This book is about the interweaving between cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of the two stages of perception, namely early and late vision, in justifying perceptual beliefs. It examines the impact of the epistemic role of perception in defining cognitive penetrability and the relation between the epistemic role of perceptual stages and the kinds (direct or indirect) of cognitive effects on perceptual processing. The book presents the argument that early vision is cognitively impenetrable because neither is it affected directly by cognition, nor does cognition affect its epistemic role. It also argues that late vision, even though it is cognitively penetrated and, thus, affected by concepts, is still a perceptual state that does not involve any discursive inferences and does not belong to the space of reasons. Finally, an account is given as to how cognitive states with symbolic content could affect perceptual states with iconic, analog content, during late vision.

According to the cognitive penetrability hypothesis, our beliefs, desires, and possibly our emotions literally affect how we see the world. This book elucidates the nature of the cognitive penetrability and impenetrability hypotheses, assesses their plausibility, and explores their philosophical consequences. It connects the topic's multiple strands (the psychological findings, computationalist background, epistemological consequences of cognitive architecture, and recent philosophical developments) at a time when the outcome of many philosophical debates depends on knowing whether and how cognitive states can influence perception. All sixteen chapters were written especially for the book. The first chapters provide methodological and conceptual clarification of the topic and give an account of the relations between penetrability, encapsulation, modularity, and cross-modal interactions in perception. Assessments of psychological and neuroscientific evidence for cognitive penetration are given by several chapters. Most of the contributions analyse the impact of cognitive penetrability and impenetrability on specific philosophical topics: high-level perceptual contents, the epistemological consequences of penetration, nonconceptual content, the phenomenology of late perception, metacognitive feelings, and action. The book includes a comprehensive introduction which explains the history of the debate, its key technical concepts (informational encapsulation, early and late vision, the perception-cognition distinction, hard-wired perceptual processing, perceptual learning, theory-ladenness), and the debate's relevance to current topics in the philosophy of mind and perception, epistemology, and philosophy of psychology.

One of the perennial themes in philosophy is the problem of our access to the world around us; do our perceptual systems bring us into contact with the world as it is or does perception depend upon our individual conceptual frameworks? This volume of new essays examines reference as it relates to perception, action and realism, and the questions which arise if there is no neutral perspective or independent way to know the world. The essays discuss the nature of referring, concentrating on the way perceptual reference links us with the observable world, and go on to examine the implications of theories of perceptual reference for realism and the way in which scientific theories refer and thus connect us with the world. They will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of psychology, cognitive science, and action theory.

One of the perennial themes in philosophy is the problem of our access to the world around us; do our perceptual systems bring us into contact with the world as it is or does perception depend upon our individual conceptual frameworks? This volume of new essays examines reference as it relates to perception, action and realism, and the questions which arise if there is no neutral perspective or independent way to know the world. The essays discuss the nature of referring, concentrating on the way perceptual reference links us with the observable world, and go on to examine the implications of theories of perceptual reference for realism and the way in which scientific theories refer and thus connect us with the world. They will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of psychology, cognitive science, and action theory.

Cognitive Developmental Change makes an original contribution to the fields of developmental, cognitive and educational science by bringing together a uniquely diverse range of perspectives for analysing the dynamics of change. Connecting traditional Piagetian, information processing, and psychometric approaches with newer frameworks and tools for the assessment and analysis of developmental change it provides the reader with a cutting-edge account of the latest theory and research. The contributors, all internationally respected experts, were asked when writing to consider three main aspects of cognitive change. Its object (what changes in the mind during development), its nature (how does change occur?) and its causes (why does change occur? Or, what are the internal and external factors responsible for cognitive change?). As a result chapters cover key theories of cognitive change, the factors that affect change including neurological, emotional and socio-cultural factors and the latest methods for measuring and modelling change.

Cognitive Developmental Change makes a fascinating contribution to the fields of developmental, cognitive and educational science by bringing together a uniquely diverse range of perspectives for analysing the dynamics of change. Connecting traditional Piagetian, information processing, and psychometric approaches with newer frameworks for the analysis of developmental change it provides the reader with an account of the latest theory and research at the time of publication. The contributors to the volume, all internationally respected experts, were asked when writing to consider three main aspects of cognitive change. Its object (what changes in the mind during development), its nature (how does change occur?) and its causes (why does change occur? Or, what are the internal and external factors responsible for cognitive change?). As a result chapters cover key theories of cognitive change, the factors that affect change including neurological, emotional and socio-cultural factors and methods for measuring and modelling change.