Originally published in 1963. The essays in this volume are critical and, with one exception, directed against the philosophic movement of pragmatism. "The Thirteen Pragmatisms" is an exercise in logical analysis and is a challenge to a group of philosophers who have taken on a collective name to show how their apparent diversities are to be reconciled. Few philosophers would call themselves orthodox followers of this train of thought, so these essays can be studied without a sense of personal injury that deadens the critical faculty and obscures insight. In The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays, logical technique is on display: the author's keenness in spotting double meanings and his ability to rephrase them in univalent form. This collection of essays should afford students of philosophy a set of cases in which they need not take sides but which give them an analytical method they can practice themselves on contemporary issues. The fact that these essays are on the whole critical gives them a heuristic value that dogmatic or expository essays would not have.

From later antiquity down to the close of the eighteenth century, most philosophers and men of science and, indeed, most educated men, accepted without question a traditional view of the plan and structure of the world.

In this volume, which embodies the William James lectures for 1933, Professor Lovejoy points out the three principles--plenitude, continuity, and graduation--which were combined in this conception; analyzes their origins in the philosophies of Plato, Aristole, and the Neoplatonists; traces the most important of their diverse samifications in subsequent religious thought, in metaphysics, in ethics and asesthics, and in astronomical and biological theories; and copiously illustrates the influence of the conception as a whole, and of the ideas out of which it was compounded, upon the imagination and feelings as expressed in literature.

"Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity" was intended to be the first volume of a four-part series of books covering the history of primitivism and related ideas, but the outbreak of World War II, and, later, Lovejoy's death, prevented the other books from being published as originally conceived by the two authors. A documentary and analytical record, the book presents the classical background of primitivism and anti-primitivism in modern literature, historiography, and social and moral philosophy, and comprises chapters that center around particular ancient concepts and authors, including cynicism, stoicism, epicureanism, Plato, Aristotle, Lucretius, and Cicero. According to the authors in their preface, "there is some reason to think that this background is not universally familiar to those whose special field of study lie within the period of the Renaissance to our own time"; this book, in which the original Greek and Latin sources stand side by side with their English translations, will prove useful to scholars from a variety of disciplines who study this period.

Originally published in 1961. Arthur O. Lovejoy, beginning with his book The Great Chain of Being, helped usher in the discipline of the History of Ideas in America. In Reflections on Human Nature, Lovejoy devotes particular attention to influential figures such as Hobbes, Locke, Bishop Butler, and Mandeville, tracing developments and changes in the concept of human nature through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He also discusses the theory of human nature held by the founders of the American Constitution, giving special attention to James Madison and the "Federalist Papers."

This is a new release of the original 1930 edition.

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THE REVOLT AGAINST DUALISM PUBLISHED ON THE FOUNDATION ESTABLISHED IN MEMORY OF PAUL CARUS EDITOR OF THE OPEN COURT AND THE MONIST 1888-1919 THE REVOLT AGAINST DUALISM An Inquiry Concerning the Existence of Ideas ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY W. W. NORTON COMPANY, INC. Publishers CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE ix LECTURE I. CARTESIAN DUALISM AND NATURAL DUALISM i II. THE FIRST PHASE OF THE REVOLT AND ITS OUTCOME . 34 III. THE SECOND PHASE OBJECTIVE RELATIVISM ... 79 IV. THE OUTCOME OF THE SECOND PHASE 101 V. MR. WHITEHEAD AND THE DENIAL OF SIMPLE LOCA TION 156 VI. MR. BERTRAND RUSSELL AND THE UNIFICATION OF MIND AND MATTER I 190 VII. MR. BERTRAND RUSSELL AND THE UNIFICATION OF MIND AND MATTER II 222 VIII. DUALISM AND THE PHYSICAL WORLD 257 IX. THE NATURE OF KNOWING AS A NATURAL EVENT . . 303 INDEX 323 PREFACE The principal purpose of this volume is not to present a private and original speculation, but to show, through a critical survey of the reflection of the greater part of a generation of philosophers in America and Great Britain upon two important philosophical issues, that certain conclusions with respect to those issues have thereby been definitely established. The practise of philosophiz ing in vacuo I have always regarded with a distaste and suspicion. Philosophy seems to me essentially a collective and cooperative business. Effective cooperation among philosophers consists, it is true, primarily in disagreement. For, given a sufficiently well de fined problem, philosophy can really get forward with it only by bringing together in their logical interconnection all the considera tions which have occurred, orare likely to occur, to acute and philosophically initiated minds as significantly pertinent to that problem. These considerations will always be numerous, they will always, during the progress of any philosophical inquiry, be con flicting, and they must be contributed by many minds of diverse types and different training and preconceptions. But no typical and, so to say, normal consideration can with safety be left unconsidered, if the philosophers distinctive but difficult duty of logical circum spection is to be observed, and if the joint inquiry is to be brought to a critically reasoned and convincing result a result which may fairly objectively be said to be more probable than any alternative, at least in the light of the existing state of empirical knowledge, and of the relevant reflections which have thus far presented themselves to the human mind. The true procedure of philosophy as a science as distinct from the philosophic idiosyncrasies of in dividuals is thus that of a Platonic dialogue on a grand scale, in which the theses, proposed proofs, objections, rejoinders, of nu merous interlocutors are focused upon a given question, and the argument gradually shapes itself, through its own immanent dia lectic, to a conclusion. It is this conception of the method in which fruitful philosophical inquiry is to be conducted that has determined the procedure fol lowed in the greater part of the following lectures. I have tried to review what seem the main points that have been brought for ward in the debate upon the two questions here chiefly dealt with and, in so far as is consistent with brevity, I have for the most part ix x PREFACE put those points which to me seem unconvincing inthe terms of those writers who have so far as I recall best presented them. I am very far from meaning by this that I conceive such a method to be adequately exemplified in this volume. It is not to be assumed that all the arguments which have been advanced in twenty-five years of many-sided discussion with respect to these questions are here expounded, analyzed and weighed...

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Originally published in 1948. In the first essay of this collection, Lovejoy reflects on the nature, methods, and difficulties of the historiography of ideas. He maps out recurring phenomena in the history of ideas, which the essays illustrate. One phenomenon is the presence and influence of the same presuppositions or other operative "ideas" in very diverse provinces of thought and in different periods. Another is the role of semantic transitions and confusions, of shifts and of ambiguities in the meanings of terms, in the history of thought and taste. A third phenomenon is the internal tensions or waverings in the mind of almost every individual writer-sometimes discernible even in a single writing or on a single page-arising from conflicting ideas or incongruous propensities of feeling or taste to which the writer is susceptible. These essays do not contribute to metaphysical and epistemological questions; they are primarily historical.