the European context, it remains embedded in the developments of general international law. However, because the Court does not always follow general international law closely and develops its own doctrines, which are, in turn, influential for national courts as well as other international courts and tribunals, a feedback loop of influence occurs. This book explores the interaction, including the problems arising in the context of human rights, between the European Convention on Human Rights and general international law. It contributes to ongoing debates on the fragmentation and convergence of international law from the perspective of international judges as well as academics. Some of the chapters suggest reconciling methods and convergence while others stress the danger of fragmentation. The focus is on specific topics which have posed special problems, namely sources, interpretation, jurisdiction, state responsibility and immunity.