This edited collection marks a new wave of international and philosophical scholarship on “the heart�- that rich dimension of our emotional being in the world.  This text addresses the relation between feeling and knowing and investigates whether or not the heart has its own way of cognition and critique. This book takes up the emotional turn in philosophy in general, and phenomenology in particular, advancing this field through innovative and original perspectives.  The contributions come from philosophers working in distinctive, yet overlapping areas of research.   

Since the introduction of phenomenology to Japan in the 1910's, Japan has steadily become a major international site for both original and scholarly phenomenological work. Phenomenology in Japan presents several of Japan's leading phenomenologists, studied in both the Buddhist and Western thought, who bring to bear their unique backgrounds on our rich fields of experience. These contributions converge in novel ways on the problem of dualist', and draw on resources within the phenomenological tradition to respond to its challenges.

This edited collection marks a new wave of international and philosophical scholarship on "the heart"- that rich dimension of our emotional being in the world. This text addresses the relation between feeling and knowing and investigates whether or not the heart has its own way of cognition and critique. This book takes up the emotional turn in philosophy in general, and phenomenology in particular, advancing this field through innovative and original perspectives. The contributions come from philosophers working in distinctive, yet overlapping areas of research.

Exploring the first-person narratives of three figures from theChristian, Jewish, and Islamic mystical traditions -- St. Teresa of Avila, Rabbi DovBaer, and R zbih n Baql -- Anthony J. Steinbock provides a completephenomenology of mysticism based in the Abrahamic religious traditions. He relates abroad range of religious experiences, or verticality, to philosophical problems ofevidence, selfhood, and otherness. From this philosophical description of verticalexperience, Steinbock develops a social and cultural critique in terms of idolatry-- as pride, secularism, and fundamentalism -- and suggests that contemporaryunderstandings of human experience must come from a fuller, more open view ofreligious experience.

The first reader to offer a comprehensive view of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's (1908-1961) work, this selection collects in one volume the foundational essays necessary for understanding the core of this critical twentieth-century philosopher's thought. Arranged chronologically, the essays are grouped in three sections corresponding to the major periods of Merleau-Ponty's work: First, the years prior to his appointment to the Sorbonne in 1949, the early, existentialist period during which he wrote important works on the phenomenology of perception and the primacy of perception; second, the years of his work as professor of child psychology and pedagogy at the Sorbonne, period especially concerned with language; and finally, his years as chair of modern philosophy at the College de France, a time devoted to the articulation of a new ontology and philosophy of nature. The editors, who provide an interpretive introduction, also include previously unpublished working notes found in Merleau-Ponty's papers after his death. Translations of all selections have been updated and several appear here in English for the first time. By contextualizing Merleau-Ponty's writings on the philosophy of art and politics within the overall development of his thought, this volume allows readers to see both the breadth of his contribution to twentieth-century philosophy and the convergence of the various strands of his reflection.

In his fascinating new book, leading phenomenologist Anthony Steinbock intervenes in contemporary debate around the idea of the gift through a set of critical readings in which he situates the gift in the context of interpersonal relations. While taking up the key figures in the discussion (Heidegger, Derrida, Marion, Henry, Maimonides), Steinbock proposes the following: that these discussions of the gift are really not about the gift. He demonstrates, through critical interpretations and phenomenological analyses, how the gift only becomes meaningful in the context of interpersonal loving. The gift is not the point: "it's not about the gift". The gift becomes most fully what it is, following Maimonides, in participating with others toward their liberation. The point is the interpersonal relation of lover to beloved, which allows the gift to appear.

In his fascinating new book, leading phenomenologist Anthony Steinbock intervenes in contemporary debate around the idea of the gift through a set of critical readings in which he situates the gift in the context of interpersonal relations. While taking up the key figures in the discussion (Heidegger, Derrida, Marion, Henry, Maimonides), Steinbock proposes the following: that these discussions of the gift are really not about the gift. He demonstrates, through critical interpretations and phenomenological analyses, how the gift only becomes meaningful in the context of interpersonal loving. The gift is not the point: "it's not about the gift". The gift becomes most fully what it is, following Maimonides, in participating with others toward their liberation. The point is the interpersonal relation of lover to beloved, which allows the gift to appear.

Recent discussions around limit-problems, namely the questions concerning what can appear in phenomenological reflection, as well as what phenomenology as philosophical reflection can handle, call for a concerted treatment of the problem of limit-phenomena. In this important new book, Anthony J. Steinbock, a leading voice in contemporary phenomenology, explores that question in the context of an interrelated series of problems in Husserl's phenomenology. Representing a continued struggle with these insights and problems, the first section sketches out the problem of limit-phenomena, and addresses generally that rich estuary of liminal experience that commanded Husserl's attention in his research manuscripts. The book goes on to offer a correlative reflection on the issue of method and finally explores a specific set of what have been called recently "limit-problems" within phenomenology, relating to the problem of individuation and on a more personal level, vocation. This rich and timely volume offers an excellent demonstration of phenomenology in practice.

Exploring the first-person narratives of three figures from theChristian, Jewish, and Islamic mystical traditions -- St. Teresa of Avila, Rabbi DovBaer, and R zbih n Baql -- Anthony J. Steinbock provides a completephenomenology of mysticism based in the Abrahamic religious traditions. He relates abroad range of religious experiences, or verticality, to philosophical problems ofevidence, selfhood, and otherness. From this philosophical description of verticalexperience, Steinbock develops a social and cultural critique in terms of idolatry-- as pride, secularism, and fundamentalism -- and suggests that contemporaryunderstandings of human experience must come from a fuller, more open view ofreligious experience.

Drawing on and developing the phenomenological work of figures such as Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler, Knowing by Heart: Loving as Participation and Critique provides an account of the various feelings and feeling‑states that pertain to matters of the heart. Anthony J. Steinbock’s work investigates the special kind of knowing that is revealed most profoundly through love.   Knowing by Heart describes the movement of loving as a participation that bears on all beings. Eschewing the dichotomy of rationalism and sensibility that has dominated discussions of love and emotion, Steinbock understands the heart as a vast schema ranging from the deepest loving to affects and felt conditions. The book brings into focus the importance of a full‑bodied relational account of a normative critique based in emotion. From a phenomenological description of diverse feelings to the normativity of loving as the discernment of the heart, this work evaluates hating’s relation to loving. At the basis of all this is a phenomenological and philosophical anthropology in response to the basic question: In reality, who and what are we?

Drawing on and developing the phenomenological work of figures such as Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler, Knowing by Heart: Loving as Participation and Critique provides an account of the various feelings and feeling-states that pertain to matters of the heart. Anthony J. Steinbock's work investigates the special kind of knowing that is revealed most profoundly through love. Knowing by Heart describes the movement of loving as a participation that bears on all beings. Eschewing the dichotomy of rationalism and sensibility that has dominated discussions of love and emotion, Steinbock understands the heart as a vast schema ranging from the deepest loving to affects and felt conditions. The book brings into focus the importance of a full-bodied relational account of a normative critique based in emotion. From a phenomenological description of diverse feelings to the normativity of loving as the discernment of the heart, this work evaluates hating's relation to loving. At the basis of all this is a phenomenological and philosophical anthropology in response to the basic question: In reality, who and what are we?

Recent discussions around limit-problems, namely the questions concerning what can appear in phenomenological reflection, as well as what phenomenology as philosophical reflection can handle, call for a concerted treatment of the problem of limit-phenomena. In this important new book, Anthony J. Steinbock, a leading voice in contemporary phenomenology, explores that question in the context of an interrelated series of problems in Husserl's phenomenology. Representing a continued struggle with these insights and problems, the first section sketches out the problem of limit-phenomena, and addresses generally that rich estuary of liminal experience that commanded Husserl's attention in his research manuscripts. The book goes on to offer a correlative reflection on the issue of method and finally explores a specific set of what have been called recently "limit-problems" within phenomenology, relating to the problem of individuation and on a more personal level, vocation. This rich and timely volume offers an excellent demonstration of phenomenology in practice.

Slavoj Zižek is one of the most interesting and important philosophers working today, known chiefly for his theoretical explorations of popular culture and contemporary politics. This book focuses on the generally neglected and often overshadowed philosophical core of Zižek's work--an essential component in any true appreciation of this unique thinker's accomplishment. His central concern, Zižek has proclaimed, is to use psychoanalysis (especially the teachings of Jacques Lacan) to redeploy the insights of late-modern German philosophy, in particular, the thought of Kant, Schelling, and Hegel. By taking this avowal seriously, Adrian Johnston finally clarifies the philosophical project underlying Zižek's efforts. His book charts the interlinked ontology and theory of subjectivity constructed by Zižek at the intersection of German idealism and Lacanian theory. Johnston also uses Zižek's combination of philosophy and psychoanalysis to address two perennial philosophical problems: the relationship of mind and body, and the nature of human freedom. By bringing together the past two centuries of European philosophy, psychoanalytic metapsychology, and cutting-edge work in the natural sciences, Johnston develops a transcendental materialist theory of subjectivity--in short, an account of how more-than-material forms of subjectivity can emerge from a corporeal being. His work shows how an engagement with Zižek's philosophy can produce compelling answers to today's most vexing and urgent questions as inherited from the history of ideas.

Alphonso Lingis's singular works of philosophy are not so much written as performed, and in "The First Person Singular" the performance is characteristically brilliant, a consummate act of philosophical reckoning. Lingis's subject here, aptly enough, is the subject itself, understood not as consciousness but as embodied, impassioned, active being. His book is, at the same time, an elegant cultural analysis of how subjectivity is differently and collectively understood, invested, and situated.
The subject Lingis elaborates in detail is the passionate subject of fantasy, of obsessive commitment, of noble actions, the subject enacting itself through an engagement with others, including animals and natural forces. This is not the linguistic or literary subject posited by structuralism and post-structuralism, nor the rational consciousness posited by post-Enlightenment philosophy. It is rather a being embodied in both a passionate, intensifying activity and a cultural collective made up of embodied others as well as the social rituals and practices that comprise this first person singular.

By virtue of the originality and depth of its thought, Emmanuel Levinas's masterpiece, "Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, "is destined to endure as one of the great works of philosophy. It is an essential text for understanding Levinas's discussion of "the Other," yet it is known as a "difficult" book. Modeled after Norman Kemp Smith's commentary on "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Levinas's Existential Analytic "guides both new and experienced readers through Levinas's text. James R. Mensch explicates Levinas's arguments and shows their historical referents, particularly with regard to Heidegger, Husserl, and Derrida. Students using this book alongside "Totality and Infinity "will be able to follow its arguments and grasp the subtle phenomenological analyses that fill it.

By virtue of the originality and depth of its thought, Emmanuel Levinas's masterpiece, "Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, "is destined to endure as one of the great works of philosophy. It is an essential text for understanding Levinas's discussion of "the Other," yet it is known as a "difficult" book. Modeled after Norman Kemp Smith's commentary on "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Levinas's Existential Analytic "guides both new and experienced readers through Levinas's text. James R. Mensch explicates Levinas's arguments and shows their historical referents, particularly with regard to Heidegger, Husserl, and Derrida. Students using this book alongside "Totality and Infinity "will be able to follow its arguments and grasp the subtle phenomenological analyses that fill it.

Christophe Bouton's "Time and Freedom "addresses the problem of the relationship between time and freedom as a matter of practical philosophy, examining how the individual lives time and how her freedom is effective in time. Bouton first charts the history of modern philosophy's reengagement with the Aristotelian debate about future contingents, beginning with Leibniz. While Kant, Husserl, and their followers would engage time through theories of knowledge, Schopenhauer, Schelling, Kierkegaard, and (later), Heidegger, Sartre, and Levinas applied a phenomenological and existential methodology to time, but faced a problem of the temporality of human freedom. Bouton's is the first major work of its kind since Bergson's "Time and Free Will "(1889), and Bouton's "mystery of the future," in which the individual has freedom within the shifting bounds dictated by time, charts a new direction.

In our time, Ted Toadvine observes, the philosophical question of nature is almost entirely forgotten--obscured in part by a myopic focus on solving "environmental problems" without asking how these problems are framed. But an "environmental crisis," existing as it does in the human world of value and significance, is at heart a philosophical crisis. In this book, Toadvine demonstrates how Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology has a special power to address such a crisis--a philosophical power far better suited to the questions than other modern approaches, with their over-reliance on assumptions drawn from the natural sciences.

The book examines key moments in the development of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of nature while roughly following the historical sequence of his major works. Toadvine begins by setting out an ontology of nature proposed in Merleau-Ponty's first book, "The Structure of Behavior. "He takes up the theme of the expressive role of reflection in "Phenomenology of Perception, "as it negotiates the area between nature's own "self-unfolding" and human subjectivity. Merleau-Ponty's notion of "intertwining" and his account of space provide a transition to Toadvine's study of the philosopher's later work--in which the concept of "chiasm," the crossing or intertwining of sense and the sensible, forms the key to Merleau-Ponty's mature ontology--and ultimately to the relationship between humans and nature.

How does the body politic reflect the nature of human embodiment? To pursue this question in a new and productive way, James Mensch employs a methodology consistent with the fact of our embodiment; he uses Merleau-Ponty's concept of "intertwining"--the presence of one's self in the world and of the world in one's self--to understand the ideas that define political life.

Mensch begins his inquiry by developing a philosophical anthropology based on this concept. He then applies the results of his investigation to the relations of power, authority, freedom, and sovereignty in public life. This involves confronting a line of interpretation, stretching from Hobbes to Agamben, which sees violence as both initiating and preserving the social contract. To contest this interpretation, Mensch argues against its presupposition, which is to equate freedom with sovereignty over others. He does so by understanding political freedom in terms of embodiment--in particular, in terms of the finitude and interdependence that our embodiment entails. Freedom, conceived in these terms, is understood as the gift of others. As a function of our dependence on others, it cannot exist apart from them. To show how public space and civil society presuppose this interdependence is the singular accomplishment of "Embodiments." It accomplishes a phenomenological grounding for a new type of political philosophy.

Upon Scheler's death in 1928, Martin Heidegger remarked that he was the most important force in philosophy at the time. Jose Ortegay Gasset called Scheler 'the first man of the philosophical paradise.' ""The Human Place in the Cosmos"", the last of his works Scheler completed, is a pivotal piece in the development of his writing as a whole, marking a peculiar shift in his approach and thought. He had been asked to provide an initial sketch of his much larger works on philosophical anthropology and metaphysics - works he was not able to complete because of his early demise.Frings' new translation of this key work allows us to read and understand Scheler's thought within current philosophical debates and interests. The book addresses two main questions: What is the human being? And what is the place of the human being in the universe? Scheler responds to these questions within contexts of his projected larger works but not without reference to scientific research. He covers various levels of being: inorganic reality, organic reality (including plant life and psychological life), all the way up to practical intelligence and the spiritual dimension of human beings, and touching upon the holy.Negotiating two intertwined levels of being, life-energy ('impulsion') and 'spirit', this work marks not only a critical moment in the development of his own philosophy but also a significant contribution to the current discussions of continental and analytic philosophers on the nature of the person.

The first reader to offer a comprehensive view of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's (1908-1961) work, this selection collects in one volume the foundational essays necessary for understanding the core of this critical twentieth-century philosopher's thought. Arranged chronologically, the essays are grouped in three sections corresponding to the major periods of Merleau-Ponty's work: First the years prior to his appointment to the Sorbonne in 1949, the early existentialist period during which he wrote important works on the phenomenology of perception and the primacy of perception; second the years of his work as professor of child psychology at the Sorbonne, a period especially concerned with language; and finally, his years as chair of modern philosophy at the College de France a time devoted to the articulation of a new ontology and philosophy of nature. The editors, who provide an interpretive introduction, also include previously unpublished working notes found in Merleau-Ponty's papers after his death. Translations of all selections have been updated and several appear here in English for the first time. By contextualizing Merleau-Ponty's writings on the philosophy of art and politics within the overall development of his thought, this volume allows readers to see both the breadth of his contribution to twentieth-century philosophy and the convergence of the various strand of his reflection.

However widely--and differently--Jacques Derrida may be viewed as a "foundational" French thinker, the most basic questions concerning his work still remain unanswered: Is Derrida a friend of reason, or philosophy, or rather the most radical of skeptics? Are language-related themes--writing, semiosis--his central concern, or does he really write about something else? And does his thought form a system of its own, or does it primarily consist of commentaries on individual texts? This book seeks to address these questions by returning to what it claims is essential history: the development of Derrida's core thought through his engagement with Husserlian phenomenology. Joshua Kates recasts what has come to be known as the Derrida/Husserl debate, by approaching Derrida's thought historically, through its development. Based on this developmental work," Essential History "culminates by offering discrete interpretations of Derrida's two book-length 1967 texts, interpretations that elucidate the until now largely opaque relation of Derrida's interest in language to his focus on philosophical concerns.
A fundamental reinterpretation of Derrida's project and the works for which he is best known, Kates's study fashions a new manner of working with the French thinker that respects the radical singularity of his thought as well as the often different aims of those he reads. Such a view is in fact "essential" if Derrida studies are to remain a vital field of scholarly inquiry, and if the humanities, more generally, are to have access to a replenishing source of living theoretical concerns.

At a time in which many philosophers have concluded that Husserl's philosophy is exhausted, but when the alternatives to Husserl appear to be exhausted as well, this work aims to presents an innovative approach to Husserlian phenomenology. The author implicitly attacks the most fundamental criticism aimed at Husserl: that his philosophy is intrinsically formalistic, unable in principle to deal with concrete matters of life and how to live it. This study of the problems and themes of a generative phenomenology, normality and abnormality, and the sociohistorical concepts of homeworld and generative phenomenology, opens doors for a philosophy of the social world while casting new light on work done by Husserl himself.

Moral Emotions builds upon the philosophical theory of persons begun in "Phenomenology and Mysticism "and marks a new stage of phenomenology. Author Anthony J. Steinbock finds personhood analyzing key emotions, called moral emotions. "Moral Emotions "offers a systematic account of the moral emotions, described here as pride, shame, and guilt as emotions of self-givenness; repentance, hope, and despair as emotions of possibility; and trusting, loving, and humility as emotions of otherness. The author argues these reveal basic structures of interpersonal experience. By exhibiting their own kind of cognition and evidence, the moral emotions not only help to clarify the meaning of person, they reveal novel concepts of freedom, critique, and normativity. As such, they are able to engage our contemporary social imaginaries at the impasse of modernity and postmodernity.