|
Showing 1 - 5 of
5 matches in All Departments
What determines whether an action is right or wrong? One appealing
idea is that a moral code ought to contain a number of rules that
tell people how to behave and that are simple and few enough to be
easily learned. Another appealing idea is that the consequences of
actions matter, often more than anything else. Rule
consequentialism tries to weave these two ideas into a general
theory of morality. This theory holds that morally wrong actions
are the ones forbidden by rules whose acceptance would maximize the
overall good. Morality, Rules, and Consequences: A Critical Reader
explores for students and researchers the relationship between
consequentialist theory and moral rules. Most of the chapters focus
on rule consequentialism or on the distinction between act and rule
versions of consequentialism. Contributors, among them the leading
philosophers in the discipline, suggest ways of assessing whether
rule consequentialism could be a satisfactory moral theory. These
essays, all of which are previously unpublished, provide students
in moral philosophy with essential material and ask key questions
on just what the criteria for an adequate moral theory might be.
Thinking about Reasons is a collection of fourteen new essays on
topics in ethics and the philosophy of action, inspired in one way
or another by the work of Jonathan Dancy-one of his generation's
most influential moral philosophers. Many of the most influential
living thinkers in the area are contributors to this collection,
which also contains an autobiographical afterword by Dancy himself.
Topics discussed in this volume include: * the idea that the facts
that explain action are non-psychological ones * buck passing
theories of goodness and rightness * the idea that some moral
reasons justify action without requiring it * the particularist
idea that there are no true informative moral principles * the idea
that egoism and impartial consequentialism are self-defeating * the
idea that moral reasons are dependent on either impersonal value,
or benefits to oneself, or benefits to those with whom one has some
special connection, but not on deontological constraints * the idea
that we must distinguish between reasons and enablers, disablers,
intensifiers, and attenuators of reasons * the idea that, although
the lived ethical life is shaped by standing commitments,
uncodifable judgement is at least sometimes needed to resolve what
to do when these commitments conflict * the idea that the value of
a whole need not be a mathematical function of the values of the
parts of that whole * the idea that practical reasoning is based on
inference the idea that there cannot be irreducibly normative
properties.
Does human well-being consist in pleasure, the satisfaction of
desires, or some set of goods such as knowledge, friendship, and
accomplishment? Does being moral contribute to well-being, and is
there a conflict between people's self-interest and the moral
demands on them? Are the values of well-being and of morality
measurable? Are such values objective? What is the relation between
such values and the natural world? And how much can philosophical
theory help us in our answers to these and similar questions?
Issues such as these provide the focus for much of the work of
James Griffin, White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford, in
whose honour Well-Being and Morality has been prepared. They are
also among the main topics of these fourteen new essays by an
international array of leading philosophers. Professor Griffin
himself provides a further discussion of central themes in his
thought, specially written in response to contributions to this
volume.
Ideal Code, Real World is a powerful presentation of rule-consequentialism, an ethical theory of which Brad Hooker is a leading contemporary exponent. According to rule-consequentialism, acts are to be assessed in terms of rules, and rules are to be assessed by their consequences. Hooker starts by establishing appropriate criteria for assessing a theory of morality. He then sets out his rule-consequentialism, discusses criticisms and rival theories, and considers implications of the theory for practical issues.
Twelve new essays by a distinguished international team of contributors, including some of the leading moral philosophers of the day, debate the plausibility of moral particularism. This will be the starting-point for all future discussion of the topic, and compelling reading for all who work in moral philosophy.
|
|