It was not so long ago that the dominant picture of Kant's practical philosophy was forma listic, focusing almost exclusively on his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason. However, the overall picture of Kant's wide-ranging philosophy has since been broadened and deepened. We now have a much more complete understanding of the range of Kant's practical interests and of his contributions to areas as diverse as anthropology, peda gogy, and legal theory. What remains somewhat obscure, however, is how these different contributions hang together in the way that Kant suggests that they must. This book explores these different conceptions of humanity, morality, and legality in Kant as main 'manifestations' or 'dimensions' of practical normativity. These interrelated terms play a cru cial role in highlighting different rational obligations, their source(s), and their appli cability in the face of changing circumstances.

This book offers new perspectives on the theoretical elements of the Opus postumum (OP), Kant's project of a final work which remained unknown until eighty years after his death. The contributors read the OP as a central work in establishing the relation between Kant's transcendental philosophy, his natural philosophy, practical philosophy, philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and his broader epistemology. Interpreting the OP is an important task because it helps reveal how Kant himself tried to correct and develop his critical philosophy. It also sheds light on the foundational role of the three Critiques for other philosophical inquiries, as well as the unified philosophical system that Kant sought to establish. The chapters in this volume address a range of topics relevant to the epistemological and theoretical problems raised in the OP, including the transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to physics as an answer to a deficiency in critical thought; the notion of ether and, more specifically, its transcendental deduction; self-affection and the self-positing of the subject; and the idea of God and the system of ideas in the highest standpoint of transcendental philosophy. Perspectives on Kant's Opus postumum will be of interest to upper-level students and scholars working on Kant.

This book investigates various aspects of freedom as developed in the philosophical systems of Kant and Fichte. Freedom, both Kant and Fichte insist, does not mean that we can choose or think independently from all rules or necessity, but rather that we willingly accept a certain kind of submission under these rules. Therefore, the conditions of our knowledge affect and inform our self-understanding, our willing, and the ways we justify our practical choices. The essays in this volume explore both philosophers' conceptions of human freedom as they relate to art, history, politics, and religion. They reveal how integrating freedom into a system of thought is crucial for our understanding of modern philosophy. System and Freedom in Kant and Fichte will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Kant, modern philosophy, and German Studies.

It was not so long ago that the dominant picture of Kant's practical philosophy was forma listic, focusing almost exclusively on his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason. However, the overall picture of Kant's wide-ranging philosophy has since been broadened and deepened. We now have a much more complete understanding of the range of Kant's practical interests and of his contributions to areas as diverse as anthropology, peda gogy, and legal theory. What remains somewhat obscure, however, is how these different contributions hang together in the way that Kant suggests that they must. This book explores these different conceptions of humanity, morality, and legality in Kant as main 'manifestations' or 'dimensions' of practical normativity. These interrelated terms play a cru cial role in highlighting different rational obligations, their source(s), and their appli cability in the face of changing circumstances.

What makes us human beings? Is it merely some corporeal aspect, or rather some specific mental capacity, language, or some form of moral agency or social life? Is there a gendered bias within the concept of humanity? How do human beings become more human, and can we somehow cease to be human? This volume provides some answers to these fundamental questions and more by charting the increased preoccupation of the European Enlightenment with the concepts of humankind and humanity. Chapters investigate the philosophical concerns of major figures across Western Europe, including Montesquieu, Diderot, Rousseau, Locke, Hume, Ferguson, Kant, Herder, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach and the Comte de Buffon. As these philosophers develop important descriptive and comparative approaches to the human species and moral and social ideals of humanity, they present a view of the Enlightenment project as a particular kind of humanism that is different from its Ancient and Renaissance predecessors. With contributions from a team of internationally recognized scholars, including Stephen Gaukroger, Michael Forster, Céline Spector, Jacqueline Taylor, and Günter Zöller, this book offers a novel interpretation of the Enlightenment that is both clear in focus and impressive in scope.