The United States has gained considerable experience in nation-building operations through its participation in at least eight significant operations since World War II - in Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. These eight cases can be split into three distinct periods: the post - World War II cases of Germany and Japan under the administrations of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman; the post - Cold War cases of Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo under the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton; and the post-9/11 cases of Afghanistan and Iraq under the administration of George W. Bush. Exploring both the decision-making style and structure of government in the three periods can lead to a deeper understanding of American decision-making on, and the American capacity for, nation-building.This volume first discusses some general theories of administration, leadership, and authority in order to frame the empirical evidence on nation-building. Then, each period of nation-building is examined, focusing on operations, the distribution of responsibility, how U.S. efforts fit into larger international efforts, and the impact of the decision-making structures on the overall success of the operation. Finally, the authors combine theory and evidence to draw conclusions about the influence of decision-making style and structure on American nation-building.