This volume of twenty-three essays by German and American historians deals with the most important issues of U.S. policy toward Germany in the decade following World War II: Germany's democratization, economic recovery, rearmament, and integration into the European community and Western alliance. All contributions to this volume are based on recent research in German and American archives, and include two comprehensive essays on archival sources and a selected bibliography. In contrast to most other studies, the essays cover not only the period of military government (1945-1949) but also the era of the Allied High Commission for Germany.

One of the largest twentieth century summit meetings, the Genoa Conference of 1922, was also a notable failure, due to the gulf between the Allies and Germany, between the West and Soviet Russia, and among the World War I victors and their small allies. This book, a unique international collaboration, presents various perspectives on the Genoa Conference: its leadership, goals, and outcome. The authors present new findings on such questions as the sensational Rapallo Treaty between Germany and Russia; the strategy of the small neutral powers; and the policy of the United States toward European debts. Readers will find contrasting as well as complementary views in this volume.

This volume of twenty-three essays by German and American historians deals with the most important issues of U.S. policy toward Germany in the decade following World War II: Germany's democratization, economic recovery, rearmament, and integration into the European community and Western alliance. All contributions to this volume are based on recent research in German and American archives, and include two comprehensive essays on archival sources and a selected bibliography. In contrast to most other studies, the essays cover not only the period of military government (1945-1949) but also the era of the Allied High Commission for Germany.

One of the largest twentieth century summit meetings, the Genoa Conference of 1922, was also a notable failure, due to the gulf between the Allies and Germany, between the West and Soviet Russia, and among the World War I victors and their small allies. This book, a unique international collaboration, presents various perspectives on the Genoa Conference: its leadership, goals, and outcome. The authors present new findings on such questions as the sensational Rapallo Treaty between Germany and Russia; the strategy of the small neutral powers; and the policy of the United States toward European debts. Readers will find contrasting as well as complementary views in this volume.