The Middle East is an international flashpoint, a place where open warfare could erupt at any time. It is the home of numerous countries possessing some combination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons), and is an area where states are developing an increasing capability to deliver such WMD by missiles and/or aircraft. The Middle East is also the home of US friends who oppose each other as well as rogue states who are hostile to the United States. In short, the Middle East is a WMD war waiting to happen. Such a conflict would harm US allies and US interests; it needs to be avoided. Or, if WMD warfare occurs, such a conflict needs to be limited and the United States and allied forces need to be prepared to cope with the effects. The authors of this study address important questions that demand an answer if US national security policy is to be well informed.

This is a book about strategy and war fighting. It contains 11 essays which examine topics such as military operations against a well-armed rogue state, the potential of parallel warfare strategy for different kinds of states, the revolutionary potential of information warfare, the lethal possibilities of biological warfare and the elements of an ongoing revolution in military affairs. The purpose of the book is to focus attention on the operational problems, enemy strategies and threat that will confront U.S. national security decision makers in the twenty-first century.

On December 7, 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced that the United States was adding a military dimension to its fight to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The new program, called the Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI), provides funding to prepare for combating foes with nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) and missile weapons on future battlefields, improves monitoring for locating rival NBC/missile programs, improves theater defenses, and develops weapons capable of penetrating and destroying underground facilities. US efforts will include a diplomatic offensive to persuade US allies to take similar counter-proliferation steps. The central thrust of the CPI is to prepare US and allied forces for dealing with future enemies on the battlefield who are armed with weapons of mass destruction. An important secondary thrust of the CPI is to provide the Commander-in-Chief with the tools to disarm an adversary unilaterally if necessary, before the adversary can initiate the use of WMD in situations where we are on a collision course with such an enemy and no alternative course seems feasible. Numerous preemptive counter-proliferation strikes have taken place since 1940. Allied air forces and special operations forces destroyed German nuclear facilities and heavy water supplies that were an integral part of the Nazi A-bomb research effort. US bombers also destroyed the most important Japanese nuclear research laboratory in Tokyo at the end of WWII. Other raids include: Iran versus Iraq in 1980, Israel versus Iraq in 1981, Iraq versus Iran with seven raids from 1984 to 9188, and the US-led coalition versus Iraq in 1991. When deciding whether or not to use military action to remove a WMD capacity from a rival state, it is important that decision makers address a number of key questions, and ensure that answers to each are positive, before making PCP decisions: is the enemy undeterrable, violent, and a risk taker? Is the enemy on the WMD threshold or beyond it? Are vital US interest threatened? Are key enemy targets precisely located and vulnerable? Is surprise achievable? Does the US have a first strike capability? Is the US homeland safe from enemy WMD? Would the US and its allies be safe from retaliation from the WMD of third parties? Have all non-military options been exhausted before considering preemption? Does the US have clear objectives achievable by appropriate means? Is the US committing enough resources and is it taking all necessary steps to insure victory? Finally, a note of caution, PCP strikes against states armed with WMD had better work completely or they could spell disaster for the initiator.

The ten authors of the essays in this study examine issues that the US must address if its national security policy in the Middle East is to be well informed. In "NBC and Missile Proliferation in the Middle East," Lawrence Scheinman summarizes the nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons capabilities and missile systems of Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, and Syria. Scheinman argues that that stability in the region is best served by universal adherence to treaties to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Anthony R. Cordesman, in his essay "Recent Developments in the Persian Gulf," looks at both the conventional and WMD military balance between the states in the region. He assesses the volume of arms transfers to each state in the region and their impact on balance of power in the region. In "Arab Perspectives on Middle Eastern Security," Ibrahim A. Karawan, concludes that the lack of success in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East is not surprising. Karawan asserts that the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons among Arab and Middle East states is a natural deterrence response. Avner Cohen, in "Regional Security and Arms Control in the Middle East: The Nuclear Dimension," explains the diametrically opposite approaches taken by the two sides in the arms control and regional security negotiations. Cohen asserts that the future of nuclear arms control in the region will depend on progress toward the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the evolution of politics and society in states outside the region. In "The Egyptian-Israeli confrontation over the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty," W. Andrew Terrill compares and contrasts the Egyptian and Israeli views of how best to achieve a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.

A new threat is stalking nations, as terrorist organizations and rogue states alike appear intent on acquiring and using the "poor man's nuclear weapon": biological agents such as anthrax, smallpox, and plague. Attacks against Americans during the past dozen years may be an indication of more worrisome events to come. U.S. military forces in Japan were attacked in April of 1990 with botulinum toxin by the Aum Shinrikyo cult. Hundreds in Oregon were sickened with Salmonella after an attack in 1984. And small amounts of anthrax resulted in widespread panic and frequent evacuations across the United States in the fall of 2001. Ten experts discuss in detail the threats posed by bio-weapons and assess the current state of U.S. biological defenses. Chapters highlight the future prospects for biological warfare, bio-weapons in the Middle East, potential agroterrorism, the emerging bio-cruise missile threat, prevalent myths and likely scenarios, as well as the public health response. The promise of future world peace after World War II was quickly shattered by the Cold War. Indeed, the nuclear age was born at a time when the world seemed to be emerging from a dark past into a hopeful future. Are we to repeat history? With the end of the Cold War, does the future hold even greater threats? Or is an old threat merely resurfacing with a new level of lethality? This book should be required reading for anyone interested in national security, as well as concerned citizens who wish to know what form this new enemy may take and what can be done to stop it.

In December 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced the Counterproliferation Initiative, a response to President Clinton's assertion that if we do not stem the proliferation of the world's deadliest weapons, no democracy can feel secure. This timely book brings together contributions from a wide range of experts to help readers understand how far the nation has come since then—and what still needs to happen. Insightful essays examine: arms control treaty programs; export control regimes; interdiction; diplomatic/economic/political persuasion and sanctions; deterrence; counterforce; active and passive defense; and consequence management. Many positive changes have occurred since 1993. Regime changes in Iraq and South Africa have removed some WMD proliferation threats. Saddam Hussein has been overthrown, and a new Iraq is beginning to emerge. South Africa's clandestine WMD program has apparently ended. Libya announced it has given up its efforts to have active WMD programs. The Taliban and al Qaeda have been routed in Afghanistan, probably delaying efforts to develop or buy WMD. Yet, states continue to develop and export WMD and/or their delivery systems. As many as 30 states are still believed to have either a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons program. Some have all three. India and Pakistan have acknowledged programs. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the scientist who directed the Pakistani A-bomb program, has admitted selling nuclear weapons designs, and nuclear enrichment equipment to Libya, Iran, and North Korea. His colleagues have held discussions with al Qaeda representatives. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, number two in the al Qaeda chain of command, claims that the terrorist organization has several suitcase A-bombs from the Former Soviet Union. It appears clear to many that Iran has a desire to develop nuclear weapons. Syria still has a chemical weapons program. North Korea's WMD profile has escalated. As Avoiding the Abyss so convincingly demonstrates, much has been accomplished since the Counterproliferation Initiative was launched-but much work still lies ahead. It is an important story for every American.

A new threat is stalking nations, as terrorist organizations and rogue states alike appear intent on acquiring and using the poor man's nuclear weapon: biological agents such as anthrax, smallpox, and plague. Attacks against Americans during the past dozen years may be an indication of more worrisome events to come. U.S. military forces in Japan were attacked in April of 1990 with botulinum toxin by the Aum Shinrikyo cult. Hundreds in Oregon were sickened with Salmonella after an attack in 1984. And small amounts of anthrax resulted in widespread panic and frequent evacuations across the United States in the fall of 2001. Ten experts discuss in detail the threats posed by bio-weapons and assess the current state of U.S. biological defenses.

Chapters highlight the future prospects for biological warfare, bio-weapons in the Middle East, potential agroterrorism, the emerging bio-cruise missile threat, prevalent myths and likely scenarios, as well as the public health response. The promise of future world peace after World War II was quickly shattered by the Cold War. Indeed, the nuclear age was born at a time when the world seemed to be emerging from a dark past into a hopeful future. Are we to repeat history? With the end of the Cold War, does the future hold even greater threats? Or is an old threat merely resurfacing with a new level of lethality? This book should be required reading for anyone interested in national security, as well as concerned citizens who wish to know what form this new enemy may take and what can be done to stop it.

The United States faces a small number of rogue states that either have or are working to acquire weapons of mass destruction. These NASTIs, or NBC-Arming Sponsors of Terrorism and Intervention, include such states as North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria. U.S. nonproliferation programs and policies have helped to keep this number small, but U.S. and allied counterproliferation programs are essential to reduce the danger. It is up to deterrence, active defenses, passive defenses, decontamination, and counterforce to turn enemy weapons of mass destruction into instruments of limited destructive effect. Warfighters will also have to adopt a different strategy and concept of operations in fighting an adversary that is so heavily armed. This strategy will feature a combination of deception, dispersion, mobility and maneuver, diffused logistics, remote engagement, missile defense bubbles, non-combatant evacuation operations, and large area decontamination. It will also involve upgrades to NBC passive defense measures and equipment, as well as a counterforce capability that can find and destroy a variety of adversary targets, including mobile launchers and deeply buried and hardened underground structures.