Every year, states negotiate, conclude, sign, and give effect to hundreds of new international agreements. Koremenos argues that the detailed design provisions of such agreements matter for phenomena that scholars, policymakers, and the public care about: when and how international cooperation occurs and is maintained. Theoretically, Koremenos develops hypotheses regarding how cooperation problems like incentives to cheat can be confronted and moderated through law's detailed design provisions. Empirically, she exploits her data set composed of a random sample of international agreements in economics, the environment, human rights and security. Her theory and testing lead to a consequential discovery: considering the vagaries of international politics, international cooperation looks more law-like than anarchical, with the detailed provisions of international law chosen in ways that increase the prospects and robustness of cooperation. This nuanced and sophisticated 'continent of international law' can speak to scholars in any discipline where institutions, and thus institutional design, matter.

Every year, states negotiate, conclude, sign, and give effect to hundreds of new international agreements. Koremenos argues that the detailed design provisions of such agreements matter for phenomena that scholars, policymakers, and the public care about: when and how international cooperation occurs and is maintained. Theoretically, Koremenos develops hypotheses regarding how cooperation problems like incentives to cheat can be confronted and moderated through law's detailed design provisions. Empirically, she exploits her data set composed of a random sample of international agreements in economics, the environment, human rights and security. Her theory and testing lead to a consequential discovery: considering the vagaries of international politics, international cooperation looks more law-like than anarchical, with the detailed provisions of international law chosen in ways that increase the prospects and robustness of cooperation. This nuanced and sophisticated 'continent of international law' can speak to scholars in any discipline where institutions, and thus institutional design, matter.

The twentieth century witnessed an explosion of new nations carved out of existing ramshackle empires and multiethnic states. Many observers contend that the creation of new states will continue indefinitely, with the two hundred of today becoming the four hundred of tomorrow as more groups seek independence. This provocative and compelling book explores the impact of globalization and terrorism on this trend, arguing convincingly that the era of national self-determination has finally come to an end. Examining the forces that determine the emergence of new nation-states, the distinguished contributors consider a rich array of specific cases from the Middle East, Asia, North America, Europe, and Russia where new states could be created. They contend that globalization, rather than expanding such opportunities, is not as friendly to new weak states with limited resources as it is to established rich nations. Given the vast sums circulating in the world market, few fledgling nations can be financially independent. They find it more prudent to shelter within the protective embrace of existing federations. Equally, governments of federal states can induce restive petitioners_such as Quebec, Scotland, and the Basques_to remain inside the metropolitan boundary through a system of tangible restraints and rewards. Those who reject the benefits, such as rebels in Chechnya and Aceh, will fail in their bids for independence. Taiwan_poised on a knife-edge between integration with China and independence_faces a series of costs and diminished returns if it seeks full statehood. Finally, terrorism has lost its legitimacy as a technique for gaining independence in the eyes of the international community. Despite the stall in new state formation, there has been no sign of successful military or imperial expansion by established countries toward consolidation into fewer, larger national units. Neither aggression by regional states_such as the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990, nor intervention_such as the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003, are likely to succeed. On balance, the book concludes, discontented national movements will have to find ways to exist within current geopolitical boundaries.

The twentieth century witnessed an explosion of new nations carved out of existing ramshackle empires and multiethnic states. Many observers contend that the creation of new states will continue indefinitely, with the two hundred of today becoming the four hundred of tomorrow as more groups seek independence. This provocative and compelling book explores the impact of globalization and terrorism on this trend, arguing convincingly that the era of national self-determination has finally come to an end. Examining the forces that determine the emergence of new nation-states, the distinguished contributors consider a rich array of specific cases from the Middle East, Asia, North America, Europe, and Russia where new states could be created. They contend that globalization, rather than expanding such opportunities, is not as friendly to new weak states with limited resources as it is to established rich nations. Given the vast sums circulating in the world market, few fledgling nations can be financially independent. They find it more prudent to shelter within the protective embrace of existing federations. Equally, governments of federal states can induce restive petitioners such as Quebec, Scotland, and the Basques to remain inside the metropolitan boundary through a system of tangible restraints and rewards. Those who reject the benefits, such as rebels in Chechnya and Aceh, will fail in their bids for independence. Taiwan poised on a knife-edge between integration with China and independence faces a series of costs and diminished returns if it seeks full statehood. Finally, terrorism has lost its legitimacy as a technique for gaining independence in the eyes of the international community. Despite the stall in new state formation, there has been no sign of successful military or imperial expansion by established countries toward consolidation into fewer, larger national units. Neither aggression by regional states such as the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990, nor intervention such as the U.S. occupation"

International institutions vary widely in terms of key institutional features such as membership, scope, and flexibility. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal argue that this is so because international actors are goal-seeking agents who make specific institutional design choices to solve the particular cooperation problems they face in different issue-areas. Using a Rational Design approach, they explore five important features of institutions--membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility--and explain their variation in terms of four independent variables that characterize different cooperation problems: distribution, number of actors, enforcement, and uncertainty. The contributors to the volume then evaluate a set of conjectures in specific issue areas. (This book is Volume 55, part 4 of International Organization.)