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This is a book on metaethics and moral epistemology. It asks two fundamental questions: (i) Is there any such thing as (non-relative) moral truth?; and (ii) If there is such truth, how do we come into epistemic contact with it? Roughly the first half of the book is aimed at answering the first question. Its animating idea is that we should take our ordinary, tutored moral judgments seriously-judgments typified by our conviction that it is clearly true that some acts, policies, social norms et al. are morally right or wrong, permissible or impermissible, praiseworthy or condemnable, etc., no matter when, where, or by whom they are performed. In order to provide a firm conceptual basis for such judgments, the book develops a theory of moral truth, based on a theory of moral facts. The account of moral truth and moral facts is further grounded on a theory of moral properties. In short, the book develops a theory of moral realism, roughly, the view that there are indeed non-relative, first-order moral truths. The second half of the book is aimed at answering the second question above. Building squarely on the metaethical theories developed earlier, the book argues for a non-empiricist theory of justified moral belief and knowledge. Pivotal to this project is a careful analysis of various forms of moral skepticism, by which I mean any conception of morality substantially at odds with the general contours of our ordinary moral thinking. All such skepticisms are rejected, and in their place a broadly intuitionist, epistemically fallibilist theory of moral knowledge is advanced. The conclusion reached is that we have very strong reason to believe that our ordinary moral thinking, although certainly liable to error, is fundamentally sound. Moral knowledge is ubiquitous.

This is a book on metaethics and moral epistemology. It asks two fundamental questions: (i) Is there any such thing as (non-relative) moral truth?; and (ii) If there is such truth, how do we come into epistemic contact with it? Roughly the first half of the book is aimed at answering the first question. Its animating idea is that we should take our ordinary, tutored moral judgments seriously-judgments typified by our conviction that it is clearly true that some acts, policies, social norms et al. are morally right or wrong, permissible or impermissible, praiseworthy or condemnable, etc., no matter when, where, or by whom they are performed. In order to provide a firm conceptual basis for such judgments, the book develops a theory of moral truth, based on a theory of moral facts. The account of moral truth and moral facts is further grounded on a theory of moral properties. In short, the book develops a theory of moral realism, roughly, the view that there are indeed non-relative, first-order moral truths. The second half of the book is aimed at answering the second question above. Building squarely on the metaethical theories developed earlier, the book argues for a non-empiricist theory of justified moral belief and knowledge. Pivotal to this project is a careful analysis of various forms of moral skepticism, by which I mean any conception of morality substantially at odds with the general contours of our ordinary moral thinking. All such skepticisms are rejected, and in their place a broadly intuitionist, epistemically fallibilist theory of moral knowledge is advanced. The conclusion reached is that we have very strong reason to believe that our ordinary moral thinking, although certainly liable to error, is fundamentally sound. Moral knowledge is ubiquitous.

This is a book on metaethics-in particular, an inquiry into the metaphysical foundations of morality. After carefully exploring the metaphysical commitments, or lack thereof, of the leading versions of moral anti-realism, Kulp develops a new and in-depth theory of moral realism. Starting with the firm recognition of the importance of our common sense belief that we possess a great deal of moral knowledge-that, for example, some acts are objectively right and some objectively wrong-the book goes on to examine the metaphysical grounds of various skeptical responses to this perspective. In great part, the book is devoted to developing a version of realist metaethics: specifically, developing in detail realist theories of moral truth, moral facts, and moral properties.Concluding with the rejection of prominent contemporary forms of moral anti-realism, Kulp presents a rigorous non-naturalistic theory of moral realism, and a vindication of the basic commitments of commonsense moral thought.

This is a book on metaethics-in particular, an inquiry into the metaphysical foundations of morality. After carefully exploring the metaphysical commitments, or lack thereof, of the leading versions of moral anti-realism, Kulp develops a new and in-depth theory of moral realism. Starting with the firm recognition of the importance of our common sense belief that we possess a great deal of moral knowledge-that, for example, some acts are objectively right and some objectively wrong-the book goes on to examine the metaphysical grounds of various skeptical responses to this perspective. In great part, the book is devoted to developing a version of realist metaethics: specifically, developing in detail realist theories of moral truth, moral facts, and moral properties.Concluding with the rejection of prominent contemporary forms of moral anti-realism, Kulp presents a rigorous non-naturalistic theory of moral realism, and a vindication of the basic commitments of commonsense moral thought.

Mit diesem Lehrbuch beabsichtigen die Verfasser, einen sy- stematischen Uberblick tiber die wichtigsten Probleme der sektoralen Wirtschaftspolitik zu geben. Der Schwerpunkt der Betrachtungsweise liegt hierbei in einer Anwendung der Er- kenntnisse der allgemeinen Wirtschaftstheorie. Die ersten vier Kapitel gehen der Frage nach, unter welchen Voraussetzungen sektorale Eingriffe in einer Marktwirtschaft gerechtfertigt erscheinen. Die folgenden Kapitel bringen eine Wirkungsanalyse der wichtigsten Instrumente der sektoralen Wirtschaftspolitik, wobei sich die Verfasser bemtiht haben, die einzelnen MaBnahmenkomplexe jeweils anhand eines Wirtschaftssektors darzustellen und zu diskutieren. Ftir die freundliche und aufopfemde Mitarbeit bei der Anfer- tigung der Manuskripte und Korrektur der Texte danken die Verfasser Frau G. Barle und Herm Dr. V. Laine. Die Verfasser Inhaltsverzeichnis 1 Einfohnmg.................. 1 1.1 Sektorale Wirtschaftspolitik als Mesopolitik 1 1.2 Zie1-versus Mitte10rientierung . . . . . . . 2 1.3 Die Unterscheidung nach funktionellen, regional en und personellen Kriterien . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.4 Die Bedeutung der sektoralen Wirtschaftspolitik in den einzelnen Wirtschaftsepochen . . . . . . . . 8 1.5 Die Ziele der sektoralen Wirtschaftspolitik . 11 1.6 Die Mittel der sektoralen Wirtschaftspolitik 15 1.7 Die Trager der sektoralen Wirtschaftspolitik 16 2 Rechifertigungsgriinde for politische Eingriffe: Unbefriedigende Allokationsergebnisse des Marktes 18 2.1 Meritorische Zielsetzungen ......... 20 2.2 Marktversagen: Fehlendes Gleichgewicht 22 2.3 Marktversagen: Labiles Gleichgewicht 27 2.4 Marktmangel: Exteme Effekte .... 36 2.5 Marktmangel: Monopolistische Macht 41 3 Rechifertigungsgriinde for politische Eingriffe: Unbefriedigende Verteilungsergebnisse des Marktes 44 3.1 Einfiihrung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 44 . . . . 3.2 Korrektur des Leistungsprinzips . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 46 .

This is a pre-1923 historical reproduction that was curated for quality. Quality assurance was conducted on each of these books in an attempt to remove books with imperfections introduced by the digitization process. Though we have made best efforts - the books may have occasional errors that do not impede the reading experience. We believe this work is culturally important and have elected to bring the book back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide.