The last survey of the rent-seeking literature took place more than a decade ago. Since that time a great deal of new research has been published in a wide variety of journals, covering a wide variety of topics. The breadth of that research is such that very few researchers will be familiar with more than a small part of contemporary research, and very few libraries will be able to provide access to the full breadth of that research. This two-volume collection provides an extensive overview of 40 years of rent-seeking research.

The volumes include the foundational papers, many of which have not been in print for two decades. They include recent game-theoretic analyses of rent-seeking contests and also applications of the rent-seeking concepts and methodology to economic regulation, international trade policy, economic history, political competition, and other social phenomena. The new collection is more than twice as large as any previous collection and both updates and extends the earlier surveys. Volume I contains previously published research on the theory of rent-seeking contests, which is an important strand of contemporary game theory. Volume II contains previously published research that uses the theory of rent-seeking to analyze a broad range of public policy and social science topics.

The editors spent more than a year assembling possible papers and, although the selections fill two large volumes, many more papers could have been included. Our aim has been to include the most important contributions in the literature and give a broad overview of secondary contributions. The end result is a fine collection that shows the flexibility and power of the rent-seeking methodology, and the light shed on a broad range of political, social, and institutional research issues. Each volume begins with an extensive survey of the literature written by the editors and an overview of the contributions included in the two volumes.

Arye L. Hillman There has been much economic theorizing directed at providing the politician with guidance in the design of policies that will amend market outcomes in ways that achieve specified efficiency or equity objectives. It has been common practice in economic models to portray the politician who implements the policy recommendations as a mechanistic individual who behaves as would a benevolent dictator to maximize a prespecified conception of social welfare or the utility of a representative consumer. The self-interest and discretion that is attributed to firms and consumers as optimizing agents is absent from the motives of such a politician. Economic policy choice is thereby depoliticized. How well depoliticized economic theory fares in explaining or predicting economic policy choice depends naturally enough upon how politicized is the economic system in which economic and political agents function. The papers in this volume recognize that politicians may exercise sufficient discretion so as not to behave mechanistically in correcting market inefficiencies or in pursuit of a somehow specified just income distribution. Since politicians are viewed as self-interested optimizing agents, just as are utility-maximizing consumers and profit-maximizing producers, the choice of economic policies is politicized. Coverage is provided of a broad spectrum of economic policy choice where markets and politicians interact. Section I is concerned with policy determination in western market economies, Section II with the introduction of markets into economies in transition from socialism, and Section III with international transactions.

This indispensable volume brings together the key contributions to the academic literature on the subject of the political economy of trade policy. Topics covered include unilateral and multilateral trade policies, international trade agreements and administered protection. In their comprehensive introduction, the editors present an insightful discussion of the political economy approach, the development of multilateral trade agreements, the trade and internal motives that guide unilateral trade policy and the features that characterise unilateralism. This volume is essential for professors, researchers and policymakers concerned with international trade policy.

The last survey of the rent-seeking literature took place more than a decade ago. Since that time a great deal of new research has been published in a wide variety of journals, covering a wide variety of topics. The breadth of that research is such that very few researchers will be familiar with more than a small part of contemporary research, and very few libraries will be able to provide access to the full breadth of that research. This two-volume collection provides an extensive overview of 40 years of rent-seeking research.

The volumes include the foundational papers, many of which have not been in print for two decades. They include recent game-theoretic analyses of rent-seeking contests and also applications of the rent-seeking concepts and methodology to economic regulation, international trade policy, economic history, political competition, and other social phenomena. The new collection is more than twice as large as any previous collection and both updates and extends the earlier surveys. Volume I contains previously published research on the theory of rent-seeking contests, which is an important strand of contemporary game theory. Volume II contains previously published research that uses the theory of rent-seeking to analyze a broad range of public policy and social science topics.

The editors spent more than a year assembling possible papers and, although the selections fill two large volumes, many more papers could have been included. Our aim has been to include the most important contributions in the literature and give a broad overview of secondary contributions. The end result is a fine collection that shows the flexibility and power of the rent-seeking methodology, and the light shed on a broad range of political, social, and institutional research issues. Each volume begins with an extensive survey of the literature written by the editors and an overview of the contributions included in the two volumes.

This book examines how trade policy is determined in democratic countries, and illustrates how protectionist policies are engendered by political processes that allow groups to pursue their own interests.

This twenty-seven chapter book provides an excellent and accessible overview of the literature on rent seeking since its inception. What makes the book a fascinating reading is its application to different areas, such as regulation and economic aid, and presentation of an array of highly readable cases studies, including on China, Greece, India and Russia. It is a must for both students of public finance and policy makers.' - Sanjeev Gupta, International Monetary Fund'Indeed, this book is an indispensable companion to everyone working on rent seeking or the theory or politics of contests. It combines excellent surveys and innovative work of the most eminent researchers in this field.' - Kai Konrad, Director, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Munich, Germany The quest for benefit from existing wealth or by seeking privileged benefit through influence over policy is known as rent seeking. Much rent seeking activity involves government and political decisions and is therefore in the domain of political economy, although rent seeking can also take place in personal relations and within firms and bureaucracies. The contributions in this outstanding volume provide an accompaniment or 'companion' to the literature on rent seeking and the related political economy of rent creation and extraction. The chapters, written by leading scholars in the field, demonstrate the centrality of rent-related incentives to the study of economics, politics, culture, public administration and history. The expert and original contributions summarize and extend the literature in both theoretical and applied areas of research. The book begins with a clear and comprehensive description of the theory of rent seeking and of contest design for political and bureaucratic rent extraction. This is followed by a series of case studies showing the relevance of rent seeking for regulatory policies, international-trade policies, public finance, natural-resource discoveries, development aid, behavior in international bureaucracies, litigation and judicial systems. The applied chapters also include overviews of rent seeking and rent extraction in Europe, Russia, Asia, Africa and the US. This volume will appeal to a broad readership, including economists, political scientists and development practitioners, wishing to gain an understanding of the concept of rent seeking. The chapters in this book also provide an excellent introduction to the extensive literature. Contributors: J. A. Amegashie, M. Brooks, R.D. Congleton, G. Dari-Mattiacci, R.T. Deacon, G.S. Epstein, S. Flamand, R.J. Hagan, A.L. Hillman, R.G. Holcombe, C. Kang, M.S. Kimenyi, E. Langlais, M.I. Levin, N. Van Long, B. Lovat, B. Luppi, S. Marjit, J.M. Mbaku, Y. Mealem, T. Moutos, D. C. Mueller, V. Mukherjee, S. Nitzan, M. Paldam, F. Parisi, L. Pechlivanos, L. Qijun, A. Rode, G.A.Satarov, R.M. Sheremeta, W.F. Shughart II, D.W. Thomas, G. Tridimas, O. Troumpounis, R. Vaubel, K. Warneryd

This book examines how trade policy is determined in democratic countries, and illustrates how protectionist policies are engendered by political processes that allow groups to pursue their own interests.

Most economic activity involves cross-border transactions at some point in the supply chain. The volumes reprinted here offer a wide range of perspectives on one of the most important areas of economics.

This new edition restructures and updates the political economy view of the responsibilities and limitations of government. Public-choice and behavioural concepts are prominent. Gender issues are included. Technical concepts are explained from first principles. Economic theory is rigorously applied. Excessive technicality is avoided. The book integrates traditional public finance topics - taxation, public goods, externalities, and income redistribution - with political self-interest, bureaucracy, voting, rent seeking, corruption, and the common-pool problem of public spending. Social justice is viewed as income equality, equality of opportunity, or the right to benefit from one's own effort. Public policies studied include the environment, education, health insurance, welfare payments and entitlements under moral hazard, unemployment insurance, paternalistic impositions, and defence and public safety. This book is ideal for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses that combine economic theory with a real-world perspective on the politics of public finance and public policy. A broad scope makes the book suitable for students in all countries.

The last survey of the rent-seeking literature took place more than a decade ago. Since that time a great deal of new research has been published in a wide variety of journals, covering a wide variety of topics. The scope of that research is such that very few researchers will be familiar with more than a small part of contemporary research, and very few libraries will be able to provide access to the full breadth of that research. This two-volume collection provides an extensive overview of 40 years of rent-seeking research. The volumes include the foundational papers, many of which have not been in print for two decades. They include recent game-theoretic analyses of rent-seeking contests and also appUcations of the rent-seeking concepts and methodology to economic regulation, international trade policy, economic history, poUtical com petition, and other social phenomena. The new collection is more than twice as large as any previous collection and both updates and extends the earUer surveys. Volume I contains previously pubhshed research on the theory of rent-seeking contests, which is an important strand of contemporary game theory. Volume II contains previously published research that uses the theory of rent-seeking to an alyze a broad range of public policy and social science topics. The editors spent more than a year assembling possible papers and, although the selections fill two large volumes, many more papers could have been included.

The last survey of the rent-seeking literature took place more than a decade ago. Since that time a great deal of new research has been published in a wide variety of journals, covering a wide variety of topics. The scope of that research is such that very few researchers will be familiar with more than a small part of contemporary research, and very few libraries will be able to provide access to the full breadth of that research. This two-volume collection provides an extensive overview of 40 years of rent-seeking research. The volumes include the foundational papers, many of which have not been in print for two decades. They include recent game-theoretic analyses of rent-seeking contests and also appHcations of the rent-seeking concepts and methodology to economic regulation, international trade policy, economic history, poUtical com petition, and other social phenomena. The new collection is more than twice as large as any previous collection and both updates and extends the earlier surveys. Volume I contains previously published research on the theory of rent-seeking contests, which is an important strand of contemporary game theory. Volume II contains previously pubHshed research that uses the theory of rent-seeking to an alyze a broad range of public policy and social science topics. The editors spent more than a year assembling possible papers and, although the selections fill two large volumes, many more papers could have been included."

This new edition restructures and updates the political economy view of the responsibilities and limitations of government. Public-choice and behavioural concepts are prominent. Gender issues are included. Technical concepts are explained from first principles. Economic theory is rigorously applied. Excessive technicality is avoided. The book integrates traditional public finance topics - taxation, public goods, externalities, and income redistribution - with political self-interest, bureaucracy, voting, rent seeking, corruption, and the common-pool problem of public spending. Social justice is viewed as income equality, equality of opportunity, or the right to benefit from one's own effort. Public policies studied include the environment, education, health insurance, welfare payments and entitlements under moral hazard, unemployment insurance, paternalistic impositions, and defence and public safety. This book is ideal for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses that combine economic theory with a real-world perspective on the politics of public finance and public policy. A broad scope makes the book suitable for students in all countries.

Arye L. Hillman There has been much economic theorizing directed at providing the politician with guidance in the design of policies that will amend market outcomes in ways that achieve specified efficiency or equity objectives. It has been common practice in economic models to portray the politician who implements the policy recommendations as a mechanistic individual who behaves as would a benevolent dictator to maximize a prespecified conception of social welfare or the utility of a representative consumer. The self-interest and discretion that is attributed to firms and consumers as optimizing agents is absent from the motives of such a politician. Economic policy choice is thereby depoliticized. How well depoliticized economic theory fares in explaining or predicting economic policy choice depends naturally enough upon how politicized is the economic system in which economic and political agents function. The papers in this volume recognize that politicians may exercise sufficient discretion so as not to behave mechanistically in correcting market inefficiencies or in pursuit of a somehow specified just income distribution. Since politicians are viewed as self-interested optimizing agents, just as are utility-maximizing consumers and profit-maximizing producers, the choice of economic policies is politicized. Coverage is provided of a broad spectrum of economic policy choice where markets and politicians interact. Section I is concerned with policy determination in western market economies, Section II with the introduction of markets into economies in transition from socialism, and Section III with international transactions.