From the Subhdsitaratnakosa, Verse No. 1729: vahati na pural) kascit pasclill na ko 'py anuyati mam na ca navapadak~ul)l)o marga!) katham nv aham ekaka!) bhavatu viditam purvavyu

We are grateful to the authors who wrote papers specially for this volume and kindly gave their permission for printing them together. None of these papers appeared anywhere before. Our special thanks are due to the first six authors who kindly responded to our request and agreed to join this new venture which we are calling 'comparative perspective' in ana lytical philosophy. In the introductory essay certain salient points from each paper have been noted only to show how 'com parative perspective' may add to, and be integrated with, mod ern philosophical discussion in the analytic tradition. Need less to say, any mistake, possible mis-attribution or misrepresentation of the views of the original authors of the papers (appearing in the said introductory essay) is entirely the responsibility of the author of that essay. The author apologizes if there has been such unintentional misrepresenta tion and insists that the readers should depend upon the orig inal papers themselves for their own understanding. For typo graphical problems it has not always been possible to use the symbols originally used by the authors, but care has been taken to use the proper substitute for each of them. Bimal K. Matilal ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: AN INTRODUCTION 1. The aim of this volume is to extend the horizon of philosophi cal analysis as it is practiced today."

Never before, in any anthology, have contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of language come together to address the single most neglected important issue at the confluence of these two branches of philosophy, namely: Can we know facts from reliable reports? Besides Hume's subversive discussion of miracles and the literature thereon, testimony has been bypassed by most Western philosophers; whereas in classical Indian (Pramana) theories of evidence and knowledge philosophical debates have raged for centuries about the status of word-generated knowledge. Is the response "I was told by an expert on the subject" as respectable as "I saw" or "I inferred" in answer to "How do you know?"' is a question answered in diverse and subtle ways by Buddhists, Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas. For the first time this book makes available the riches of those debates, translating from Sanskrit some contemporary Indian Pandits' reactions to Western analytic accounts of meaning and knowledge. For advanced undergraduates in philosophy, for researchers - in Australia, Asia, Europe or America - on epistemology, theory of meaning, Indian or comparative philosophy, as well as for specialists interested in this relatively fresh topic of knowledge transmission and epistemic dependence this book will be a feast. After its publication analytic philosophy and Indian philosophy will have no excuse for shunning each other.

For the first time in recent history, seventeen scholars from allover the world (India, Japan, Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States) collaborated here to produce a volume containing an in-depth study of Buddhist log ical theory in the background of Buddhist epistemology. The Tibetan tradition identifies this important chapter in the history of Buddhist philosophy as the prama a school. It owes its origin to the writings of the great Buddhist master, Dih naga (circa A. D. 480-540), whose influence was to spread far beyond India, as well as to his celebrated interpreter of sev enth century A. D., Dharmakirti, whose texts presented the standard version of the school for the later Buddhist and non Buddhist authors for a long time. The history of Buddhist and Indian logical and epistemo logical theories constitutes an interesting study not only for the Buddhist scholars but also for philosophers as well as historians of philosophy in general. Each author of this anthology combines historical and philological scholarship with philosophical acumen and linguistic insight. Each of them uses original textual (Tibetan or Sanskirt) material to resolve logical issues and philosophical questions. Attention has been focused upon two crucial philosophical concepts: trairupya (the "triple" character of evidence) and apoha (meaning as "exclusion"). Broadly the issues are concerned with the problems of inductive logic and the problem of mean ing and universals."

Never before, in any anthology, have contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of language come together to address the single most neglected important issue at the confluence of these two branches of philosophy, namely: Can we know facts from reliable reports? Besides Hume's subversive discussion of miracles and the literature thereon, testimony has been bypassed by most Western philosophers; whereas in classical Indian (Pramana) theories of evidence and knowledge philosophical debates have raged for centuries about the status of word-generated knowledge. Is the response "I was told by an expert on the subject" as respectable as "I saw" or "I inferred" in answer to "How do you know?"' is a question answered in diverse and subtle ways by Buddhists, Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas. For the first time this book makes available the riches of those debates, translating from Sanskrit some contemporary Indian Pandits' reactions to Western analytic accounts of meaning and knowledge. For advanced undergraduates in philosophy, for researchers - in Australia, Asia, Europe or America - on epistemology, theory of meaning, Indian or comparative philosophy, as well as for specialists interested in this relatively fresh topic of knowledge transmission and epistemic dependence this book will be a feast. After its publication analytic philosophy and Indian philosophy will have no excuse for shunning each other.