Neo-classical economics, with its emphasis on general equilibrium, has developed a tightly-knit group of theories of great rigour. However, it lacks a conceptualization of organization, institutions, structure and change and has virtually nothing to say about the role of norms and rules in economic behaviour. Such notions are of great significance in institutional economics, with its emphasis on property rights, contract and organizational forms. But institutional economics lacks the rigour and elegance of general equilibrium theory. "Rationality, Institutions and Economic Methodology" looks at ways to increase the scope and power of institutional economics. Different approaches to economic methodology are considered and the broader notions of rationality offered by institutional economics are discussed, as are the methodological problems of evolutionary and institutional change.

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The market does not spontaneously generate democratic or participatory economic institutions. This book asks whether a modern, efficient economy can be rendered democratically accountable and, if so, what strategic changes might be required to regulate the market-mediated interaction of economic agents. The contributors bring contemporary microeconomic theory to bear on a range of related issues, including the relationship between democratic firms and efficiency in market economies; incentives and the relative merits of various forms of internal democratic decision-making; and the effects of democratically accountable firms on innovation, saving, investment, and on the informational and disciplinary aspects of markets. Various approaches to the study of economic interaction (game theory, transactions' cost analysis, social choice theory, rent-seeking, etc.) are considered in an attempt to understand the relationship between power and efficiency in market economies.

In general terms, one way of describing the world we live in is to say that it is made up of nature and society, and that human beings belong to both. This was the first volume to be published which addresses the historical contexts of the relations between these two characteristics of human nature. A distinguished international team aims to contribute - through selective, interdisciplinary studies - to a much-needed but currently scant debate over the reciprocal links between conceptions of nature and conceptions of society from the ancient Greek kosmos to late twentieth-century 'ecology'. Individual essays and the general conclusions of the volume are important not only for our understanding of the evolution of knowledge of nature and of society, but also for an awareness of the types of truth and perception produced in the process.

In general terms, one way of describing the world we live in is to say that it is made up of nature and society, and that human beings belong to both. This is the first volume to be published that addresses the historical contexts of the relations between these two characteristics of human nature. Individual essays and the general conclusions of the volume are important not only for our understanding of the evolution of knowledge of nature and of society, but also for an awareness of the types of truth and perception produced in the process.

The market does not spontaneously generate democratic or participatory economic institutions. This book asks whether a modern, efficient economy can be rendered democratically accountable and, if so, what strategic changes might be required to regulate the market-mediated interaction of economic agents. The contributors bring contemporary microeconomic theory to bear on a range of related issues, including the relationship between democratic firms and efficiency in market economies; incentives and the relative merits of various forms of internal democratic decision-making; and the effects of democratically accountable firms on innovation, saving, investment, and on the informational and disciplinary aspects of markets. Various approaches to the study of economic interaction (game theory, transactions' cost analysis, social choice theory, rent-seeking, etc.) are considered in an attempt to understand the relationship between power and efficiency in market economies.