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From the Subhdsitaratnakosa, Verse No. 1729: vahati na pural)
kascit pasclill na ko 'py anuyati mam na ca navapadak~ul)l)o
marga!) katham nv aham ekaka!) bhavatu viditam purvavyu
We are grateful to the authors who wrote papers specially for this
volume and kindly gave their permission for printing them together.
None of these papers appeared anywhere before. Our special thanks
are due to the first six authors who kindly responded to our
request and agreed to join this new venture which we are calling
'comparative perspective' in ana lytical philosophy. In the
introductory essay certain salient points from each paper have been
noted only to show how 'com parative perspective' may add to, and
be integrated with, mod ern philosophical discussion in the
analytic tradition. Need less to say, any mistake, possible
mis-attribution or misrepresentation of the views of the original
authors of the papers (appearing in the said introductory essay) is
entirely the responsibility of the author of that essay. The author
apologizes if there has been such unintentional misrepresenta tion
and insists that the readers should depend upon the orig inal
papers themselves for their own understanding. For typo graphical
problems it has not always been possible to use the symbols
originally used by the authors, but care has been taken to use the
proper substitute for each of them. Bimal K. Matilal ANALYTICAL
PHILOSOPHY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: AN INTRODUCTION 1. The aim
of this volume is to extend the horizon of philosophi cal analysis
as it is practiced today."
Never before, in any anthology, have contemporary epistemologists
and philosophers of language come together to address the single
most neglected important issue at the confluence of these two
branches of philosophy, namely: Can we know facts from reliable
reports? Besides Hume's subversive discussion of miracles and the
literature thereon, testimony has been bypassed by most Western
philosophers; whereas in classical Indian (Pramana) theories of
evidence and knowledge philosophical debates have raged for
centuries about the status of word-generated knowledge. Is the
response "I was told by an expert on the subject" as respectable as
"I saw" or "I inferred" in answer to "How do you know?"' is a
question answered in diverse and subtle ways by Buddhists,
Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas. For the first time this book makes
available the riches of those debates, translating from Sanskrit
some contemporary Indian Pandits' reactions to Western analytic
accounts of meaning and knowledge. For advanced undergraduates in
philosophy, for researchers - in Australia, Asia, Europe or America
- on epistemology, theory of meaning, Indian or comparative
philosophy, as well as for specialists interested in this
relatively fresh topic of knowledge transmission and epistemic
dependence this book will be a feast. After its publication
analytic philosophy and Indian philosophy will have no excuse for
shunning each other.
For the first time in recent history, seventeen scholars from
allover the world (India, Japan, Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada
and the United States) collaborated here to produce a volume
containing an in-depth study of Buddhist log ical theory in the
background of Buddhist epistemology. The Tibetan tradition
identifies this important chapter in the history of Buddhist
philosophy as the prama a school. It owes its origin to the
writings of the great Buddhist master, Dih naga (circa A. D.
480-540), whose influence was to spread far beyond India, as well
as to his celebrated interpreter of sev enth century A. D.,
Dharmakirti, whose texts presented the standard version of the
school for the later Buddhist and non Buddhist authors for a long
time. The history of Buddhist and Indian logical and epistemo
logical theories constitutes an interesting study not only for the
Buddhist scholars but also for philosophers as well as historians
of philosophy in general. Each author of this anthology combines
historical and philological scholarship with philosophical acumen
and linguistic insight. Each of them uses original textual (Tibetan
or Sanskirt) material to resolve logical issues and philosophical
questions. Attention has been focused upon two crucial
philosophical concepts: trairupya (the "triple" character of
evidence) and apoha (meaning as "exclusion"). Broadly the issues
are concerned with the problems of inductive logic and the problem
of mean ing and universals."
Never before, in any anthology, have contemporary epistemologists
and philosophers of language come together to address the single
most neglected important issue at the confluence of these two
branches of philosophy, namely: Can we know facts from reliable
reports? Besides Hume's subversive discussion of miracles and the
literature thereon, testimony has been bypassed by most Western
philosophers; whereas in classical Indian (Pramana) theories of
evidence and knowledge philosophical debates have raged for
centuries about the status of word-generated knowledge. Is the
response "I was told by an expert on the subject" as respectable as
"I saw" or "I inferred" in answer to "How do you know?"' is a
question answered in diverse and subtle ways by Buddhists,
Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas. For the first time this book makes
available the riches of those debates, translating from Sanskrit
some contemporary Indian Pandits' reactions to Western analytic
accounts of meaning and knowledge. For advanced undergraduates in
philosophy, for researchers - in Australia, Asia, Europe or America
- on epistemology, theory of meaning, Indian or comparative
philosophy, as well as for specialists interested in this
relatively fresh topic of knowledge transmission and epistemic
dependence this book will be a feast. After its publication
analytic philosophy and Indian philosophy will have no excuse for
shunning each other.
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