This book reviews the experience of the textile and apparel sectors over the post-war period. An econometric study of the cost structure of the industry is undertaken to obtain inferences regarding the existence of structural change and the exact nature of any changes that occurred. A variety of approaches to modeling production technologies in both the textile and apparel sectors are considered. Our results confirm the existence of significant structural breaks which altered the nature of production technologies and economic relationships in these sectors. Our results indicate that a significant amount of labor, which became relatively more expensive as the economy developed after the Second World War, was replaced by capital in these sectors. Our results indicate that new technologies made it easier to substitute capital for labor. We also give attention to the important role played by textile and apparel imports over this period. Textile trade has traditionally been heavily regulated, most recently by the Multi-Fiber Arrangement of the GATT. Policy changes allowed greater access to developed country markets. This stimulated production in developing countries and thus enhanced the role of imports from developing countries. We argue that this stimulated the structural changes which led to, among other things, the release of labor from these sectors and the concomitant plant closings. These factors also stimulated capital deepening. Finally, we also consider the issue of substitutability among alternative forms of fibers in the textile sector. Our analysis quantifies demand relationships among natural and synthetic fibers. Our analysis reveals that structural changes often encouraged the use of synthetic fibers.

First Published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

As America debates the merits of government-provided health insurance, it is important to note that the U.S. government is already the largest insurance provider in the world. For decades, it has used taxpayer funds to support the world's largest health care insurance programs (Medicare and Medicaid) as well as the biggest pension and disability insurance system (Social Security). The recent economic crisis has prompted the government to dramatically increase its insurance role by assuming large equity positions in private firms and bailing out troubled mortgages buyers and sellers. Do these public insurance programs improve social welfare? Or does government intervention risk moral hazard and result in inefficient programs that would be better handled by the private sector? In Public Insurance and Private Markets, leading economists critically examine the government's role in insuring against pension fund shortfalls, crop losses, property damage from floods and other natural catastrophes, bank failure, and terrorism. Jeffrey R. Brown and his coauthors argue that government intervention must always be economically justified; that risk adjusted premiums are essential; that the true taxpayer burden for public insurance programs must be recognized; and that private markets are capable of transferring risk without government intervention. Poorly designed government insurance programs result in misallocation of resources, excessive risk-taking, and potentially enormous burdens on current and future taxpayers. Public Insurance and Private Markets offers market-based guidelines for the proper scope of government intervention and the design of public insurance programs guidelines that will benefit the U.S. economy and protect the resources of future generations.

From any coherent policy perspective, agricultural policy in the United States is in total disarray. Not surprisingly, persistent and pervasive rent-seeking by well-funded lobbies explains many of the complex and often internally inconsistent federal programs that fall under the umbrella of US agricultural policy. This two-volume examination of US agricultural policies includes analyses on the federal crop insurance program, the sugar program, constraints on domestic production, and policy-mandated price discrimination. Those subsidy programs and other forms of support are deliberately structured to funnel the vast majority of their benefits to large farm businesses and, in the case of agricultural insurance, an entire segment of the insurance industry that would not otherwise exist. They do nothing to alleviate rural poverty and in most cases encourage farm and other agricultural businesses to waste some of society’s scarce resources. Some federal programs do provide benefits for society as a whole. However, collusion among lobbies with competing interests has caused many of those programs to be inefficient. Agricultural Policy in Disarray provides fascinating, detailed, and contemporary evidence of how rent-seeking by small, well-organized interest groups results in government policies that do little good and much harm.

From any coherent policy perspective, agricultural policy in the United States is in total disarray. Not surprisingly, persistent and pervasive rent-seeking by well-funded lobbies explains many of the complex and often internally inconsistent federal programs that fall under the umbrella of US agricultural policy. This two-volume examination of US agricultural policies includes analyses on the federal crop insurance program, the sugar program, constraints on domestic production, and policy-mandated price discrimination. Those subsidy programs and other forms of support are deliberately structured to funnel the vast majority of their benefits to large farm businesses and, in the case of agricultural insurance, an entire segment of the insurance industry that would not otherwise exist. They do nothing to alleviate rural poverty and in most cases encourage farm and other agricultural businesses to waste some of society’s scarce resources. Some federal programs do provide benefits for society as a whole. However, collusion among lobbies with competing interests has caused many of those programs to be inefficient. Agricultural Policy in Disarray provides fascinating, detailed, and contemporary evidence of how rent-seeking by small, well-organized interest groups results in government policies that do little good and much harm.