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In recent decades normative reasons-considerations that count in
favor of one thing or another-have come to the theoretical fore in
ethics and epistemology. A major attraction of normative reasons is
that they have weight or strength. Reasons are particular
considerations that count in favor of actions or attitudes to some
degree. This feature is attractive to theorists who want to explain
more complex normative phenomena in terms of a notion that is
weighted. This volume aims to provide the beginnings for a theory
of weight. The fourteen new essays fall into three groups. One set
of essays addresses questions about the nature of weight. Topics
include the relations between reasons and conditions and modifiers,
between reasons and other weighted notions such as commitments, and
different models of the interaction of reasons. A second set of
essays addresses substantive questions: questions about weight
relevant to value-first, desire-first, evidence-first and other
normative research programs. A third set of essays applies issues
in the theory of weight to broader ethical debates. The book thus
not only makes novel contributions to debates in ethics and
epistemology about the nature of normative reasons and their
weight, it also makes a strong case for the theoretical
fruitfulness of the ideology of normative reasons.
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